Law Commons^™

Trump V. Mazars Usa, Llp: The Case Of The Chief Justice And The Congressional Subpoenas, Rodger D. Citron

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No abstract provided.

Equality And Access To Credit: A Social Contract Framework, John Linarelli

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The problems governments face in regulating consumer finance fall into two categories: normative and cognitive. The normative problems have to do with the way that some governments, particularly those adhering to an American model of household finance, have financed social mobility and intergenerational welfare through debt, a tenuous and socially risky policy choice. Credit has a substantial social aspect to it in the United States, where the federal government has in some way engaged in subsidizing about 1/3 of consumer credit, particularly in the residential mortgage market, feeding into a substantial capital markets dimension through government-guaranteed securitization. Most Americans think …

Financial Inclusion, Access To Credit, And Sustainable Finance, John Linarelli, Stephen L. Schwarcz, Ignacio Tirado

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No abstract provided.

Debt In Just Societies: A General Framework For Regulating Credit, John Linarelli

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Debt presents a dilemma to societies: successful societies benefit from a substantial infrastructure of consumer, commercial, corporate, and sovereign debt but debt can cause substantial private and social harm. Pre- and post-crisis solutions have seesawed between subsidizing and restricting debt, between leveraging and deleveraging. A consensus exists among governments and international financial institutions that financial stability is the fundamental normative principle underlying financial regulation. Financial stability, however, is insensitive to equality concerns and can produce morally impermissible aggregations in which the least advantaged in a society are made worse off. Solutions based only on financial stability can restrict debt without …

Law And The Blockchain, Usha Rodrigues

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All contracts are necessarily incomplete. The inefficiencies of bargaining over every contingency, coupled with humans’ innate bounded rationality, mean that contracts cannot anticipate and address every potential eventuality. One role of law is to fill gaps in incomplete contracts with default rules. The blockchain is a distributed ledger that allows the cryptographic recording of transactions and permits “smart” contracts that self-execute automatically if their conditions are met. Because humans code the contracts of the blockchain, gaps in these contracts will arise. Yet in the world of “smart contracting” on the blockchain, there is no place for the law to step …

Asset Partitioning And Financial Innovation, Christopher Bruner

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Review of the article by Ofer Eldar and Andrew Verstein titled “The Enduring Distinction between Business Entities and Security Interests”, 92 Southern California Law Review, no. 2 (2019).

Winning And Losing In Investor-State Arbitration, Tim Samples

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As tensions between investors’ rights and sovereign power escalate, investor-state dispute settlement has become a focal point of backlash and controversy. As a result, ISDS now embodies two opposing currents in international law: (i) the erosion of sovereignty that accompanied economic globalization, trade frameworks, and investment treaties following the Second World War and (ii) more recently, reassertions of sovereignty prompted by recent backlashes against the global economic order. This Article measures and evaluates outcomes of the ISDS system for sovereign participants. Using the best available data, this Article contributes more detailed assessments of sovereign winners (home states of claimants) and …

Financial Contracting With The Crowd, Usha Rodrigues

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Equity crowdfunding is broken. The current model imposes too many burdens on entrepreneurs in exchange for too little money. For alternative models, this Article looks to the time-tested venture capital financial contract, and the recent experience of initial coin offerings (ICOs). ICOs made headlines over the past two years, as the means by which blockchain technology companies raised billions of dollars to launch new cryptocurrency ventures. Although their novelty as a monetary and investing device is well known, ICOs also presented significant, unappreciated insights into financial contracting.

ICOs furnished an unprecedented experiment into how bargains would look if entrepreneurs raised …

Between Economic Planning And Market Competition: Institutional Law And Economics In The Us, Laura Phillips Sawyer

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In 1926 John Maurice Clark published a seminal text in institutionalist economics, Social Control of Business, surveying the ways in which business was subject to control by a variety of formal and informal constraints. 1 The text rejected mainstream ideas in neoclassical political economy by explaining how individual self-interest and competition could be manipulated not only through legal rules but also by custom, habit, codes of ethics, and morals. Representative of the institutionalist movement, Clark discarded presumptions of an individualistic economy based on market competition. Instead, he posited that long-term public goals of prosperity and equity could be achieved through …

Postal Banking's Public Benefits, Mehrsa Baradaran

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The basic idea of postal banking is to have a public bank that would offer a wide range of transaction services, including deposit-taking and small lending. Post offices could offer these services at a much lower cost than banks and the fringe banking industry because (1) they can use natural economies of scale and scope to lower the costs of the products; (2) their existing infrastructure significantly reduces overhead costs, and (3) they do not have profit-demanding shareholders and would be able to offer products at cost.

