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Articles 1 - 30 of 45
Full-Text Articles in Law
Merger Enforcement Statistics: 2001-2020, Logan Billman, Steven C. Salop
Merger Enforcement Statistics: 2001-2020, Logan Billman, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article summarizes merger enforcement data for the period between 2001 and 2020, using a database created by the authors. The database lists the identity and outcome of every transaction that received a second request during this 20-year period. The database also lists the identity and outcome of every challenge to an already-consummated merger during the period. To our knowledge, it is the only complete database for the listing and outcomes of all such transactions. The goal of creating the database is to provide further information on merger enforcement, which hopefully can inform policy and spur additional analysis. We describe …
A Proposed Sec Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman
A Proposed Sec Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman
Faculty Scholarship
Constant cyber threats result in: intellectual property loss; data disruption; ransomware attacks; theft of valuable company intellectual property and sensitive customer information. During March 2022, The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposed rule addressing Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, which requires: 1. Current reporting about material cybersecurity incidents; 2. Periodic disclosures about a registrant’s policies and procedures to identify and manage cybersecurity risks; 3. Management’s role in implementing cybersecurity policies and procedures; 4. Board of directors’ cybersecurity expertise, if any, and its oversight of cybersecurity risk; 5. Registrants to provide updates about previously reported cybersecurity …
Leaving Judicial Review With The Judiciary: The Misplaced Role Of Agency Deference In Tunney Act Public Interest Review, Alexandra P. Clark
Leaving Judicial Review With The Judiciary: The Misplaced Role Of Agency Deference In Tunney Act Public Interest Review, Alexandra P. Clark
Washington and Lee Law Review
This Note explores the Tunney Act’s mechanism for judicial review of consent decrees negotiated by the U.S. Department of Justice and merging parties to remedy alleged antitrust issues. The Tunney Act requires that the reviewing court only approve a consent decree if it is “in the public interest.” This Note argues, however, that courts have improperly circumscribed their review by affording too much deference to the Department of Justice when reviewing these consent decrees. This deference subverts Congress’s intent in imposing judicial review and allows the government and merging parties the opportunity to skirt meaningful judicial review. As such, this …
Christianity And Antitrust, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Daniel Crane
Christianity And Antitrust, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Daniel Crane
Book Chapters
The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether the Christian faith has a nexus with the institution of antitrust. It turns out it doesn’t – and it does. For example, Christianity cannot explain why the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is superior to the four-firm concentration ratio as a measure of industry concentration. Economics can. On the other hand, economics cannot explain why the per se rule against price-fixing is morally appropriate. The Bible can.
Fascism And Monopoly, Daniel A. Crane
Fascism And Monopoly, Daniel A. Crane
Michigan Law Review
The recent revival of political interest in antitrust has resurfaced a longstanding debate about the role of industrial concentration and monopoly in enabling Hitler’s rise to power and the Third Reich’s wars of aggression. Proponents of stronger antitrust enforcement argue that monopolies and cartels brought the Nazis to power and warn that rising concentration in the American economy could similarly threaten democracy. Skeptics demur, observing that German big business largely opposed Hitler during the crucial years of his ascent. Drawing on business histories and archival material from the U.S. Office of Military Government’s Decartelization Branch, this Article assesses the historical …
Antitrust's "Curse Of Bigness" Problem, D. Daniel Sokol
Antitrust's "Curse Of Bigness" Problem, D. Daniel Sokol
Michigan Law Review
Review of Tim Wu's The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age.
The Rise And (Potential) Fall Of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, Vivek Ghosal, D. Daniel Sokol
The Rise And (Potential) Fall Of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, Vivek Ghosal, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Government enforcement against collusion, now viewed by the Supreme Court as the “supreme evil” in antitrust, has gone through various phases of enforcement in the United States. There have been periods in which cartels have been able to collude more or less effectively given various institutional tools at the disposal of the government. By analyzing enforcement and prosecutions data over a long time horizon, 1969–2016, this Article examines the attributes of cartel enforcement over time and the changing use of tools to assist with detection and punishment. We provide a comprehensive description of critical cartel enforcement events and institutional developments …
Antitrust In Digital Markets, John M. Newman
Antitrust In Digital Markets, John M. Newman
Vanderbilt Law Review
Antitrust law has largely failed to address the challenges posed by digital markets. At the turn of the millennium, the antitrust enterprise engaged in intense debate over whether antitrust doctrine, much of it developed during a bygone era of smokestack industries, could or should evolve to address digital markets. Eventually, a consensus emerged: although the basic doctrine is supple enough to apply to new technologies, courts and enforcers should adopt a defendant-friendly, hands-off approach.
