Law Commons^™

The Use Doctrine In Trademark Law: Issues From Trade And Transborder Reputation, Srividhya Ragavan

Faculty Scholarship

Mindful of the current trend within the United States to revive the focus on the use of trademark to determine a mark’s ability to act as a source indicator, in this paper I highlight how focusing on use can create disparate results by examining the role of use when dealing with well-known marks. Hence, this paper implicates the prescriptions from the harmonized trade regime, especially trademark law. In doing so, the paper outlines larger public policy concerns that will ensue especially considering the role of the use doctrine in the context of international harmonization of protection of well-known trademarks. In …

Regulating New Tech: Problems, Pathways, And People, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

New technologies bring with them many promises, but also a series of new problems. Even though these problems are new, they are not unlike the types of problems that regulators have long addressed in other contexts. The lessons from regulation in the past can thus guide regulatory efforts today. Regulators must focus on understanding the problems they seek to address and the causal pathways that lead to these problems. Then they must undertake efforts to shape the behavior of those in industry so that private sector managers focus on their technologies’ problems and take actions to interrupt the causal pathways. …

Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Are large digital platforms that deal directly with consumers “winner take all,” or natural monopoly, firms? That question is surprisingly complex and does not produce the same answer for every platform. The closer one looks at digital platforms the less they seem to be winner-take-all. As a result, competition can be made to work in most of them. Further, antitrust enforcement, with its accommodation of firm variety, is generally superior to any form of statutory regulation that generalizes over large numbers.

Assuming that an antitrust violation is found, what should be the remedy? Breaking up large firms subject to extensive …

Addressing The Divisions In Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This is the text of an interview conducted in writing by Professor A. Douglas Melamed, Stanford Law School.

The Real Monopoly Is In The Boardroom, Ramsi Woodcock

Law Faculty Popular Media

We have always thought of the problem of monopoly as a problem of size or of markets. We say that Facebook is a monopoly because it is too big, or because it is in the nature of networked markets to reward scale.

But what if the problem of monopoly were really a problem of firm governance?

We don’t hate monopolies in themselves; we hate them for what they do. They charge us higher prices or deliver us lower-quality products. They pay us less or make our jobs harder.

But what a monopolist does is determined not by its size …

Federalism, Free Competition, And Sherman Act Preemption Of State Restraints, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Sherman Act establishes free competition as the rule governing interstate trade. Banning private restraints cannot ensure that competitive markets allocate the nation's resources. State laws can pose identical threats to free markets, posing an obstacle to achieving Congress's goal to protect free competition.

The Sherman Act would thus override anticompetitive state laws under ordinary preemption standards. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected such preemption in Parker v. Brown, creating the "state action doctrine." Parker and its progeny hold that state-imposed restraints are immune from Sherman Act preemption, even if they impose significant harm on out-of-state consumers. Parker's progeny …

Rico Had A Birthday! A Fifty-Year Retrospective Of Questions Answered And Open, Randy D. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) came into the world in 1970, a time of great social upheaval that was accompanied by shifting attitudes towards both crime and civil litigation. From the outset, the statute’s complexity, ambiguity, and uncertain purpose have confounded courts and commentators. At least some doubts as to the statute’s meaning and application arise because it has criminal and civil components that subject it to the twin—yet antithetical—social impulses to be “tough on crime” while containing a perceived “litigation explosion.” In this Article, I situate RICO in this larger context and offer that context as …

Vertical Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust litigation often requires courts to consider challenges to vertical “control.” How does a firm injure competition by limiting the behavior of vertically related firms? Competitive injury includes harm to consumers, labor, or other suppliers from reduced output and higher margins.