Corporate Governance Reform In Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two Fundamental Tensions, Christopher Bruner

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The manner in which financial firms are governed directly impacts the stability and sustainability of both the financial sector and the "real" economy, as the financial crisis and associated regulatory reform efforts have tragically demonstrated. However, two fundamental tensions continue to complicate efforts to reform corporate governance in post-crisis financial firms. The first relates to reliance on increased equity capital as a buffer against shocks and a means of limiting leverage. The tension here arises from the fact that no corporate constituency desires risk more than equity does, and that risk preference only tends to be stronger in banks, and …

The Rise Of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-Advisers Rescue The Retail Market?, Benjamin P. Edwards

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Consumer interest in automated investment advice continues to grow. One informed observer recently predicted that automated investment advisers may manage $2 trillion in assets by 2020.Today, the two largest automated investment advice providers now manage approximately seventeen billion in assets while continuing to expand their capabilities. This rise of automated investment advice firms may disrupt and improve the market for investment advice and finally allow modem technology to make financial intermediation more efficient. For a variety of reasons, costs in the sector have remained abnormally high. One study found that "the unit cost of intermediation is about as high today …

The Dark Side Of Self-Regulation, Benjamin P. Edwards

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The financial services industry indirectly regulates itself through little discussed, scandal-prone, and structurally-entrenched self-regulatory organizations. FINRA, the most prominent of these self-regulatory organizations, makes regulations and sets enforcement policy that directly affect public welfare. As with other self-regulatory organizations, FINRA's structure poses a continual risk that industry members will subvert its processes to act like a cartel, promoting industry interests at the expense of the public and contributing to the excessive rents collected by financial intermediaries. Although this dark side to self-regulation poses a constant danger, structural reforms may increase the likelihood that FINRA and other self-regulatory organizations will take …

Distributed Governance, Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Benjamin P. Edwards

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Distributed ledger technology disrupts traditional business organizations by introducing new business entities without the directors and officers of traditional corporate entities. Although these emerging entities offer intriguing possibilities, distributed entities may suffer significant collective action problems and expose investors to catastrophic regulatory and governance risks. Our Article examines key considerations for stakeholders and argues that distributed entities must be carefully structured to function effectively.

This Article breaks new ground by critically examining distributed entities. We argue that a distributed model is most appropriate when distributed ledger technology solves a unique corporate governance problem. We caution against ignoring the lessons painstakingly …

Conflicts & Capital Allocation, Benjamin P. Edwards

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The regulatory structure for financial advice now tolerates incentives motivating financial advisors to manipulate and deceive retail investors. While scholars thus far have argued for ways to improve investor protections, the literature has largely ignored how these flawed incentives affect the economy.

This Article contends that these flawed incentives cause financial advisors to negatively affect capital allocation throughout the overall economy.

This Article draws on literature about manipulation and deception in principal-agent relationships to show how conflicts of interest cause the market for financial advisor services to generate excessive intermediation, driving harms to the real economy. This Article uses case …

Banks: A Broken Social Contract, Mehrsa Baradaran

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This article explores how how the Financial Crisis of 2008 affected the banking industry and brought three specific problems: The first was that the banks and non‐bank financial institutions created due to deregulation were huge, interconnected, and highly leveraged; Second, the panic started in the “shadow banking” sector and showed that the short‐term credit transactions and derivatives that non‐bank financial institutions traded and used for funding for years were similar to banking, and thus prone to runs; and Third, the entire premise of deregulation rested on an assumption that individual firms and market players could accurately calculate and manage risks, …

Hurrah For The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Consumer Arbitration As A Poster Child For Regulation, Jean R. Sternlight

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Drawing on economic, psychological and philosophical considerations, this Essay considers whether consumers should be "free" to "agree" to contractually trade their opportunity to litigate in a class action for the opportunity to bring an arbitration claim against a company. The Essay suggests that by looking at the CFPB's regulation through these three lenses, one sees that the regulation is desirable—even a poster child—for the potential value of regulation when market forces are not sufficient to protect individual or public interests.

Regulation By Hypothetical, Mehrsa Baradaran

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A new paradigm is afoot in banking regulation—and it involves a turn toward the more speculative. Previous regulatory instruments have included geographic restrictions, activity restrictions, disclosure mandates, capital requirements, and risk management oversight to ensure the safety of the banking system. This Article describes and contextualizes these regulatory tools and shows how and why they were formed to deal with industry change. The financial crisis of 2008 exposed the shortcomings in each of these regimes. In important ways, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) departs from these past regimes and proposes something new: Call it …

Corporate Governance Theory And Review Of Board Decisions, Christopher M. Bruner

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No abstract provided.

Banking And The Social Contract, Mehrsa Baradaran

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This article asserts that there exists today and has always existed an interdependent relationship between banks and the state. I refer to this connection and its mutual benefits and responsibilities as a social contract. When Alexander Hamilton responded to President Washington’s inquiry about the advisability of a national bank, he wrote that “such a Bank is not a mere matter of private property, but a political machine of the greatest importance to the State.” This social contract has existed since the inception of banking in the United States and has been reinforced over time, but it has recently become weakened …

It’S Time For Postal Banking, Mehrsa Baradaran

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This essay makes the case that the USPS is in a unique position to provide much-needed financial services for the large population of unbanked or underbanked Americans. First, the post office can offer credit at lower rates than fringe lenders by taking advantage of economies of scale as well as their position in the federal bureaucracy. Second, they already have branches in many low-income neighborhoods that have been long deserted by commercial banks. And, third, people at every level of society, including the unbanked, have a level of familiarity and comfort with the post office that they do not have …