But this pro-defendant position is deeply-and dangerously-flawed. Economic theory, empirical research, and extant judicial and regulatory authority all contradict the prevailing views regarding power, conduct, and …
Due Process In International Antitrust Enforcement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, Christopher S. Yoo
Due Process In International Antitrust Enforcement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
The past year has witnessed an upsurge of international interest in due process in antitrust enforcement, reflected in two new comparative studies and International Competition Network’s (ICN’s) May 2019 adoption of its Recommended Practices for Investigative Process and Framework for Competition Agency Procedures and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Competition Committee’s discussion of the Draft Recommendation on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement in June 2019. This article reviews those developments, traces key differences among them, and looks ahead to what comes next.
Toward A Realistic Comparative Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane
Toward A Realistic Comparative Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane
Book Chapters
Over the course of her extraordinary career, Eleanor Fox has contributed in many vital ways to our understanding of the importance of institutional analysis in antitrust and competition law. Most importantly, Eleanor has become the leading repository of knowledge about what is happening around the globe in the field of competition law and its enforcement institutions. At a time when much of the field of antitrust was moving in the direction of theoretical generalization, formal modeling, game theory, and the like, Eleanor tirelessly worked the globe to discover the actual practice of competition law in the world. She left no …
Given Today's New Wave Of Protectionsim, Is Antitrust Law The Last Hope For Preserving A Free Global Economy Or Another Nail In Free Trade's Coffin?, Allison Murray
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review
No abstract provided.
Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Faculty Scholarship
Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anti-competitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater trade openness makes antitrust unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to realize the benefits of trade liberalization. Data limitations have made this debate largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and antitrust empirically using new data on antitrust laws and enforcement activities. We find that trade openness and stringency of antitrust laws are positively correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears …
State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester
State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester
Michigan Law Review
The state-action immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown immunizes anticompetitive state regulations from preemption by federal antitrust law so long as the state takes conspicuous ownership of its anticompetitive policy. In its 1943 Parker decision, the Supreme Court justified this doctrine, observing that no evidence of a congressional will to preempt state law appears in the Sherman Act’s legislative history or context. In addition, commentators generally assume that the New Deal court was anxious to avoid re-entangling the federal judiciary in Lochner-style substantive due process analysis. The Supreme Court has observed, without deciding, that the Federal Trade Commission might …
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert Hovenkamp
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert Hovenkamp
Herbert Hovenkamp
Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally means a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost savings …
The Strategic Use Of Public And Private Litigation In Antitrust As Business Strategy, D. Daniel Sokol
The Strategic Use Of Public And Private Litigation In Antitrust As Business Strategy, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
This Article claims that there may be a subset of cases in which private rights of action may work with public rights as an effective strategy for a firm to raise costs against rival dominant firms. A competitor firm may bring its own case (which is costly) and/or have government bring a case on its behalf (which is less costly). Alternatively, if the competitor firm has sufficient financial resources, it can pursue an approach that employs both strategies simultaneously. This situation of public and private misuse of antitrust may not happen often. As the Article will explore, it is not …
Antitrust, Institutions, And Merger Control, D. Daniel Sokol
Antitrust, Institutions, And Merger Control, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
This Article makes two primary contributions to the antitrust literature. First, it identifies the dynamic interrelationship across antitrust institutions. Second, it provides new empirical evidence from practitioner surveys to explore how the dynamic institutional interrelationship plays out in the area of merger control. This Article provides a descriptive, analytical overview of the various institutions to better frame the larger institutional interrelations for a comparative institutional analysis. In the next Part it examines mergers as a case study of how one might apply antitrust institutional analysis across these different kinds and levels of antitrust institutions. The Article utilizes both quantitative and …
Merger Policy And The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Merger Policy And The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
New Horizontal Merger Guidelines were issued jointly by the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission in August, 2010, replacing Guidelines issued in 1992 that no longer reflected either the law or government enforcement policy. The new Guidelines are a striking improvement. They are less technocratic, accommodating a greater and more realistic variety of theories about why mergers of competitors can be anticompetitive and, accordingly, a greater variety of methodologies for assessing them.
