Law Commons^™

Competition And-Or Efficiency: A Review Of West German Antimerger Law As A Model For The Proposed Treatment Of Efficiency Promotion Under Section 7 Of The Clayton Act, James F. Ponsoldt, Christian Westerhausen

Scholarly Works

The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the need for legislative change in the Clayton Act. Such change should be based upon the merger control legislation enacted in the Federal Republic of Germany ("Germany"), which explicitly recognizes an appropriate role for the efficiency effects of mergers but, at the same time, often subordinates the role of efficiency to the quite separate goal of protecting competitive markets, when those goals conflict. This Article first will briefly summarize the existing state of United States antimerger law, insofar as Section 7 of the Clayton Act and its history incorporate efficiency considerations. The …

Retaliatorily Discharged Employees’ Standing To Sue Under The Antitrust Laws, Gary M. Shaw

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Attorneys’ Fees In Antitrust Litigation: Making The System Fairer, Edward D. Cavanagh

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

Section 4(a) of the Clayton Act entitles prevailing plaintiffs in private antitrust actions to recover, in addition to treble damages, their reasonable attorneys' fees. Unique when adopted as part of the Sherman Act in 1890, this fee-shifting provision has been imitated, at least in part, in over 100 federal statutes. In providing for attorneys' fees, Congress intended to promote private enforcement of the antitrust laws and to insulate the treble damages recovery from expenditures for legal fees. Fee-shifting is mandatory where a plaintiff prevails, but the court has some leeway in setting the amount of the fee. The controversy …