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Full-Text Articles in Law
Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct: The 'Exclusion Of A Competitive Rival' Approach, Thom Lambert
Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct: The 'Exclusion Of A Competitive Rival' Approach, Thom Lambert
Faculty Publications
Unreasonably exclusionary conduct, the element common to monopolization and attempted monopolization offenses under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, remains essentially undefined. Federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have purported to define the term, but the definitions they have offered are so indeterminate as to be, in the words of one prominent commentator, “not just vague but vacuous.” Seeking to fill the void left by the courts, antitrust scholars have in recent years proposed four universal definitions of unreasonably exclusionary conduct. Each, however, is deficient: One would fail to deter a substantial amount of anticompetitive conduct, and the other …
The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane
The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Of all Robert Bork’s many important contributions to antitrust law, none was more significant than his identification of economic efficiency, disguised as consumer welfare, as the sole normative objective of U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court relied primarily on Bork’s argument that Congress intended the Sherman Act to advance consumer welfare in making its landmark statement in Reiter v. Sonotone that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” This singular normative vision proved foundational to the reorientation of antitrust law away from an interventionist, populist, Brandeisian, and vaguely Jeffersonian conception of antitrust law as a constraint on …
Kamakahi V. Asrm: The Egg Donor Price Fixing Litigation, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Kamakahi V. Asrm: The Egg Donor Price Fixing Litigation, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Faculty Scholarship
In April 2011, Lindsay Kamakahi caused an international stir by suing the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), SART-member fertility clinics, and a number of egg donor agencies on behalf of herself and other oocyte donors. The suit challenged the ASRM-SART oocyte donor compensation guidelines, which limit payments to egg donors to $5,000 ($10,000 under special circumstances), as an illegal price-fixing agreement in violation of United States antitrust laws.
Ensuing discussion of the case has touched on familiar debates surrounding coercion, commodification, and exploitation. It has also revealed many misconceptions about oocyte donation, …
The Law And Economics Of (Functional) Antitrust Standing In The United States And The European Union, Jeffrey L. Harrison
The Law And Economics Of (Functional) Antitrust Standing In The United States And The European Union, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
To date, and despite pressures toward convergence, the United States and the European Union have taken different paths with respect to the enforcement of antitrust laws by private parties and, therefore, differ dramatically in levels of functional standing. U.S. law is more encouraging to private enforcement than E.U. law but has a narrower view of whom those private parties are permitted to be. In the European Union, the eligible parties are broad but the motivation of any single party to bring an action is quite low. In the United States, the substantive law and much of the procedural law flow …