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Antitrust and Trade Regulation

University of Michigan Law School

Federal Communications Commission

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Astroturf Campaigns: Transparency In Telecom Merger Review, Victoria Peng Jan 2016

Astroturf Campaigns: Transparency In Telecom Merger Review, Victoria Peng

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Large telecommunications companies looking to merge spend millions of dollars in their lobbying efforts to clear regulatory hurdles and obtain approval for their proposed mergers. Corporations such as AT&T, Comcast, and Time Warner use public participation processes as vehicles to influence regulatory decision-making. In the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) merger review context, the notice- and-comment process and public hearings have become fertile breeding grounds for hidden corporate influence. Corporations spend millions on corporate social responsibility programs and call upon nonprofit organizations that receive their largesse to represent their corporate interests as grassroots interests when the FCC seeks public comment. This …


Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers Dec 2011

Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers

Michigan Law Review

Until recently, regulation and antitrust law operated in tandem to safeguard competition in regulated industries. In three recent decisions-Trinko, Credit Suisse, and Linkline-the Supreme Court limited the operation of the antitrust laws when regulation "performs the antitrust function." This Note argues that cable programming regulations-which are in some respects factually similar to the telecommunications regulations at issue in Trinko and Linkline-do not perform the antitrust function because they cannot deter anticompetitive conduct. As a result, Trinko and its siblings should not foreclose antitrust claims for damages that arise out of certain cable programming disputes.


The Common Law In Cyberspace, Tom W. Bell May 1999

The Common Law In Cyberspace, Tom W. Bell

Michigan Law Review

Wrong in interesting ways, counts for high praise among academics. Peter Huber's stirring new book, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace, certainly merits acclaim by that standard. The very subtitle of the book, Abolish the FCC and Let Common Law Rule the Telecosm, announces the daring arguments to follow. A book so bold could hardly fail to make some stimulating errors, the most provocative of which this review discusses. Thanks to his willingness to challenge musty doctrines of telecommunications law and policy, moreover, Huber gets a great deal right. Law and Disorder in Cyberspace argues at length that the Federal Communications …


Unconstitutional Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership Ban: It Seemed Like A Good Idea At The Time, Arthur Bresnahan Jun 1995

Unconstitutional Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership Ban: It Seemed Like A Good Idea At The Time, Arthur Bresnahan

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

This article is a survey of the law regarding the federal government's ability to regulate a telephone company's provision of video programming to subscribers in its service area. Part I of the article is a history of the telco-cable cross-ownership ban. Part II is an analysis of the cases striking down the ban, exploring the rationale of these cases on a consolidated basis. Part III is a summary of the applicable standards by which to evaluate future attempts by Congress or the FCC to regulate telephone companies' provision of video programming.


Reforming Fcc Regulation Of Dominant Telephone Carriers: Putting Some Teeth Into The Test For Predation, Thomas K. Gump May 1993

Reforming Fcc Regulation Of Dominant Telephone Carriers: Putting Some Teeth Into The Test For Predation, Thomas K. Gump

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note examines the ineffective protections against predatory pricing by AT&T contained in the price cap scheme. Part I outlines price cap regulation and explains how the FCC hopes that a test based on the average variable cost standard will detect predatory pricing. Part II argues that the FCC erred in adopting an average variable cost standard as the test for telecommunications predation because that standard ignores the high fixed costs common to all firms in the industry. Part II demonstrates that AT&T could engage in predatory pricing despite the protections contained in the regulatory scheme. Part II then examines …


Regulation Of Business - Antitrust Laws - Effect Upon A Subsequent Antitrust Suit Of Fcc Approval Of An Exchange Of Television Stations, John F. Powell S.Ed. Apr 1959

Regulation Of Business - Antitrust Laws - Effect Upon A Subsequent Antitrust Suit Of Fcc Approval Of An Exchange Of Television Stations, John F. Powell S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

United States v. Radio Corporation of America-Creation of independent regulatory agencies presented the courts with the problem of allocating jurisdiction whenever the determination of proper judicial action was found to require the resolution of issues which an administrative agency was competent to resolve. To meet this problem the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" was developed whereby administrative issues are to be decided by the agency prior to the court's determination of issues not within the realm of the agency. Application of the doctrine is based on the need for efficient and uniform agency regulation and the desirability of utilizing agency …