Historically antitrust considers this issue by attempting to identify a market that is vertically related to the defendant, and then consider what portion of it is “foreclosed” by the vertical practice. There are better mechanisms for identifying competitive harm, including a more individualized look at how the practice injures the best placed firms or bears directly on a firm’s …

Competing Explanations For Parallel Conduct: Lessons From The Australian Detergent Case (Colgate-Palmolive), George Hay, E. Jane Murdoch

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Parallel conduct by competing firms is an almost unavoidable phenomenon in the real world. Of course, parallel conduct can be the result of completely independent and uncontroversial behaviour, such as when all suppliers are affected by and respond unilaterally to an identical increase in costs. Few would suggest that, in such circumstances, the firms’ conduct should be subject to sanctions. At the other extreme, parallel conduct can be the result of interdependent and deliberately coordinated behaviour, such as when all suppliers meet in the proverbial smoke-filled room and agree to fix prices. Few would hesitate to condemn such conduct under …

Alston And The Dejudicialization Of Antitrust, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

A curious feature of NCAA v. Alston is the shoe that didn’t drop, at least not immediately. “Put simply,” Justice Gorsuch wrote for a unanimous Court, “this suit involves admitted horizontal price fixing in a market where the defendants exercise monopoly control.” Given that this pronouncement occurred on page fourteen of the Court’s opinion, one might have expected that the opinion would end on, say, page fifteen, for if there has been one fixed point in American antitrust law it has been that horizontal price-fixing, especially but not only by those with monopoly power, is per se illegal. Instead, the …

Voting Trusts And Antitrust: Rethinking The Role Of Shareholder Litigation In Public Regulation, From The 1880s To The 1930s, Laura Phillips Sawyer, Naomi R. Lamoreaux

Scholarly Works

In 1903 the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) bought a majority interest in the Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Company, allegedly with the aim of eliminating competition in the telephone business. Perhaps it is not remarkable that the Illinois Supreme Court ruled this acquisition of an Illinois corporation to be illegal. What is noteworthy, however, is that the court took this step at the behest of a group of Kellogg’s minority shareholders who had filed suit to block the deal. Judges had long responded skeptically to such actions, worried that shareholders would clog the courts with challenges to managers’ decisions …

Appreciating The Overlooked Contributions Of The New Harvard School, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

My colleague, Herbert Hovenkamp, is almost universally recognized as the most cited and the most authoritative US antitrust scholar. Among his many honors, his status as the senior author of the authoritative Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise makes him the unquestioned leader of the New Harvard School, which has long served as the bellwether for how courts are likely to resolve emerging issues in modern antitrust doctrine. Unfortunately, its defining tenets and its positions on emerging issues remain surprisingly obscure. My contribution to this festschrift explores the core commitments that distinguish the New Harvard School from other approaches to antitrust. It …

Antitrust Harm And Causation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

How should plaintiffs show harm from antitrust violations? The inquiry naturally breaks into two issues: first, what is the nature of the harm? and second, what does proof of causation require? The best criterion for assessing harm is likely or reasonably anticipated output effects. Antitrust’s goal should be output as high as is consistent with sustainable competition.

The standard for proof of causation then depends on two things: the identity of the enforcer and the remedy that the plaintiff is seeking. It does not necessarily depend on which antitrust statute the plaintiff is seeking to enforce. For public agencies, enforcement …

Protecting And Fostering Online Platform Competition: The Role Of Antitrust Law, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This essay provides a perspective on the role of antitrust law in protecting and fostering competition in the digital economy, with particular attention to online platforms. It highlights the danger of anticompetitive exclusionary conduct by dominant online platforms and describes ways that antitrust law can challenge and deter such conduct. The essay also identifies a number of difficulties that U.S. courts and enforcers face in challenging harmful exclusionary conduct by dominant platforms, and discusses some ways that regulation can supplement antitrust law in fostering competition.

Will The Supreme Court Recover Its Own Fumble? How Alston Can Repair The Damage Resulting From Ncaa's Sports League Exemption, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Horizontal restraints are unlawful per se unless a court can identify some redeeming virtue that such restraints may create. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (“NCAA”), the Supreme Court rejected this standard, refusing to condemn horizontal restraints on price and output imposed by the NCAA without specifying any possible redeeming virtues. The Court emphasized that other restraints not before the Court were necessary to create and maintain athletic competition like that supervised by the NCAA. This exemption for sports leagues ensures that all restraints imposed by such entities merit Rule …

A Suggested Revision Of The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (July 2021), Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The DOJ/ FTC Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) were adopted by the FTC in June 2020 by a party-line 3-2 party line over the dissent of the Acting Chair. One might expect that the VMGs will be withdrawn and/or revised, now that there is a Democratic majority. Revision is appropriate because the VMGs are both incomplete and overly permissible. This Suggested Revision can aid that process.

