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Full-Text Articles in Law
Devising A Microsoft Remedy That Serves Consumers, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
Devising A Microsoft Remedy That Serves Consumers, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
UF Law Faculty Publications
According to Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, Microsoft was a “predacious” monopolizer that did extensive “violence . . . to the competitive process.” Through a “single, well-coordinated course” of anticompetitive action, it suppressed competition from Netscape's Navigator, an Internet browser, and from Sun's Java programming language and related technologies. Microsoft “mounted a deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts, . . . placed an oppressive thumb on the scale of competitive fortune, . . . and trammeled the competitive process.” Having colorfully concluded that Microsoft's offenses were extreme, Judge Jackson deferred to the government's demand for a drastic remedy. He ordered that Microsoft …
The Competitive Effects Of Passive Minority Equity Interests: Reply, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien
The Competitive Effects Of Passive Minority Equity Interests: Reply, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In a recent article published in this journal, Jon Dubrow examines the acquisitions of passive minority equity interests. The focus of his article is the treatment of these transactions by the courts and the federal antitrust agencies, including their treatment of the investment-only exemption from Section 7 of the Clayton Act. One section of the article discusses the economic foundation for the competitive effects analysis of these acquisitions, focusing mainly on our article recently published in this journal. Dubrow accepts the basic economic framework set out in our earlier article, and the analysis of factors that affect the acquiring firm's …
Analysis Of Foreclosure In The Ec Guidelines On Vertical Restraints, Steven C. Salop
Analysis Of Foreclosure In The Ec Guidelines On Vertical Restraints, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The antitrust treatment of vertical restraints is quite controversial. In the United States, for example, warring vertical restraints guidelines were issued by the Department of Justice and National Association of Attorneys General, a group of antitrust enforcers from the individual states. However, a consensus was never achieved and these guidelines never entered the mainstream. Compare them to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which have become a template for evaluation of horizontal restraints.
The new EC Guidelines on Vertical Restraints Guidelines ("GVRs") represent a significant effort to create and implement a consistent analytic framework for evaluating vertical restraints. The scope of …
Challenges Of The New Economy: Issues At The Intersection Of Antitrust And Intellectual Property, Robert Pitofsky
Challenges Of The New Economy: Issues At The Intersection Of Antitrust And Intellectual Property, Robert Pitofsky
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
There is wide agreement that the last decade or so has presented an unusually lively and challenging period for antitrust analysis. Among many reasons we can point to are deregulation and problems of transition to a free market (telecommunications and electricity production offer leading examples), developments in procedural cooperation and possible substantive convergence in response to the increasing globalization of competition and enforcement approaches, and priorities in addressing an unprecedented merger wave. An additional challenge involves the application of established antitrust principles to the growing high-tech sector of the economy. It is that application of antitrust law to the new …
Antitrust And Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues At The Heart Of The New Economy, Robert Pitofsky
Antitrust And Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues At The Heart Of The New Economy, Robert Pitofsky
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The New Economy differs in degree rather than kind from the "old" economy. Part II of this discussion examines the key differences that define the New Economy. Part Ill turns to several implications of those differences as they pertain to antitrust enforcement. I argue that the differences do not justify sweeping generalizations that antitrust enforcement has no place in the New Economy, but do require antitrust enforcement to make adjustments and exercise sensitivity towards intellectual property issues on a case-by-case basis. The goal of a coherent overall competition policy, in deciding both what conduct to enforce against and what remedies …