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Vertical Restraints, Dealers With Power, And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Vertical Restraints, Dealers With Power, And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court’s Leegin decision has now brought the rule of reason to all purely vertical intrabrand distribution restraints. But the rule of reason does not mean per se legality and occasions for anticompetitive vertically imposed restraints may still arise. Of all those that have been suggested the most plausible are vertical restraints imposed at the behest of a powerful dealer or group (cartel) of dealers.
Although a vertical distribution restraint resembles a dealer cartel in that both limit intraband competition, a manufacturer restraining the distribution of its product shuns the excess dealer profits a dealer cartel would seek. Accordingly, …
New Options For State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting The Real Victims Of Antitrust Violations, Robert H. Lande
New Options For State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting The Real Victims Of Antitrust Violations, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
In Illinois Brick v. Illinois Co., the Supreme Court held that, under federal antitrust law, only direct purchasers have standing to sue antitrust violators for damages. Since most products travel through one or more intermediaries before reaching consumers, this decision left most true victims of illegal cartels and other antitrust violations without a remedy to compensate them. Illinois Brick Co. also had the effect of undermining the objective of optimal deterrence of antitrust violations-because direct purchasers often have a suboptimal incentive to sue, the Court's decision often allows violators to escape paying significant damages. For this reason firms are insufficiently …
Transplanting Antitrust In China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, And State Control, Wentong Zheng
Transplanting Antitrust In China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, And State Control, Wentong Zheng
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article examines the compatibility of Western antitrust models as incorporated in China's first comprehensive antitrust law – the Antimonopoly Law ("AML") – with China's local conditions. It identifies three forces that shape competition law and policy in China: China's current transitional stage, China's market structures, and pervasive state control in China's economy. This Article discusses how these forces have limited the applicability of Western antitrust models to China in three major areas of antitrust: cartels, abuse of dominant market position, and merger review. Specifically, it details how these forces have prevented China from pursuing a rigorous anti-cartel policy, how …