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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies Under The Issuer Pay Model Through A Mandatory Compensation Competition, Robert J. Rhee
Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies Under The Issuer Pay Model Through A Mandatory Compensation Competition, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
Credit rating agencies are important institutions of the global capital markets. If they had performed properly, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 would not have occurred. This article offers the simplest fix proposed thus far, and it is contrarian. This Article accepts the central role of rating agencies in the regulation of bond investments, the realities of a duopoly, and the issuer-pay model of compensation. The status quo is the baseline. The role of regulation should be to create the conditions necessary to induce competition. This article proposes that a small, recurring portion of revenue earned by the largest rating agencies …
Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies Under The Issuer Pay Model Through A Mandatory Compensation Competition, Robert J. Rhee
Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies Under The Issuer Pay Model Through A Mandatory Compensation Competition, Robert J. Rhee
Faculty Scholarship
Credit rating agencies are important institutions of the global capital markets. If they had performed properly, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 would not have occurred. This article offers the simplest fix proposed thus far, and it is contrarian. This Article accepts the central role of rating agencies in the regulation of bond investments, the realities of a duopoly, and the issuer-pay model of compensation. The status quo is the baseline. The role of regulation should be to create the conditions necessary to induce competition. This article proposes that a small, recurring portion of revenue earned by the largest rating agencies …
Drastic Times Call For Drastic Risk Measures: Why Value-At-Risk Is (Still) A Flawed Preventative Of Financial Crises And What Regulators Can Do About It, Andrew L. Mcelroy
Drastic Times Call For Drastic Risk Measures: Why Value-At-Risk Is (Still) A Flawed Preventative Of Financial Crises And What Regulators Can Do About It, Andrew L. Mcelroy
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
Bank regulators recently proposed the most fundamental reforms to U.S. banking law in decades, yet the value-at-risk statistic--replete with known deficiencies--remains the basis of the capital adequacy requirement. Consequently, there exists an unresolved tension in the law: the purpose of the banking rules is to require riskier financial institutions to hold additional capital, yet the value-at-risk statistic used to make this assessment induces a perverse incentive to hold the riskiest securities. Overlaid on this framework is the wide latitude afforded to banks in designing their value-at-risk models. This Article explores foreseeable issues with the regulatory reliance on value-at-risk. Moreover, it …
Extraterritorial Impacts Of Recent Financial Regulation Reforms: A Complex World Of Global Finance, Lawrence G. Baxter
Extraterritorial Impacts Of Recent Financial Regulation Reforms: A Complex World Of Global Finance, Lawrence G. Baxter
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Impact Of Income Disparity On Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz
The Impact Of Income Disparity On Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
A Return To Old-Time Religion? The Glass-Steagall Act, The Volcker Rule, Limits On Proprietary Trading, And Sustainability, Douglas M. Branson
A Return To Old-Time Religion? The Glass-Steagall Act, The Volcker Rule, Limits On Proprietary Trading, And Sustainability, Douglas M. Branson
Articles
Pursuant to directions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), five federal agencies collaborated to produce a 983 page rule limiting proprietary trading by financial institutions (the Volcker Rule, which becomes effective in summer, 2015). The Volcker Rule limits proprietary trading to no more than 3 percent of “Tier One” assets. The hoped for effects are that financial institutions will be strictly limited in trading for their own accounts. Some say, propelled by unbridled greed, U.S. financial institutions borrowed excessive amounts of money, inflating leverage ratios as high as 36 or 40 to 1, using the borrowed funds to engage in …
Big Banks And Business Method Patents, Megan M. La Belle, Heidi Mandanis Schooner
Big Banks And Business Method Patents, Megan M. La Belle, Heidi Mandanis Schooner
Scholarly Articles
The banking industry and the patent system are longstanding American institutions whose histories date back to the founding of this country. Historically, however, the paths of these two institutions rarely crossed. Although financial firms have been increasing their innovative output for decades now, until recently they relied on trade secrecy, first mover advantages, and other business mechanisms to protect and monetize their intellectual property — not patents.
Through a convergence of circumstances over the past several years, that pattern has changed. The shift began when the Federal Circuit decided that business methods — banks’ primary mode of innovation — are …
Improving Hedge Fund Governance, Houman B. Shadab
Improving Hedge Fund Governance, Houman B. Shadab
Articles & Chapters
This Article provides the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the internal governance of hedge funds. Hedge fund governance consists of the funds’ underlying legal regime and the practices they adopt in response to lacking permanent capital and to reduce agency costs. Hedge fund governance is important because better governance can improve investor returns and help managers raise and retain capital. I argue that hedge fund governance is best understood as a type of responsive managerialism. It is a type of managerialism because applicable law and contracting structures give managers uniquely wide-ranging control over the fund and its operations. Hedge fund …
Who's In Charge Of Global Finance?, Michael S. Barr
Who's In Charge Of Global Finance?, Michael S. Barr
Articles
The global financial crisis caused widespread harm not just to the financial system, but also to millions of households and businesses and to the global economy. The crisis revealed substantive, fundamental weaknesses in global financial regulation and raised serious questions about whether national regulators and the international financial regulatory system could ever be up to the task of overseeing global finance. This Article analyzes post-crisis reforms with two questions in mind: First, how can we build an effective international financial architecture with more than one architect? Second, can we build a system that is legitimate and accountable? The Article suggests …