Potential Competition And Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This short note prepared for an OECD meeting in June 2021 examines several antitrust issues involving analysis of potential competition. While the analysis is not new, it is still useful to collect them together in a unified fashion to show how they are related. In this regard, all the analysis and conclusions flow from the overarching (and obvious) points that exclusionary conduct and agreements that maintain monopoly power very often harm consumers, and that monopoly profits typically exceed the combined duopoly profits earned by the dominant firm and the entrant, if there is successful entry. While this is not inevitably …

Patents And Price Fixing By Serial Colluders, Michael J. Meurer, William Kovacic, Robert Marshall

Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust law has long been mindful of the danger that firms may misuse their patents to facilitate price fixing. Courts and commentators addressing this danger have assumed that patent-facilitated price fixing occurs in a single market. In this Article, we extend conventional analysis to address firms’ patent misuse to facilitate price fixing across multiple products lines. By doing so, we expose gaps in existing agency enforcement and scholarly proposals for reform. Important legal tests that make sense in the single market setting do not carry over to the context we call serial collusion, where certain offenders engage in repeat collusion …

Brief Of Amici Curiae 65 Professors Of Law, Business, Economics, And Sports Management In Support Of Respondents, Chris Sagers, Michael A. Carrier, Lisa M. Geary

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

The Alston plaintiffs are college athletes who successfully challenged the NCAA's "amateurism" rules, convincing the lower courts that the rules should be modestly relaxed to limit their effect on competition for athletic talent. Nearly 60 professors of law, business, and economics from around the country joined the brief.

Comments To The Draft Working Group Iii Workplan, Columbia Center On Sustainable Investment, International Institute For Environment And Development, International Institute For Sustainable Development

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is currently working on how to reform international investment treaties, focusing in particular on those treaties’ provisions enabling investors to sue governments in international arbitration. As an observer organization in this process, CCSI has emphasized that in the context of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) reform, it is important to first consider what it is that investment treaties aim to achieve, and only then to consider what form(s) of dispute settlement will best advance those objectives. This means not only looking at reform of the existing ISDS mechanism, but also alternatives to …

Achieving Privacy: Costs Of Compliance And Enforcement Of Data Protection Regulation, Anupam Chander, Meaza Abraham, Sandeep Chandy, Yuan Fang, Dayoung Park, Isabel Yu

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Is privacy a luxury for the rich world? Remarkably, there is a dearth of literature evaluating whether data privacy is too costly for companies to implement, or too expensive for governments to enforce. This paper is the first to offer a review of surveys of costs of compliance, and to summarize national budgets for enforcement. The study shows that while privacy may indeed prove costly for companies to implement, it is not too costly for governments to enforce. This study will help inform governments as they fashion and implement privacy laws to address the “privacy enforcement gap”—the disparity between the …

Antitrust Antitextualism, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Judges and scholars frequently describe antitrust as a common-law system predicated on open-textured statutes, but that description fails to capture a historically persistent phenomenon:judicial disregard of the plain meaning of the statutory texts and manifest purposes of Congress. This pattern of judicial nullification is not evenly distributed: when the courts have deviated from the plain meaning or congressional purpose, they have uniformly done so to limit the reach of antitrust liability or curtail the labor exemption to the benefit of industrial interests. This phenomenon cannot be explained solely or even primarily as a tug-of-war between a progressive Congress and conservative …

What Those Shocking Texas Power Bills Have In Common With Uber Surges, Broadway Tickets, And Airfare, Ramsi Woodcock

Law Faculty Popular Media

You might think that the $17,000 bills that Texas electricity providers are sending to customers who kept their lights on during last week’s historic storm reflect red state libertarian ideology run amuck. But you would be wrong.

