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Articles 1 - 24 of 24
Full-Text Articles in Law
A Socio-Economic Approach To Antitrust: Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, And Allocative Efficiency, Jeffrey L. Harrison
A Socio-Economic Approach To Antitrust: Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, And Allocative Efficiency, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article demonstrates the relationship between socio-economics and antitrust law. It uses socio-economics to both deconstruct the current economic foundation of antitrust policy and to suggest ways to improve that policy. There are four steps in this presentation. Part II examines the core elements of the economic approach to antitrust and its shortcomings, if any. For those even moderately versed in economics, it will note that the analysis begins at the most basic level. Obviously, antitrust is designed to make markets more competitive. But that goal is merely a means to the end of greater consumer surplus and allocative efficiency. …
The Corporation As Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, And The Corporate Form, Lynn A. Stout
The Corporation As Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, And The Corporate Form, Lynn A. Stout
Seattle University Law Review
This Symposium Article argues that the board-controlled corporation can be understood as a legal innovation that historically has functioned as a means of transferring wealth forward and sometimes backward through time, for the benefit of present and future generations. In this fashion the board-controlled corporation promotes both intergenerational equity and intergenerational efficiency. Logic and evidence each suggest, however, that the modern embrace of “shareholder value” as the only corporate objective and “shareholder democracy” as the ideal of corporate governance is damaging the corporate form’s ability to serve this economically and ethically important function.
The Messenger Model: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, Jeffrey L. Harrison
The Messenger Model: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Jeffrey L Harrison
This article makes the case that the messenger model is either tacitly or inadvertently a "don't ask, don't tell" policy when it comes to competitor cooperation. In addition, this article presents an economic framework that explains how such a policy may benefit health care consumers. Finally, it is suggested that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy has created an area of per se legality that precludes an examination designed to distinguish consumer-benefiting practices from those that provide no benefit.
Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
United States antitrust policy is said to promote some version of economic welfare. Antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as competitive as they can practicably be, and that firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to both cost minimization and innovation. One important welfare debate is whether antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” principle rather than a more general “total welfare” principle.
The simple version of the consumer welfare test is not a balancing test. If consumers are harmed by reduced output or higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power, …
Distributive Justice And Consumer Welfare In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Distributive Justice And Consumer Welfare In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The dominant view of antitrust policy in the United States is that it is intended to promote some version of economic welfare. More specifically, antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as competitive as they can practicably be, and that firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to both cost minimization and innovation.
The distribution concern that has dominated debates over United States antitrust policy over the last several decades is whether antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” principle rather than a more general neoclassical “total welfare” principle. In The Antitrust Paradox Robert …
Robert Bork's Controversial Legacy, Robert H. Lande
Robert Bork's Controversial Legacy, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
Judge Robert Bork was undeniably one of the towering figures in antitrust history. He advanced the field positively in many respects, articulating a serious critique of excesses of an earlier social-political approach to antitrust. But as one of the conservative movement’s intellectual godfathers he also shares responsibility for many of their own excesses that have transformed our nation in harmful ways. This short essay explores some of the effects of his overall approach to antitrust: his preoccupation with economic efficiency.
Race, Markets, And Hollywood's Perpetual Antitrust Dilemma, Hosea H. Harvey
Race, Markets, And Hollywood's Perpetual Antitrust Dilemma, Hosea H. Harvey
Michigan Journal of Race and Law
This Article focuses on the oft-neglected intersection of racially skewed outcomes and anti-competitive markets. Through historical, contextual, and empirical analysis, the Article describes the state of Hollywood motion-picture distribution from its anticompetitive beginnings through the industry's role in creating an anti-competitive, racially divided market at the end of the last century. The Article's evidence suggests that race-based inefficiencies have plagued the film distribution process and such inefficiencies might likely be caused by the anti-competitive structure of the market itself, and not merely by overt or intentional racial-discrimination. After explaining why traditional anti-discrimination laws are ineffective remedies for such inefficiencies, the …
Rummaging Through The Bottom Of Pandora’S Box: Funding Predatory Pricing Through Contemporaneous Recoupment, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Wesley J. Heath
Rummaging Through The Bottom Of Pandora’S Box: Funding Predatory Pricing Through Contemporaneous Recoupment, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Wesley J. Heath
Shaun D. Ledgerwood
Predatory pricing doctrine is currently a dead area of the law. To proceed beyond summary judgment, a plaintiff must prove the predation created a "dangerous probability" of supracompetitive pricing as the mechanism for recouping the losses “invested” in the predation. This requires proof that the predator sold products below its average variable cost and raised an entry barrier that ultimately enabled the recoupment of profits at some later time. We offer an alternative to this two-phased recoupment model. In this paper we show that a multiproduct retailer can target loss leading behavior in a market segment to punish or eliminate …
Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, Daniel A. Crane
Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The two leading merger systems-those of the United States and the European Union-treat the potential benefits and risks of mergers asymmetrically. Both systems require considerably greater proof of efficiencies than they do of potential harms if the efficiencies are to offset concerns over the accumulation or exercise of market power The implicit asymmetry principle has important systemic effects for merger control. It not only stands in the way of some socially desirable mergers but also may indirectly facilitate the clearance of some socially undesirable mergers. Neither system explicitly justifies this asymmetry, and none of the plausible justifications are normatively supportable. …
Chicago, Post-Chicago, And Neo-Chicago, Daniel A. Crane
Chicago, Post-Chicago, And Neo-Chicago, Daniel A. Crane
Reviews
Of all of Chicago's law and economics conquests, antitrust was the most complete and resounding victory. Chicago, of course, is a synecdoche for ideological currents that swept through and from Hyde Park beginning in the 1950s and reached their peak in the 1970s and 1980s. From early roots in antitrust and economic regulation, the Chicago School branched outward, first to adjacent fields like securities regulation, corporate law, property, and contracts, and eventually to more distant horizons like sexuality and family law. Predictably, the Chicago School exerted its greatest influence in fields closely tied to commercial regulation. But never did Chicago …
The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande
The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
Chicago School antitrust policy rests on the premise that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That foundation is flawed. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.
This essay defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, and analyzes recent case law. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives them of the benefits of competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market power. When conduct presents a conflict between the welfare …
The Messenger Model: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, Jeffrey L. Harrison
The Messenger Model: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
This article makes the case that the messenger model is either tacitly or inadvertently a "don't ask, don't tell" policy when it comes to competitor cooperation. In addition, this article presents an economic framework that explains how such a policy may benefit health care consumers. Finally, it is suggested that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy has created an area of per se legality that precludes an examination designed to distinguish consumer-benefiting practices from those that provide no benefit.
An Efficiency Analysis Of Contracts For The Provision Of Telephone Services To Prisons, Justin Carver
An Efficiency Analysis Of Contracts For The Provision Of Telephone Services To Prisons, Justin Carver
Federal Communications Law Journal
As the numbers of prisons and prisoners continue to increase, so does the market for prison services. One of the more lucrative segments of this industry is the telephone market. To the extent that the services are provided to the prisoners, the relationship resembles a third party beneficiary contract, but due to the perverse financial incentives and the political climate surrounding prisons and prisoners, neither the state nor the private entity acts in the best interests of the consumers in particular or of society in general. This Article will analyze the efficiency of these contracts, introduce alternate arrangements, and compare …
Judicial Review Of Member-State Regulation Of Trade Within A Federal Or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism And Balancing, Da Capo, Donald H. Regan
Judicial Review Of Member-State Regulation Of Trade Within A Federal Or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism And Balancing, Da Capo, Donald H. Regan
Articles
The topic of this Essay is not one Terry Sandalow has worked on, but he got me started on it by organizing, with Eric Stein, the Bellagio Conference on comparative constitutional economic integration in the United States and the European Community. For that, and for thirty-three years during which he has been an unfailingly stimulating and supportive colleague, Dean, and friend, I am deeply grateful.
Legalizing Merger To Monopoly And Higher Prices: The Canadian Competition Tribunal Gets It Wrong, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Stephen F. Ross
Legalizing Merger To Monopoly And Higher Prices: The Canadian Competition Tribunal Gets It Wrong, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Stephen F. Ross
All Faculty Scholarship
This article analyzes the Canadian Superior Propane decision, apparently the first merger decision in world history to consider explicitly what to do when a merger was predicted to lead to both higher consumer prices and to net efficiencies. The article advocates analyzing the merger under a "price to consumers" or "consumer welfare" standard, rather than a total efficiency standard, and advocates that the enforcers and the courts block such mergers.
The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo
The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo
Michigan Law Review
There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its competitor. For example, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million worth of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operating systems market. Also, in November 1998, Northwest Airlines, the nation's fourth-largest airline, purchased 14% of the common stock of Continental Airlines Inc., the nation's fifth-largest (and fastest growing) airline. Northwest competes with Continental on seven routes, serving 3.6 million passengers per year. In another example, TCI, the nation's largest cable operator, became a passive investor with a 9% stake (which can be increased, under the terms …
Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory Of Antitrust And Consumer Protection Law, Neil W. Averitt, Robert H. Lande
Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory Of Antitrust And Consumer Protection Law, Neil W. Averitt, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
This article is about the relationship between antitrust and consumer protection law. Its purpose is to define each area of law, to delineate the boundary between them, to show how they interact with each other, and to show how they ultimately support one another as the two component parts of an overarching unity: effective consumer choice (also called consumer sovereignty).
Consumer choice only is effective when two fundamental conditions are present. There must be a range of consumer options made possible through competition, and consumers must be able to choose effectively among these options. The antitrust laws are intended to …
Black And White Thinking In The Gray Areas Of Antitrust: The Dismantling Of Vertical Restraints Regulation, Barbara Ann White
Black And White Thinking In The Gray Areas Of Antitrust: The Dismantling Of Vertical Restraints Regulation, Barbara Ann White
All Faculty Scholarship
In this Article I present a two-pronged analysis of vertical restraints, one in law and one in economics. By tracing the checkered legal history of vertical restraints, I show the marked changes recent antitrust decisions have wrought, in particular, by comparing the legal standards expressed by the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. with those in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp and Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) v. USA Petroleum Co. If through the latter two cases the Court has, for all practical purposes, created a category of per se legality for vertical price restraints, which …
The Role Of Efficiency Justifications In U.S.-American And West German Merger Control Law: A Comparison, Christian Westerhausen
The Role Of Efficiency Justifications In U.S.-American And West German Merger Control Law: A Comparison, Christian Westerhausen
LLM Theses and Essays
When merger control laws first emerged in the United States and West Germany in the early 1900s, some businessmen and economists argued that the efficiency of businesses was impeded by antimerger laws. They contended that only very large businesses could realize significant efficiencies, be internationally competitive, and attain technological progress. This paper analyzes the role that these efficiency arguments had on the laws in West Germany and the United States, respectively. German law mainly upheld the idea that preservation of competition was most important for business efficiency, but also included a provision that firms could put forward the social desirability …
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert Hovenkamp
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert Hovenkamp
Michigan Law Review
This article begins with the premise that nothing - not even an intellectual structure as imposing as the Chicago School - lasts forever. In fact, a certain amount of stagnation is already apparent. Most of the creative intellectual work of the Chicago School has already been done - done very well, to be sure. The new work too often reveals the signs of excessive self-acceptance, particularly of quiet acquiescence in premises that ought to be controversial.
Today the cutting edge of antitrust scholarship is coming, not from protagonists of the Chicago School, but rather from its critics. The critics began …
Competition, Integration And Economic Efficiency In The Eec From The Point Of View Of The Private Firm, Michel Waelbroeck
Competition, Integration And Economic Efficiency In The Eec From The Point Of View Of The Private Firm, Michel Waelbroeck
Michigan Law Review
As early as 1956, experts appointed by the six original Member State governments to investigate measures to pursue integration after the failure of the European Defence Community clearly established this link between the abolition of barriers to trade and an increase in the intensity of competition. In what has come to be known as the "Spaak Report," the experts noted the technology gap then separating Europe from the United States and proposed, as a remedial measure, the creation of a ''vast zone of common economic policy, constituting a powerful production unit, and allowing a continued expansion, and increased stability, an …
Afterword: Could A Merger Lead To Both A Monopoly And A Lower Price?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Walter Vandaele
Afterword: Could A Merger Lead To Both A Monopoly And A Lower Price?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Walter Vandaele
All Faculty Scholarship
This article demonstrates that significant net efficiencies from a merger could cause prices to decrease, even if the merger results in a monopoly. The article also shows that a price focus would require substantially more efficiencies to justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger than would an efficiency focus (in other words, it re-does the Williamsonian merger tradeoff, using price to consumers instead of net efficiencies as its focus). We demonstrate this by calculating how large the necessary efficiency gains would have to be to prevent price increases under different market conditions.
Efficiency Considerations In Merger Enforcement, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande
Efficiency Considerations In Merger Enforcement, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
This is one of the first articles to demonstrate that the primary goal of antitrust is neither exclusively to enhance economic efficiency, nor to address any social or political factor. Rather, the overriding intent behind the merger laws was to prevent prices to purchasers from rising due to mergers (a wealth transfer concern). This is the first article to show how to analyze mergers with this goal in mind. Doing so challenges the fundamental underpinnings of Williamsonian merger analysis (which assumes mergers should be evaluated only in terms of net efficiency effects).
In this and three related articles we re-do …
The "Economic" Analysis Of Transnational Mergers, William James Adams
The "Economic" Analysis Of Transnational Mergers, William James Adams
Michigan Journal of International Law
No congregation of lawyers can be considered complete without a token economist. The role of the economist consists of describing the economic mode of analyzing the legal problem under consideration. Unfortunately from the standpoint of the token, economists rarely agree on criteria appropriate for the appraisal of economic phenomena. With respect to transnational corporate mergers, four modes of analysis may be described legitimately as economic.