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Comments On Warren Grimes: Transparency In Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Robert Pitofsky
Comments On Warren Grimes: Transparency In Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Robert Pitofsky
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this review, I will concentrate on the policies and experiences of the Federal Trade Commission - an agency with which I am more familiar than the Department of Justice. Professor Grimes appreciates that FTC disclosure policies provide more information than the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. I will leave it to others to explain why Department of Justice policies, particularly in the area of criminal enforcement, deserve to be different.
The Competitive Effects Of Passive Minority Equity Interests: Reply, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien
The Competitive Effects Of Passive Minority Equity Interests: Reply, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In a recent article published in this journal, Jon Dubrow examines the acquisitions of passive minority equity interests. The focus of his article is the treatment of these transactions by the courts and the federal antitrust agencies, including their treatment of the investment-only exemption from Section 7 of the Clayton Act. One section of the article discusses the economic foundation for the competitive effects analysis of these acquisitions, focusing mainly on our article recently published in this journal. Dubrow accepts the basic economic framework set out in our earlier article, and the analysis of factors that affect the acquiring firm's …
Competitive Effects Of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest And Corporate Control, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien
Competitive Effects Of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest And Corporate Control, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this article, we set up an economic framework for analyzing the competitive effects of partial ownership interests. We have three main goals. First, we conceptually derive and explain the competitive effects of partial ownership, explaining its key elements and drawing analogies to the key ideas behind the analysis of horizontal mergers. Second, we present a general framework for evaluating the competitive effects of partial ownership that is analogous to, but at the same time recognizes key differences in the standard analysis for evaluating horizontal mergers. Third, we examine several methods of quantifying these competitive effects.