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Evaluating Appropriability Defenses For The Exclusionary Conduct Of Dominant Firms In Innovative Industries, Jonathan Baker
Evaluating Appropriability Defenses For The Exclusionary Conduct Of Dominant Firms In Innovative Industries, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
In response to antitrust cases challenging the exclusionary conduct of dominant firms, some dominant firms offer an “appropriability defense.” This defense is the claim that prohibiting the challenged conduct would lessen the dominant firm’s return to investment in research and development (R&D), undermine that firm’s incentive to innovate, and harm the prospects for industry innovation. An appropriability defense should be questioned, and often rejected, if the dominant firm would be expected to increase its own R&D effort in response to increased R&D by its rivals after liability on a dominant firm is imposed. An analytical framework for determining whether a …
Exclusionary Conduct Of Dominant Firms, R&D Competition, And Innovation, Jonathan Baker
Exclusionary Conduct Of Dominant Firms, R&D Competition, And Innovation, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This paper evaluates the innovation consequences of antitrust enforcement against the exclusionary conduct of dominant firms through a Nash equilibrium model of research and development (R&D) competition to create new products. In the two-firm model, whether one firm regards the other firm’s R&D investment as a strategic complement or strategic substitute turns on an increasing differences condition: whether the first firm’s incremental benefit of increased R&D investment is greater if its rival’s R&D effort succeeds or if its rival’s R&D effort fails. Antitrust prohibitions on pre-innovation exclusion and post-innovation exclusion are found to be effective in different strategic settings: preventing …
Exclusion As A Core Competition Concern, Jonathan Baker
Exclusion As A Core Competition Concern, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
A contemporary consensus in antitrust discourse inappropriately places exclusionary conduct at the periphery of competition policy, while putting collusion at the core. Contrary to that common view, exclusion is as important as collusion as a matter of precedent, the structure of doctrinal rules, economics, and sound competition policy. Courts treat exclusionary violations as serious competitive problems. An emerging doctrinal rule for truncated condemnation of “plain” exclusionary conduct (practices foreclosing rivals that lack a plausible efficiency justification) parallels the evolving judicial approach toward “naked” collusion. Exclusion and collusion can be understood within a common economic framework that emphasizes the close relationship …
Comcast/Nbcu: The Fcc Provides A Roadmap For Vertical Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Comcast/Nbcu: The Fcc Provides A Roadmap For Vertical Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The FCC’s analysis of the Comcast-NBCU transaction fills a gap in the contemporary treatment of vertical mergers by providing a roadmap for courts and litigants addressing the possibility of anticompetitive exclusion. The FCC identified the factors any judicial or administrative tribunal would likely consider today in analyzing whether a vertical merger would lead to anticompetitive input or customer foreclosure, and a range of economic methods potentially relevant to applying that template to the facts of a transaction. Notwithstanding the difference between administrative adjudication under a public interest standard and judicial decision-making under the Clayton Act, the legal framework and economic …