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Antitrust and Trade Regulation

University of Michigan Law School

Legislative history

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Full-Text Articles in Law

State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester Dec 2016

State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester

Michigan Law Review

The state-action immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown immunizes anticompetitive state regulations from preemption by federal antitrust law so long as the state takes conspicuous ownership of its anticompetitive policy. In its 1943 Parker decision, the Supreme Court justified this doctrine, observing that no evidence of a congressional will to preempt state law appears in the Sherman Act’s legislative history or context. In addition, commentators generally assume that the New Deal court was anxious to avoid re-entangling the federal judiciary in Lochner-style substantive due process analysis. The Supreme Court has observed, without deciding, that the Federal Trade Commission might …


The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2014

The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Of all Robert Bork’s many important contributions to antitrust law, none was more significant than his identification of economic efficiency, disguised as consumer welfare, as the sole normative objective of U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court relied primarily on Bork’s argument that Congress intended the Sherman Act to advance consumer welfare in making its landmark statement in Reiter v. Sonotone that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” This singular normative vision proved foundational to the reorientation of antitrust law away from an interventionist, populist, Brandeisian, and vaguely Jeffersonian conception of antitrust law as a constraint on …


The Distinction Between The Scope Of Section 2(A) And Sections 2(D) And 2€ Of The Robinson-Patman Act, Michigan Law Review May 1985

The Distinction Between The Scope Of Section 2(A) And Sections 2(D) And 2€ Of The Robinson-Patman Act, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that sections 2(d) and 2(e) were meant to cover only disguised discriminations not within the scope of section 2(a). If the seller's conduct falls within the scope of section 2(a), that section must be applied regardless of whether or not the conduct also falls within the language of section 2(d) or 2(e). Only when section 2(a) does not apply is recourse available under sections 2(d) and 2(e). Part I of this Note looks at general antitrust policy, the limitations of the Clayton Act that led to the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, and the legislative history of …