Law Commons^™

Commentary: Why We Need To Stop Fining Big Banks Like Wells Fargo, Mehrsa Baradaran

Popular Media

When big banks behave badly, they know that the worst thing they’ll get is a fine; no one is going to end up in jail. Instead, shareholders end up paying the cost, not the bank employees responsible. Shareholders are a diffuse group of investors, many of whom hold shares as a part of a diverse portfolio. They are not the ones who commit such fraud, nor do they have much power to change the bank’s day-to-day operations.

Clearly fines don’t work to prevent misconduct. We should instead rely on the constitutional method of dealing with wrongdoing: the criminal justice system.

A Bridge Over Troubled Waters - Resolving Bank Financial Distress In Canada, Janis P. Sarra

All Faculty Publications

Effective June 2017, Canada formalized its new resolution regime for “domestic systemically important banks”. This article examines the new resolution regime in the context of the early intervention program by the financial services regulator. The system offers a complex but integrated set of mechanisms to monitor the financial health of financial institutions, to intervene at an early stage of financial distress, and to resolve the financially distressed bank in a timely manner. Resolution is the restructuring of a financially distressed or insolvent bank by a designated authority. To “resolve” a bank is to use a series of tools under banking …

Court Capture, Jonas Anderson

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Capture — the notion that a federal agency can become controlled by the industry the agency is supposed to be regulating — is a fundamental concern for administrative law scholars. Surprisingly, however, no thorough treatment of how capture theory applies to the federal judiciary has been done. The few scholars who have attempted to apply the insights of capture theory to federal courts have generally concluded that the federal courts are insulated from capture concerns.

This Article challenges the notion that the federal courts cannot be captured. It makes two primary arguments. As an initial matter, this Article makes the …

Corporate Governance Reform In Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two Fundamental Tensions, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

The manner in which financial firms are governed directly impacts the stability and sustainability of both the financial sector and the "real" economy, as the financial crisis and associated regulatory reform efforts have tragically demonstrated. However, two fundamental tensions continue to complicate efforts to reform corporate governance in post-crisis financial firms. The first relates to reliance on increased equity capital as a buffer against shocks and a means of limiting leverage. The tension here arises from the fact that no corporate constituency desires risk more than equity does, and that risk preference only tends to be stronger in banks, and …

Regulating Robo Advice Across The Financial Services Industry, Tom Baker, Benedict G. C. Dellaert

All Faculty Scholarship

Automated financial product advisors – “robo advisors” – are emerging across the financial services industry, helping consumers choose investments, banking products, and insurance policies. Robo advisors have the potential to lower the cost and increase the quality and transparency of financial advice for consumers. But they also pose significant new challenges for regulators who are accustomed to assessing human intermediaries. A well-designed robo advisor will be honest and competent, and it will recommend only suitable products. Because humans design and implement robo advisors, however, honesty, competence, and suitability cannot simply be assumed. Moreover, robo advisors pose new scale risks that …

The Money Problem: A Rejoinder, Morgan Ricks

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Let me begin by thanking Yuri Biondi and Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium for hosting this book review symposium. It is a privilege to have my book reviewed by this distinguished roster of experts. Since the book's publication I have had some time to reflect on its strengths and weaknesses. Unsurprisingly, the reviewers in this issue have identified a number of the book's more glaring shortcomings. But it relieves me to say that I don't think the book's key arguments have (yet) sustained any mortal wounds, even if solid blows have been landed.

The basic thesis of The Money …

Too-Big-To-Fail Shareholders, Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

To build resilience within the financial system, post-Crisis regulation relies heavily on banks to fund themselves more fully by issuing equity. This reserve of value should buttress failing banks by providing a mechanism to pay off creditors and depositors and preserve the health of financial markets. In the process, shareholders are wiped out. Scholars and policymakers, however, have neglected to examine which equity investors, in fact, are purchasing bank equity and taking on the default risk of U.S. banks. This Article addresses this question. First, it shows that five asset managers - BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street Global Advisors, Fidelity and …