The unifying theme of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is to prevent the enhancement of market power that might result from mergers. The 2010 Guidelines state that “[a] …
Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued new Guidelines for assessing the competitive effects of horizontal mergers under the antitrust laws. These Guidelines were long awaited not merely because of the lengthy interval between them and previous Guidelines but also because enforcement policy had drifted far from the standards articulated in the previous Guidelines. The 2010 Guidelines are distinctive mainly for two things. One is briefer and less detailed treatment of market delineation. The other is an expanded set of theories of harm that justify preventing mergers or reversing mergers that have already occurred.
The …
Interactive Antitrust Federalism: Antitrust Enforcement In Tennessee Then And Now, Clark L. Hildabrand
Interactive Antitrust Federalism: Antitrust Enforcement In Tennessee Then And Now, Clark L. Hildabrand
Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law
In light of the recent debates surrounding the proper relationship between federal and state antitrust enforcement, this Paper explores the early years of state antitrust enforcement to see how the Sherman Act impacted state antitrust law. Since Tennessee was the location of the first federal case brought under the Sherman Act and has been involved in recent indirect purchaser action against Microsoft Corporation, this Paper particularly focuses on the development of antitrust law within Tennessee. Before the Sherman Act, Tennessee antitrust enforcement was limited to the narrow confines of common law restraint of trade, but the implementation of the Sherman …
Reflections On The Manifold Means Of Enforcing The Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, Or Just Right?, Joseph P. Bauer
Reflections On The Manifold Means Of Enforcing The Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, Or Just Right?, Joseph P. Bauer
Joseph P. Bauer
Lately, much attention has been given to the scope of the antitrust laws. This discussion has two overlapping components: (1) consideration of the substantive doctrines specifying the behavioral or structural changes that are or are not unlawful and the appropriate methodology; and (2) analysis for making those determinations with attention given to the appropriate vehicles for enforcing the antitrust laws. Some argue that the antitrust laws proscribe activities that are either pro-competitive or at worst benign. Further, they assert that the multiplicity of antitrust enforcers and enforcement devices has resulted in undue burdens, including excessive cost, time delay, and forestalling …
A Comparison Of Anti-Manipulation Rules In U.S. And Eu Electricity And Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal For A Common Standard, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Dan Harris
A Comparison Of Anti-Manipulation Rules In U.S. And Eu Electricity And Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal For A Common Standard, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Dan Harris
Shaun D. Ledgerwood
In this paper, we describe the development and current status of anti-manipulation rules as they apply to wholesale electricity and natural gas markets in the United States and the European Union, including the institutions that are responsible for overseeing these rules. We then compare and contrast these jurisdictions to discuss similarities, differences, and potential gaps in coverage within and across their internal markets. We note that while the behavior prohibited by the U.S. and EU statutes is remarkably similar, there is in fact no common standard for defining market manipulation. The absence of a common EU/U.S. framework for examining manipulative …
The Strategic Use Of Public And Private Litigation In Antitrust As Business Strategy, D. Daniel Sokol
The Strategic Use Of Public And Private Litigation In Antitrust As Business Strategy, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article claims that there may be a subset of cases in which private rights of action may work with public rights as an effective strategy for a firm to raise costs against rival dominant firms. A competitor firm may bring its own case (which is costly) and/or have government bring a case on its behalf (which is less costly). Alternatively, if the competitor firm has sufficient financial resources, it can pursue an approach that employs both strategies simultaneously. This situation of public and private misuse of antitrust may not happen often. As the Article will explore, it is not …
The Perils Of Armchair Analysis: Evaluating Merger Enforcement During The Obama Administration, Jonathan Baker, Carl Shapiro
The Perils Of Armchair Analysis: Evaluating Merger Enforcement During The Obama Administration, Jonathan Baker, Carl Shapiro
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This brief comment responds to the analysis of Obama administration merger policy in Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement? 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13 (2012).
