Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Banking and Finance Law

PDF

Columbia Law School

Columbia Business Law Review

Articles 1 - 7 of 7

Full-Text Articles in Law

Money And The Public Debt: Treasury Market Liquidity As A Legal Phenomenon, Lev Menand, Joshua Younger Jan 2023

Money And The Public Debt: Treasury Market Liquidity As A Legal Phenomenon, Lev Menand, Joshua Younger

Faculty Scholarship

The market for U.S. government debt (Treasuries) forms the bedrock of the global financial system. The ability of investors to sell Treasuries quickly, cheaply, and at scale has led to an assumption, in many places enshrined in law, that Treasuries are nearly equivalent to cash. Yet in recent years Treasury market liquidity has evaporated on several occasions and, in 2020, the market’s near collapse led to the most aggressive central bank intervention in history.

This Article pieces together what went wrong and offers a new account of the relationship between money issue and debt issue as mechanisms of public finance. …


Long-Term Bias, Eric L. Talley, Michal Barzuza Jan 2020

Long-Term Bias, Eric L. Talley, Michal Barzuza

Faculty Scholarship

An emerging consensus in certain legal, business, and scholarly communities maintains that corporate managers are pressured unduly into chasing short-term gains at the expense of superior long-term prospects. The forces inducing managerial myopia are easy to spot, typically embodied by activist hedge funds and Wall Street gadflies with outsized appetites for next quarter’s earnings. Warnings about the dangers of “short termism” have become so well established, in fact, that they are now driving changes to mainstream practice, as courts, regulators and practitioners fashion legal and transactional constraints designed to insulate firms and managers from the influence of investor short-termism. This …


Money Market Funds Run Risk: Will Floating Net Asset Value Fix The Problem?, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Christopher M. Gandia Jan 2014

Money Market Funds Run Risk: Will Floating Net Asset Value Fix The Problem?, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Christopher M. Gandia

Faculty Scholarship

The instability of money market mutual funds (“MMF”), a relatively new form of financial intermediary that connects short-term debt issuers with funders who want daily liquidity, became manifest in the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a major issuer of money market debt, led one large fund to “break the buck” (that is, violate the $1 net asset valuation convention (“NAV”)) and triggered a run on other funds that was staunched only by major interventions from the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve. One common reform proposal has been to substitute “floating NAV” for “fixed NAV,” on …


Mapping The Future Of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, And Strategies, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2013

Mapping The Future Of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, And Strategies, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The current law on insider trading is remarkably unrationalized because it contains gaps and loopholes the size of the Washington Square Arch. For example, if a thief breaks into your office, opens your files, learns material nonpublic information, and trades on that information, he has not breached a fiduciary duty and is presumably exempt from insider trading liability. But drawing a line that can convict only the fiduciary and not the thief seems morally incoherent. Nor is it doctrinally necessary.

The basic methodology handed down by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Dirks and United States v. O'Hagan dictates (i) …


Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation In Financial Firms: The Case For Convertible Equity-Based Pay, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 2012

Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation In Financial Firms: The Case For Convertible Equity-Based Pay, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Unlike the failure of a nonfinancial firm, the failure of a systemically important financial firm will reduce the value of a diversified shareholder portfolio because of economy-wide reductions in expected returns and a consequent increase in systematic risk. Thus, diversified shareholders of a financial firm generally internalize systemic risk, whereas managerial shareholders and blockholders do not. This means that the governance model drawn from nonfinancial firms will not fit financial firms. Regulations that limit risk-taking by financial firms can thus provide a benefit, rather than necessarily impose a cost, for the typical diversified public shareholder. Managerial shareholding also gives rise …


Some Reflections On Two-Sided Markets And Pricing, Victor P. Goldberg Jan 2005

Some Reflections On Two-Sided Markets And Pricing, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

We want to join Bob Pitofsky in thanking the participants in this symposium for their thoughtful contributions. The literature on two-sided markets, both analytical and policy oriented, has mushroomed and this timely set of essays represents a significant contribution. The first generation of this literature grew up around the credit card industry, largely as a result of the antitrust litigation that challenged a wide range of standard practices in that industry. However, the theoretical problems that were first uncovered in this context extend to many other activities as well. The full range of papers found in this symposium, which have …


Deutsche Telekom, German Corporate Governance, And The Transition Costs Of Capitalism, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 1998

Deutsche Telekom, German Corporate Governance, And The Transition Costs Of Capitalism, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

In November 1996, Deutsche Telekom AG, the government-owned German telephone company, sold common stock representing approximately 25 percent of the company in a global stock offering that raised approximately DM 20 billion ($13 billion), the largest equity offering ever in Europe. In selling off this equity stake, the German government (i.e., the Federal Republic) had a number of motives. First, the sale was an important step in converting a government-run telephone monopoly into a nimble competitor in the emerging European and world telecommunications market. In anticipation of a fully competitive European telecommunications regime in 1998, Deutsche Telekom ("DT") had been …