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- Ad hominem (2)
- Bias (2)
- Legal argumentation (2)
- Legal evidence (2)
- Argumentation (1)
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- Argumentation-based litigation game (1)
- Bumps (1)
- Cartesianism (1)
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- Encryption (1)
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- Identity (1)
- Indigenous cosmovision (1)
- Institutional argument (1)
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- Law and science (1)
- Legal reasoning (1)
- Meaning analysis (1)
- Metonymy (1)
- Neoplatonism (1)
- Nudges (1)
- Proportionality (1)
- Query lists (1)
- Rights as trumps (1)
Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
Between Evidence And Facts: An Argumentative Perspective Of Legal Evidence, Wenjing Du, Minghui Xiong
Between Evidence And Facts: An Argumentative Perspective Of Legal Evidence, Wenjing Du, Minghui Xiong
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper, we will present an argumentative view of legal evidence. In an argumentation-based litigation game, the only purpose of the suitor (S) or the respondent (R) is to maximize their own legal rights while the purpose of the trier (T) is to maintain judicial fairness and justice. Different selections of evidence and different orders of presenting evidence will lead to different case-facts and even adjudicative results, the purpose of litigation is to reconcile a balance among the three parties - S, R, and T.
Commentary: Scientific Evidence - From A "Deferent" To A "Novice" Judge: Comments On Zoppellari's Paper, Marko Novak
Commentary: Scientific Evidence - From A "Deferent" To A "Novice" Judge: Comments On Zoppellari's Paper, Marko Novak
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
The Acquisition Of Scientific Evidence Between Frye And Daubert. From Ad Hominem Arguments To Cross-Examination Among Experts, Lorenzo Zoppellari
The Acquisition Of Scientific Evidence Between Frye And Daubert. From Ad Hominem Arguments To Cross-Examination Among Experts, Lorenzo Zoppellari
OSSA Conference Archive
The Frye and Daubert rulings give us two very different ways to intend the relation between law and science. Through the contributions of Wellman and Walton, we will see how the main method to question the expert’s testimony before a judge deferent to science is to question her personal integrity by using ad hominem arguments. Otherwise, using Alvin Goldman’s novice/expert problem, we will investigate if other manners of argumentative cross-examinations are possible.
“Identity-Based” And “Diversity-Based” Evidence Between Linear And Fractal Rationality, Maurizio Manzin
“Identity-Based” And “Diversity-Based” Evidence Between Linear And Fractal Rationality, Maurizio Manzin
OSSA Conference Archive
I identify two types of evidence: one based on “linear” rationality (LR) and the other based on “fractal” rationality (FR). For LR, evidence depends only on systematic coherence, and all other sources of knowledge (intuitive, perceptive, symbolic, poetic, moral, etc.) are marginalized. For FR, evidence requires an approach more adherent to the “irregularities” of life. LR philosophically entails a Neoplatonist and Cartesian account on identity, whereas FR entails Plato’s account on identity and diversity as coessential.
Rights Of Nature And Indigenous Cosmovision: A Fundamental Inquiry, Jingjing Wu
Rights Of Nature And Indigenous Cosmovision: A Fundamental Inquiry, Jingjing Wu
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper, I ask whether we can weigh and balance indigenous cosmovision—the reasoning used as the main source of legitimacy in some rights of nature legislation—within a secular legal system. I examine three barriers that rights of nature and their corollary spiritual reasoning are likely to encounter if they are invoked in secular courts: (a) spiritual reasoning is non-defeasible (Part 3) and (b) irrational (Part 4), and (3) the current concept of human rights as a universal legal norm is based on a circular logic (Part 5). In order to overcome these barriers, I draw inspiration from Dworkin’s ‘rights …
The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter, Frank Zenker
The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter, Frank Zenker
OSSA Conference Archive
Starting with a brief overview of current usages (Sect. 2), this paper offers some constituents of a use-based analysis of ‘fallacy’, listing 16 conditions that have, for the most part implicitly, been discussed in the literature (Sect. 3). Our thesis is that at least three related conceptions of ‘fallacy’ can be identified. The 16 conditions thus serve to “carve out” a semantic core and to distinguish three core-specifications. As our discussion suggests, these specifications can be related to three normative positions in the philosophy of human reasoning: the meliorist, the apologist, and the panglossian (Sect. 4). Seeking to make these …
Commentary On A Perspective Of Objectivity In The Human Rights Arguments, Danny Marrero
Commentary On A Perspective Of Objectivity In The Human Rights Arguments, Danny Marrero
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Biases, Bumps, Nudges, Query Lists, And Zero Tolerance Policies, Sheldon Wein
Biases, Bumps, Nudges, Query Lists, And Zero Tolerance Policies, Sheldon Wein
OSSA Conference Archive
Zero tolerance policies are often mistakenly thought to be the best way to deal with pressing social problems. However, most arguments for zero tolerance policies are either based on inaccurate premises or they commit the zero tolerance fallacy. This paper explores ways that we might counteract the bias in favor of zero tolerance policies by adding a query list to the choice architecture.
America Vs. Apple: The Argumentative Function Of Metonyms, Ilon Lauer, Thomas Lauer
America Vs. Apple: The Argumentative Function Of Metonyms, Ilon Lauer, Thomas Lauer
OSSA Conference Archive
: Our study of public argumentation surrounding iPhone encryption addresses the argumentative function of the metonym. Metonyms accomplish general and specific argumentative purposes. Generally, metonyms help define and redefine the argumentative framework for a dispute. Within a controversy, metonyms operate as inference generators. We isolate and analyze several metonyms and elaborate their warrant-generating valences. Metonyms are inference generating tools capable of instantiating normative frameworks, invoking flexible and indeterminate senses of causality.