A Primer On Antitrust Damages, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
A Primer On Antitrust Damages, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper considers the theory of antitrust damages and then discusses some simple models for proving them. Antitrust damages theory begins with the premise that many practices alleged to violate the antitrust laws cause no consumer harm. Others are inefficient and have few socially redeeming virtues. Still others may simultaneously increase both the efficiency of the participants and their market power. A perfectly designed antitrust policy would exonerate the first set of practices, condemn the second set, and condemn the third set only when the social cost of the restraint exceeds its social value or they produce net harm to …
Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper discusses the theory and experience of United States courts concerning the quantification of harm in antitrust cases. This treatment pertains to both the social cost of antitrust violations, and to the private damage mechanisms that United States antitrust law has developed. It is submitted for the Roundtable on the Quantification of Harm to Competition by National Courts and Competition Agencies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Feb., 2011.
In a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States are by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government. Further, when the individual states …
Antitrust, Institutions, And Merger Control, D. Daniel Sokol
Antitrust, Institutions, And Merger Control, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article makes two primary contributions to the antitrust literature. First, it identifies the dynamic interrelationship across antitrust institutions. Second, it provides new empirical evidence from practitioner surveys to explore how the dynamic institutional interrelationship plays out in the area of merger control. This Article provides a descriptive, analytical overview of the various institutions to better frame the larger institutional interrelations for a comparative institutional analysis. In the next Part it examines mergers as a case study of how one might apply antitrust institutional analysis across these different kinds and levels of antitrust institutions. The Article utilizes both quantitative and …
The Obama Administration And Section Two Of The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Obama Administration And Section Two Of The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
During the administration of President George W. Bush, the Antitrust Division was not enthusiastic about use of §2 of the Sherman Act to pursue anticompetitive single-firm conduct. Indeed, its most prominent contribution on the issue was the Antitrust Division’s §2 Report, which the Obama Antitrust Division withdrew only eight months after it was issued.This withdrawal was entirely in keeping with candidate Obama’s repeated promises to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement.
This essay analyzes the current state of antitrust and makes recommendations concerning structures and practices where increased §2 enforcement is warranted and those where it is not. Wise use of enforcement dollars …
Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc's Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane
Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc's Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) unprecedented enforcement action against Intel raises profound issues concerning the scope of the FTC’s powers to give a construction to Section 5 of the FTC Act that goes beyond the substantive reach of the Sherman Act. While I have urged the FTC to assert such independence from the Sherman Act, this is the wrong case to make a break. Indeed, if anything, Intel poses a risk of seriously setting back the development of an independent Section 5 power by provoking a hostile appellate court to rebuke the FTC’s effort and cabin the FTC’s powers in …
Reflections On The Manifold Means Of Enforcing The Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, Or Just Right?, Joseph P. Bauer
Reflections On The Manifold Means Of Enforcing The Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, Or Just Right?, Joseph P. Bauer
Journal Articles
Lately, much attention has been given to the scope of the antitrust laws. This discussion has two overlapping components: (1) consideration of the substantive doctrines specifying the behavioral or structural changes that are or are not unlawful and the appropriate methodology; and (2) analysis for making those determinations with attention given to the appropriate vehicles for enforcing the antitrust laws. Some argue that the antitrust laws proscribe activities that are either pro-competitive or at worst benign. Further, they assert that the multiplicity of antitrust enforcers and enforcement devices has resulted in undue burdens, including excessive cost, time delay, and forestalling …
Department Of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955-1997: An Empirical Study, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Joseph C. Gallo, Joseph L. Craycraft, Charles J. Parker
Department Of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955-1997: An Empirical Study, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Joseph C. Gallo, Joseph L. Craycraft, Charles J. Parker
Articles by Maurer Faculty
This is an empirical study of Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement of the antitrust laws. Its purpose is fourfold:
1.To update Posner's study "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement" (Posner, 1970, pp. 365-419).
2.To provide consistent and comparable measures of antitrust enforcement effort by the Department of Justice.
3.To report these measurements in a concise and systematic way in order to encourage empirical studies of antitrust issues.
4.To explore some implications for antitrust issues.
The purpose is to present the overall historical record of DOJ antitrust activity as well as some patterns in that history. More detailed analysis is left …