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Full-Text Articles in Law
Playing Favorites With Shareholders, Stephen J. Choi, Eric Talley
Playing Favorites With Shareholders, Stephen J. Choi, Eric Talley
Faculty Scholarship
One of the most vexing historical debates in corporate law concerns whether regulations or markets are better equipped to address managerial agency costs within public corporations. Although corporate law scholars have traditionally favored immutable legal imperatives as an elixir for misaligned incentives,an increasing number of commentators place greater faith in market mechanisms to accomplish the same task. While many such mechanisms operate simultaneously (including markets for output, labor, and capital), perhaps none has received more attention than the oft-celebrated "market for corporate control" as a means for achieving deterrence. By providing a constant and credible risk of hostile acquisitions, the …
The Evolution Of Corporate Law: A Cross- Country Comparison, Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Mark D. West
The Evolution Of Corporate Law: A Cross- Country Comparison, Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Mark D. West
Faculty Scholarship
The importance of law and legal institutions for economic development is widely acknowledged today. The invention of credit mechanisms to support long-distance trade has been hailed as one of the preconditions for the development of capitalism in Europe. The corporate form is regarded as another milestone for industrialization, the creation of viable market economies, and ultimately economic prosperity. Many former socialist countries quickly enacted new corporate codes or revived their pre-World War Two ("WWII") legislation. The failure of major privatization efforts to enhance enterprise efficiency is attributed to weaknesses in corporate governance, of which the corporate law is a crucial …
Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, Jennifer H. Arlen, Matthew L. Spitzer, Eric L. Talley
Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, Jennifer H. Arlen, Matthew L. Spitzer, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Behavioral economics is an increasingly prominent field within corporate law scholarship. A particularly noteworthy behavioral bias is the "endowment effect" – the observed differential between an individual's willingness to pay to obtain an entitlement and her willingness to accept to part with one. Should endowment effects pervade corporate contexts, they would significantly complicate much common wisdom within business law, such as the presumed optimality of ex ante agreements. Existing research, however, does not adequately address the extent to which people manifest endowment effects within agency relationships. This article presents an experimental test for endowment effects for subjects situated in an …