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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
An Aggregate Approach To Antitrust: Using New Data And Rulemaking To Preserve Drug Competition, C. Scott Hemphill
An Aggregate Approach To Antitrust: Using New Data And Rulemaking To Preserve Drug Competition, C. Scott Hemphill
Center for Contract and Economic Organization
This Article examines the "aggregation deficit" in antitrust: the pervasive lack of information, essential to choosing an optimal antitrust rule, about the frequency and costliness of anticompetitive activity. By synthesizing available information, the present analysis helps close the information gap for an important, unresolved issue in U.S. antitrust policy: patent settlements between brand-name drug makers and their generic rivals. The analysis draws upon a new dataset of 143 such settlements.
Due to the factual complexity of individual brand-generic settlements, important trends and arrangements become apparent only when multiple cases are examined collectively. This aggregate approach provides valuable information that can …
Corporate Law And Governance, Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, Ailsa Röell
Corporate Law And Governance, Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, Ailsa Röell
Center for Contract and Economic Organization
This chapter surveys the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate law and governance, discusses the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examines the comparative governance literature. Corporate governance is concerned with the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders and the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors. A fundamental dilemma of corporate governance emerges from this overview: large shareholder intervention needs to be regulated to guarantee better small investor protection; but this may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse. Alternative methods of limiting abuse have yet to be …
An Introduction To The Governance And Taxation Of Not-For-Profit Organizations, Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran
An Introduction To The Governance And Taxation Of Not-For-Profit Organizations, Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran
Center for Contract and Economic Organization
This paper provides a brief overview of the current state of the not-for-profit sector and discusses specific governance issues in not-for-profit organizations. We offer an in-depth analysis of the issues that arise when not-for-profit organizations compete against for-profit firms in the same markets. We argue that while competition by for-profit firms can discipline not-for-profit firms and mitigate their governance problems, the effects of this competition are distorted by the not-for-profits’ corporate income tax exemptions. Based on a simple general equilibrium analysis, we argue that there is little justification for such exemptions.
Pay For Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation In Speculative Markets, Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman, Wei Xiong
Pay For Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation In Speculative Markets, Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman, Wei Xiong
Center for Contract and Economic Organization
We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets.