Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 8 of 8

Full-Text Articles in Law

Regulating New Tech: Problems, Pathways, And People, Cary Coglianese Dec 2021

Regulating New Tech: Problems, Pathways, And People, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

New technologies bring with them many promises, but also a series of new problems. Even though these problems are new, they are not unlike the types of problems that regulators have long addressed in other contexts. The lessons from regulation in the past can thus guide regulatory efforts today. Regulators must focus on understanding the problems they seek to address and the causal pathways that lead to these problems. Then they must undertake efforts to shape the behavior of those in industry so that private sector managers focus on their technologies’ problems and take actions to interrupt the causal pathways. …


The Failure Of Liability In Modern Markets, Yesha Yadav Jun 2016

The Failure Of Liability In Modern Markets, Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In April 2015, the Department of Justice charged Navinder Sarao for his role in causing the Flash Crash-the near-1,000-point drop-and- rebound in the Dow Jones Index that roiled markets in May 2010. Sarao, a small-time British trader operating out of his parents' suburban basement, stood accused of putting together a string of illusory, fake orders that fooled markets enough to spark the largest single-day drop in the index's history. Commentators rightly contest whether a bit-player like Sarao could have unleashed a near-catastrophe on U.S. securities markets single-handedly. Yet, the complaint-and its causal account- point to a troubling dilemma facing scholars …


Market Power Without Market Definition, Daniel A. Crane Dec 2014

Market Power Without Market Definition, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust law has traditionally required proof of market power in most cases and has analyzed market power through a market definition/market share lens. In recent years, this indirect or structural approach to proving market power has come under attack as misguided in practice and intellectually incoherent. If market definition collapses in the courts and antitrust agencies, as it seems poised to do, this will rupture antitrust analysis and create urgent pressures for an alternative approach to proving market power through direct evidence. None of the leading theoretic approaches—such as the Lerner Index or a search for supracompetitive profits—provides a robust …


Intellectual Liability, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Intellectual Liability, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Intellectual property is increasingly a misnomer since the right to exclude is the defining characteristic of property and incentives to engage in inventive and creative activity are increasingly being granted in the form of liability rights (which allow the holder of the right to collect a royalty from users) rather than property rights (which allow the holder of the right to exclude others from using the invention or creation). Much of this recent reorientation in the direction of liability rules arises from a concern over holdout or monopoly power in intellectual property. The debate over whether liability rules or property …


Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor rate regulators. The specialized, technical competence and supervisory capacity that public utilities commissions enjoy are usually absent from judicial chambers. Nonetheless, when granting antitrust remedies-particularly remedies for monopolistic abuse of intellectual property-courts sometimes purport to act as rate regulators for the licensing or sale of the defendant's assets. At the outset, we should distinguish between two forms ofjudicial rate setting. In one form, a court (or the FTC in its adjudicative capacity) grants a compulsory license and sets a specific rate as part of a final judgment or an order. The …


Application Of The Antitrust Laws To The Activities Of Insurance Companies: Heavier Risks, Expanded Coverage, And Greater Liability, Joseph Bauer, Earl W. Kintner, Michael J. Allen Jan 1985

Application Of The Antitrust Laws To The Activities Of Insurance Companies: Heavier Risks, Expanded Coverage, And Greater Liability, Joseph Bauer, Earl W. Kintner, Michael J. Allen

Journal Articles

Since 1945 Congress has exempted certain activities of insurance companies from federal antitrust scrutiny. This exemption, provided by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, is not unqualified; it only applies to insurance company activities that constitute the "business of insurance" and that already are regulated under state law. Moreover, the exemption does not apply to activities that involve boycotts, coercion, or intimidation. The purpose of this exemption was to preserve the long tradition of state regulation of insurance, while providing federal remedies for coercive anticompetitive activities. The authors examine recent Supreme Court interpretations of the Act in light of this legislative policy and …


The Antitrust System: An Impediment To The Development Of Negotiation Models, Andrew Popper Jan 1983

The Antitrust System: An Impediment To The Development Of Negotiation Models, Andrew Popper

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.


Collective Bargaining And The Antitrust Laws, Theodore J. St. Antoine Jan 1967

Collective Bargaining And The Antitrust Laws, Theodore J. St. Antoine

Other Publications

A central aim of the antitrust laws is the promotion of competition. A central aim of collective bargaining is the elimination of competition-according to classical trade union theory, the elimination of wage competition among all employees doing the same job in the same industry. Given these disparate aims, the antitrust laws and collective bargaining will almost inevitably tend to clash. To harmonize them, the type of competition which the law is intended to foster must be carefully distinguished from the type of competition which union-employer bargaining can properly displace. The Supreme Court's last major effort to draw the demarcation line …