Conceptions Of Corporate Purpose In Post-Crisis Financial Firms, Christopher M. Bruner

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American "populism" has had a major impact on the development of U.S. corporate governance throughout its history. Specifically, appeals to the perceived interests of average working people have exerted enormous social and political influence over prevailing conceptions of corporate purpose - the aims toward which society expects corporate decision-making to be directed. This article assesses the impact of American populism upon prevailing conceptions of corporate purpose - contrasting its unique expression in the context of financial firms with that arising in other contexts - and then examines its impact upon corporategovernance reforms enacted in the wake of the financial and …

How The Poor Got Cut Out Of Banking, Mehrsa Baradaran

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The United States currently has two banking systems — one for the rich, one for the poor. It wasn’t always this way. Throughout U.S. history, the government has enlisted certain banking institutions to serve the needs of the poor and offer low cost credit to enable low-income Americans to escape poverty. Credit unions, savings and loans and Morris Banks are three prominent examples of government-supported institutions with a specific focus of helping the poor. Unfortunately, these institutions are no longer fulfilling their missions and high-cost, usurious, and sometimes predatory check-cashers and payday lenders have quickly filled the void. These fringe …

Reconsidering The Separation Of Banking And Commerce, Mehrsa Baradaran

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This Article examines the long-held belief that banking and commerce need to be kept separate to ensure a stable banking system. Specifically, the Article criticizes the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”), which prohibits nonbanking entities from owning banks. The recent banking collapse has caused and exacerbated several problematic trends in U.S. banking, especially the conglomeration of banking entities and the homogenization of assets. The inflexible and outdated provisions of the BHCA are a major cause of these trends. Since the enactment of the BHCA, the landscape of U.S. banking has changed dramatically, but the strict separation of banking and commerce …

Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach To The Shareholder Bylaw Debate, Christopher M. Bruner

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Over recent decades, shareholders in public corporations have increasingly sought to augment their own power - and, correlatively, to limit the power of boards - through creative use of corporate bylaws. The bylaws lend themselves to such efforts because enacting, amending, and repealing bylaws are essentially the only corporate governance actions that shareholders can undertake unilaterally. In this Article I examine thecontested nature of bylaws, the fundamental issues of corporate power and purpose that they implicate, and the differing ways in which state and federal lawmakers and regulators may impact the debate regarding thescope of the shareholders' bylaw authority.

The …

Corporate Governance Reform In A Time Of Crisis, Christopher M. Bruner

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In this article I argue that crisis-driven corporate governance reform efforts in the United States and the United Kingdom that aim to empower shareholders are misguided, and offer an explanation of why policymakers in each country have reacted to the financial crisis as they have. I first discuss the risk incentives of shareholders and managers in financial firms, and examine how excessive leverage and risk-taking in pursuit of short-term returns for shareholders led to the crisis. I then describe the far greater power and centrality that U.K. shareholders have historically possessed relative to their U.S. counterparts, and explore historical and …

Placebo Ethics, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller

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While there are innumerable theories on the best remedy for the current financial crisis, there is agreement on one point, at least: increased transparency is good. We look at a provision from the last round of financial regulation, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which imposed disclosure requirements tailored to prevent some of the kinds of abuses that led to the downfall of Enron. In response to Enron's self-dealing transactions, Section 406 of SOX required a public company to disclose its code of ethics and to disclose immediately any waivers from that code the company grants to its top …

Organizations Matter: They Are Institutions, After All, John Linarelli

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Judge Posner (2010) offers a substantial agenda for organization economics. He advises us on how organization economics can shed substantial light on some of the most pressing social problems of the day. I comment on two of the areas he selects for discussion and offer some comments on the relationship of organization economics to new institutional economics. Judge Posner surely is right to argue that organization economics can help us understand the failures of corporate governance in regulating executive pay. Moreover, with additional and more institutionally nuanced theorizing, organizational economics should further our understanding of the work of judiciaries in …

The Changing Face Of Money, Christopher M. Bruner

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In this essay I argue that widespread failure to comprehend the intrinsic nature of modern money loomed large in the recent crisis, and that broader comprehension of its meaning is a precondition for effective post-crisis reforms. First, I provide a brief history of money, emphasizing its gradual divergence from inherent value. I then consider the value of today’s dollar in economic, legal and psychological terms, arguing that each perspective conveys a single over-arching lesson—that better comprehending our money requires better comprehending ourselves. The introspection that this exercise demands reveals with unique clarity some of the critical lessons of the crisis …

The Ilc And The Reconstruction Of U.S. Banking, Mehrsa Baradaran

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Since the Great Depression, bank regulators in the United States have endeavored to separate banking institutions from commercial firms, believing such separation was necessary for stability and growth. The recent collapse of our financial system indicates that this premise may be false, as Industrial Loan Companies ("ILCs") – the only institutions where commercial firms are permitted to own banks – remain sound. ILCs have persisted throughout U.S. banking history through exceptions and omissions in banking legislation, but the strength and resilience they have exhibited in the current financial collapse are worth investigating and even emulating. This article examines recent controversy …