Law Commons^™

Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, Steven C. Salop

All Faculty Scholarship

This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust analysis, what is 'market power' and/or 'monopoly power'? The question should be well settled because antitrust law requires proof of actual or likely market power or monopoly power to establish most types of antitrust violations.

Examination of key antitrust law opinions, however, shows that courts define 'market power' and 'monopoly power' in ways that are both vague and inconsistent. We conclude that the present level of confusion is unnecessary and results from two different but related errors:

(1) the belief or suspicion that …

Legal Reasoning And The Jurisprudence Of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations Of Neoclassical Economic Analysis In The Resolution Of Antitrust Disputes, John J. Flynn, James F. Ponsoldt

Scholarly Works

Cognizant of historical shifts in the methodology and standards applied in antitrust analysis, particularly in the analysis of vertical restraints, this Article first considers the underlying jurisprudential nature of legal reasoning as background for determining what the law of vertical restraints ought to be. The Article then explores the implications of substitution "economic analysis"--in the narrow sense of the economic analysis advocated by the Chicago School of "law and economics"--for legal reasoning in disputes arising under the antitrust laws. A more accurate, multivalued background for antitrust policy is explored. This Article finally proposes a method for analysis of vertical restraints …

The Contested Merger: Introduction And Fact Summary, Jonathan Baker

Presentations

"The Contested Merger" program arranged by the National Institute Committee of the Antitrust Section; and ABA's Division for Professional EducationThe program began with meetings set in corporate offices, in which the Yankee executives identified the business reasons behind the transaction, then consulted with in-house and outside counsel to assess the deal's antitrust risks and structure it. The transcript of this lesson in client counseling is reprinted following this introduction, as is the transcript of the panel discussion in which program participants offer a "reallife" analysis of the events of the program thus far.

Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Vertical restraints come in a glittering menu of exceptional variety, including resale price maintenance (RPM), tying, exclusive dealing, requirements contracts, "best efforts" clauses, full-line forcing, airtight and nonairtight exclusive territories, customer restrictions, areas of primary responsibility, profit-passover provisions, restrictions on locations of outlets, and dual distribution. Firms sometimes combine vertical restraints into packages. The great variety of individual and combined vertical restraints complicates the discovery of market effects. Indeed, identifying what restraint(s) a given firm is using at any particular time can be difficult.

An Anti-Antitrust Activist?; Podium, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

New Forces Chip Away At Agencies' Policy Of Antitrust Abandonment, Joe Sims, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust is at a crossroads. the federal agencies are dominated by the economic approach of the Chicago school, but congress and the states are expressing sharp dissent.

Using The Antitrust Laws To Combat Overseas Bribery By Foreign Companies: A Step To Even The Odds In International Trade, Franklin A. Gevurtz

McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

No abstract provided.

Why Price Correlations Don't Define Antitrust Markets: On Econometric Algorithms For Market Definition, Jonathan Baker

Working Papers

This paper compares two econometric methods that have been proposed for market definition: price correlations and residual demand curve estimation. Econometric theory is used to demonstrate that price correlations among firms will likely contain little or no information relevant to defining antitrust markets, under the assumption that a hypothetical cartel facing a downward sloping residual demand curve constitutes an antitrust market (defined according to the DOJ Guidelines). Hence price correlation analyses are likely to have little value for antitrust market definition. In terms of the literature on empirical techniques for market definition, this paper shows that if the econometric market …

A Comparative Approach To Extraterritoriality In The Fields Of Antitrust And Export Controls, Andreas Knaul

LLM Theses and Essays

This work will show that all isolated proposals for the solution of the extraterritoriality problem are fundamentally insufficient. Only a combination of negotiation, agreements and arbitration comes near to a solution of the problem. Taking the example of antitrust and export control laws the author will describe and analyze the different approaches currently discussed to cope with the fact that one sovereign state tries to extend its jurisdiction into the field of another sovereign state. It is to be shown that no approach can succeed as long as the substantive laws in the antitrust and export control field are different.

Legal Factors In The Acquisition Of A United State Corporation: Litigation By Hostile Targets, Johan E. Droogmans

LLM Theses and Essays

Acquisitions of United States corporations have become increasingly complex takeover contests, where bidders and target corporations are forced into offensive and defensive litigation strategies to protect their respective interests. Targets often assert that the bidders have violated federal or state securities laws, federal antitrust laws, federal margin regulations, federal and state regulatory systems, and federal anti-racketeering laws. These lawsuits are primarily based on the principal federal regulation of takeovers in section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the Williams Act. Target litigation is customary, but entails certain disadvantages; a lawsuit rarely stops an offer, is expensive, …

Law And The Abuse Of Economic Power In Europe, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

“What, Never? Well, Hardly Ever”: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny As An Alternative To Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 Hastings L.J. 471 (1987), Donald L. Beschle

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

American Retreat From Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement: Consequences Of New Legislative Policies For An International Competitive Economy, George E. Garvey

Scholarly Articles

No abstract provided.

Federalism And Conspiracy: Is Governmentally Compelled Conduct Per Se Lawful Under Section 1 Of The Sherman Act?, Mark Anderson

Articles

No abstract provided.

The Disaggregation Of Damages Requirement In Private Monopolization Actions, James R. Mccall

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Competitive Reform In Health Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, Thomas L. Greaney

All Faculty Scholarship

This article, written at the dawn of the era of "competitive reform" in health care examines the case and prospects for the introduction of competition in health care delivery and financing. It observes the failures of the ancienne regime of fee for service payment and professional sovereignty and discusses the benefits of market-oriented policy. Its contribution, still salient today, is the lesson that competition cannot succeed without regulation. It identifies legislative, professional, and cultural hurdles to effective implementation of competitive norms and policies that have impeded the success of competition policy in health care.

The Free Rider Rationale And Vertical Restraints Analysis Reconsidered, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Competition At The Teller's Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards For Banks And Other Financial Institutions, Joseph P. Bauer, Earl W. Kintner

Journal Articles

Congressional and judicial attitudes towards the banking industry have reflected two, sometimes conflicting, goals-the maintenance of the solvency of financial institutions to protect the interests of depositors, other creditors and the economy at large; and the promotion of competition among these institutions and in the economy. The advancement of these goals has been reflected in the application of the antitrust laws to the industry.

For the most part, the Sherman and Clayton Acts apply with the same force and scope to financial institutions as to other industries. In some cases, however, the goal of institutional protection is favored, and the …

Antitrust Practice And Procedure In The Formative Era: The Constitutional And Conceptual Reach Of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, James May

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.