Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Attorney’s fees; Bankruptcy attorneys; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978; Baker Botts v. ASARCO; L.L.C.; Fee applications; Prejudicial treatment; United States Trustee; Bankruptcy Code Section 330; Bankruptcy Code Section 328; Administrative expense; Reasonable fees; Actual and necessary services; Supreme Court; Fee-defense litigation; Frivolous litigation; Quantum meruit; Lodestar Method; Hindsight approach; Hybrid approach; Statutory interpretation; Underlying benefit; Enhanced fees; The American Rule; Fee-shifting; Bad faith exception to the American Rule; Higher standard (1)
- Authority (1)
- BRRD (1)
- Bank resolution (1)
- Bankruptcy Law (1)
-
- Bankruptcy Law; Stern v. Marshall; Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison; Wellness International Network; Ltd. V. Sharif; Supreme Court; Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7012(b); Balancing test; Core claims and non-core claims; Jurisdiction; Competency; Implied consent; Federal Judgeship Act of 1984; Non-Article III Courts; Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.; Statutory authority; Counterclaims; Adjuncts of district courts; Stern Claim; Stern Gap; Intermediary claims; Knowing and voluntary; Legislative history; Private or Public rights (1)
- Delegation (1)
- EBA (1)
- ECJ (1)
- EU (1)
- Enforcement powers (1)
- European Banking Authority (1)
- European Commission (1)
- European Court of Justice (1)
- European Union (1)
- Foreign Law (1)
- Harmonization (1)
- Incentive misalignment (1)
- Incentive realignment (1)
- Legal contestation (1)
- Legal framework (1)
- Member state (1)
- Meroni & Co. v. High Authority of the European Coal & Steel Community (1)
- National resolution authority (1)
- Quasi-powers (1)
- Regime (1)
- SRB (1)
- SRM (1)
- Short Selling Regulation (1)
- Single Resolution Board (1)
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Understanding Wellness International Network, Ltd. V. Sharif: The Problems With Allowing Parties To Impliedly Consent To Bankruptcy Court Adjudication Of Stern Claims, Elizabeth Jackson
Understanding Wellness International Network, Ltd. V. Sharif: The Problems With Allowing Parties To Impliedly Consent To Bankruptcy Court Adjudication Of Stern Claims, Elizabeth Jackson
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
The 2011 Supreme Court case Stern v. Marshall defined which claims bankruptcy courts had the authority to adjudicate, but it’s complicated holding left lower courts perplexed. Specifically, the Stern decision created “Stern claims”—claims that bankruptcy courts have the statutory, but not the constitutional, authority to adjudicate. Subsequent cases, such as Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, have grappled with whether Stern claims should be treated as “core” claims, which bankruptcy courts can enter final judgments on, or “non-core” claims, which bankruptcy courts can only enter final judgments on if the litigating parties consent. …
Bankruptcy: Where Attorneys Can Lose Big Even If They Win Big, Stanislav Veyber
Bankruptcy: Where Attorneys Can Lose Big Even If They Win Big, Stanislav Veyber
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Historically, bankruptcy attorneys received the short end of the stick and were paid less for their services than attorneys in other fields of law. With the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress attempted to reduce the discrepancy in compensation. However, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker Botts v. ASARCO; L.L.C., the playing field remains unequal for bankruptcy attorneys. Following this decision, if a debtor disputes their attorney’s fee application, attorneys are at a disadvantage and cannot recover fees for defending their fee application. As a result, bankruptcy attorneys take an effective pay cut if they are faced with a …
Regulatory Incentive Realignment And The Eu Legal Framework Of Bank Resolution, Andromachi Georgosouli
Regulatory Incentive Realignment And The Eu Legal Framework Of Bank Resolution, Andromachi Georgosouli
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Risks associated with incentive misalignment are liable to seriously jeopardize the effectiveness of bank resolution, when not properly contained. This Article considers the management of misaligned incentives between regulators that are found in a vertical relationship of public governance. Using the EU legal framework of bank resolution as its case study, this Article explores the effectiveness of the quasi-enforcement powers of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and, where relevant, of the European Banking Authority (EBA) as an incentive realignment legal technique. Two principal difficulties are identified: on the one hand, the problematic interinstitutional dynamic of the SRB and the EBA …