They are actually the product of the exact same approach to markets reflected in the congestion-pricing plan for midtown Manhattan adopted by the New York State legislature in 2019, in the way Broadway priced tickets for shows like The Lion King and Wicked before the pandemic, and the way airlines have been pricing seats for years.

The problem is not ideological but intellectual, …

Navigating The Transition To A More Innovation-Centric Antitrust (Review Of Richard J. Gilbert, Innovation Matters), Jonathan Baker

Book Reviews

Review of Richard J. Gilbert Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy MIT Press 2020

Dominant Digital Platforms: Is Antitrust Up To The Task?, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

It has been one hundred years since the end of the Progressive Era and twenty years since the Microsoft settlement. This twenty-year period has seen the rise of the Internet and a new set of dominant platforms, as well as increased consolidation in the brick-and-mortar world. Antitrust has become more permissive. This Essay examines both issues: (i) the potential legal difficulties in reining in exclusionary conduct by dominant platforms; and (ii) merger under-enforcement. This Essay argues that it is necessary to strengthen antitrust enforcement. Consolidation through mergers and exclusionary conduct by dominant firms can harm consumers and workers and reduce …

Hacking Antitrust: Competition Policy And The Computer Fraud And Abuse Act, Charles Duan

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a federal computer trespass statute that prohibits accessing a computer "without authorization or exceeding authorized access," has often been criticized for clashing with online norms, over-criminalizing common behavior, and infringing freedom-of-expression interests. These controversies over the CFAA have raised difficult questions about how the statute is to be interpreted, with courts of appeals split on the proper construction and the Supreme Courtset to consider the law in its current October Term 2020.

This article considers the CFAA in a new light, namely its effects on competition. Rather than merely preventing injurious trespass upon computers, …

Corporate Family Matters, Carliss N. Chatman

Scholarly Articles

Corporate groups dominate the American economy. Known publicly by a single name—Chevron, Apple, McDonald’s, or Google—these companies are a web of affiliated entities, each with its own separate legal identity. Yet, corporate laws have failed to develop a statutory scheme that acknowledges these relationships among entities. While corporate personhood, separateness, and the accompanying liability protection are the primary reasons for using the corporate form, or business entities in general, form can be exploited by bad actors who seek to take advantage of the natural legal silos that define each legal entity in a corporate group as a stand-alone person. These …

The Political Face Of Antitrust, Spencer Weber Waller

Faculty Publications & Other Works

The last twenty years have brought antitrust back to the fore as a political issue of greater salience. Several booms and busts in the economy have highlighted the issue of corporate power in the economy and the political system. The growing influence and aggressiveness of the European Union and other jurisdictions' competition laws have highlighted the relative retreat in the United States. Political movements in the United States have brought issues of corporate power and its abuse back into the public limelight and with them a greater political salience for antitrust in the election cycle of 2020.

The Political Face Of Antitrust, Spencer Weber Waller, Jacob Morse

Faculty Publications & Other Works

The last twenty years have brought antitrust back to the fore as a political issue of greater salience. Several booms and busts in the economy have highlighted the issue of corporate power in the economy and the political system. The growing influence and aggressiveness of the European Union and other jurisdictions' competition laws have highlighted the relative retreat in the United States. Political movements in the United States have brought issues of corporate power and its abuse back into the public limelight and with them a greater political salience for antitrust in the election cycle of 2020.

Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, And The Prophylactic Role Of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

For decades, the major United States airlines have raised passenger fares through coordinated fare-setting when their route networks overlap, according to the United States Department of Justice. Through its review of company documents and testimony, the Justice Department found that when major airlines have overlapping route networks, they respond to rivals’ price changes across multiple routes and thereby discourage competition from their rivals. A recent empirical study reached a similar conclusion: It found that fares have increased for this reason on more than 1000 routes nationwide and even that American and Delta, two airlines with substantial route overlaps, have come …