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Banking and Finance Law

Seattle University Law Review

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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Alarming Legality Of Security Manipulation Through Shareholder Proposals, Artem M. Joukov, Samantha M. Caspar Jan 2021

The Alarming Legality Of Security Manipulation Through Shareholder Proposals, Artem M. Joukov, Samantha M. Caspar

Seattle University Law Review

Shareholder proposals attract attention from scholars in finance and economics because they present an opportunity to study both quasidemocratic decision-making at the corporate level and the impact of this decision-making on firm outcomes. These studies capture the effect of various proposals but rarely address whether regulations should allow many of them in the first place due to the possibility of stock price manipulation. Recent changes to shareholder proposal rules, adopted in September 2020, sought to address the potential for exploitation that some proposals create (but ultimately failed to do so). This Article shows the potential for apparently legal stock price …


The Problem With Predators, June Carbone, William K. Black Feb 2020

The Problem With Predators, June Carbone, William K. Black

Seattle University Law Review

Both corporate theory and sex discrimination law start with presumptions that CEOs seek to advance legitimate ends and design the internal organization of business enterprises to achieve such ends. Yet, a growing literature questions why CEOs and boards of directors nonetheless select for Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and toxic masculinity, despite the downsides associated with these traits. Three scholarly literatures—economics, criminology, and gender theory—draw on advances in psychology to shed new light on the construction of seemingly dysfunctional corporate cultures. They start by questioning the assumption that CEOs—even CEOs of seemingly mainstream businesses—necessarily seek to advance “legitimate” ends. Instead, they suggest …


Developing Fiduciary Culture In Vietnam, Brian Jm Quinn Feb 2020

Developing Fiduciary Culture In Vietnam, Brian Jm Quinn

Seattle University Law Review

This Article examines Vietnam’s efforts during the past two and a half decades to build up its legal infrastructure during its transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. In particular, this Article will focus on the development of legal and regulatory infrastructure to support the development of the corporate sector and fiduciary culture in Vietnam. In thinking about corporate law, I do not intend to single out this particular area of law as somehow special in the context of transition. In fact, its commonness and generality are what makes the experience of the development of corporate law and …


Financial Innovation In East Asia, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner, Michael Panton Mar 2014

Financial Innovation In East Asia, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner, Michael Panton

Seattle University Law Review

Finance is important for development. However, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the global financial crisis of 2008 highlighted the serious risks associated with financial liberalization and excessive innovation. East Asia’s strong focus on economic growth has necessitated a careful balancing of the benefits of financial liberalization and innovation against the very real risks inherent in financial sector development. This Article examines the role of regulatory, legal, and institutional infrastructure in supporting both financial development and limiting the risk of financial crises. The Article then addresses a series of issues with particular developmental significance in the region: trade finance, …


Neo-Brandeisianism And The New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William O. Douglas, And The Problem Of Corporate Finance In The 1930s, Jessica Wang Jan 2010

Neo-Brandeisianism And The New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William O. Douglas, And The Problem Of Corporate Finance In The 1930s, Jessica Wang

Seattle University Law Review

This essay revisits Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and The Modern Corporation and Private Property by focusing on the triangle of Berle, Louis D. Brandeis, and William O. Douglas in order to examine some of the underlying assumptions about law, economics, and the nature of modern society behind securities regulation and corporate finance in the 1930s. I explore Douglas and Berle’s academic and political relationship, the conceptual underpinnings of Brandeis, Berle, and Douglas’s critiques of modern finance, and the ways in which the two younger men—Berle and Douglas—ultimately departed from their role model, Brandeis.