Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Antitrust and Trade Regulation

University of Baltimore Law

Consumers

Articles 1 - 12 of 12

Full-Text Articles in Law

A Traditional And Textualist Analysis Of The Goals Of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft From Consumers, And Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande Apr 2013

A Traditional And Textualist Analysis Of The Goals Of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft From Consumers, And Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article ascertains the overall purpose of the antitrust statutes in two very different ways. First, it performs a traditional analysis of the legislative history of the antitrust laws by analyzing relevant legislative debates and committee reports. Second, it undertakes a textualist or "plain meaning" analysis of the purpose of the antitrust statutes, using Justice Scalia's methodology. It does this by analyzing the meaning of key terms as they were used in contemporary dictionaries, legal treatises, common law cases, and the earliest U.s. antitrust cases, and it does this in light of the history of the relevant times.

Both approaches …


Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Describe The Goals Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande Aug 2012

Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Describe The Goals Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article is both a short introduction to the Consumer Choice explanation for Competition Law or Antitrust Law, and also a short advocacy piece suggesting that Consumer Choice is the best way to articulate the goals of European Competition Law and United States Antitrust Law.

This article briefly:

  1. defines the consumer choice approach to antitrust or competition law and shows how it differs from other approaches;
  2. shows that the antitrust statutes and theories of violation embody a concern for optimal levels of consumer choice;
  3. shows that the United States antitrust case law embodies a concern for optimal levels of consumer …


Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Recenter The Mission Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande Jan 2010

Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Recenter The Mission Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article will (1) define the consumer choice approach to competition law or antitrust law and show how it differs from other approaches; (2) discuss the types of situations where a consumer choice focus is likely to make a difference in enforcement outcomes, producing better results than the other paradigms; (3) show that another important advantage of using the consumer choice approach would be to nudge decisions in the right direction; and (4) offer a brief overview of implementation issues.

This is a chapter of a forthcoming ASCOLA book, and is a condensation and update of Neil W. Averitt & …


The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande Jan 2008

The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Chicago School antitrust policy rests on the premise that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That foundation is flawed. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.

This essay defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, and analyzes recent case law. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives them of the benefits of competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market power. When conduct presents a conflict between the welfare …


Consumer Choice As The Ultimate Goal Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande Apr 2001

Consumer Choice As The Ultimate Goal Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The mission of the antitrust laws need to be clarified, and this article asserts that the best way to do this is to interpret and enforce these laws in terms of consumer choice. This reformulation is necessary due to uncertainty and instability that exists in the field. This article will 1. define the consumer choice approach to antitrust or competition law and show how it differs from other approaches; 2. show that the antitrust statutes and theories of violation embody a concern for optimal levels of consumer choice; 3. show that the antitrust case law embodies a concern for optimal …


Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason For Both Antitrust And Consumer Protection Law, Neil W. Averitt, Robert H. Lande Jan 1997

Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason For Both Antitrust And Consumer Protection Law, Neil W. Averitt, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article is about the relationship between antitrust and consumer protection law. Its purpose is to define each area of law, to delineate the boundary between them, to show how they interact with each other, and to show how they ultimately support one another as the two components of a single overarching unity. That overarching unity is consumer choice. Antitrust and consumer protection law share a common purpose in that both are intended to facilitate the exercise of consumer sovereignty or effective consumer choice. Such consumer choice exists when two fundamental conditions are present: (l) there must be a range …


Anticonsumer Effects Of Union Mergers: An Antiitrust Solution, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr. Nov 1996

Anticonsumer Effects Of Union Mergers: An Antiitrust Solution, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

Should unions and corporations be treated identically under the antitrust laws? This article explores this provocative question by examining whether union mergers should be subject to the antitrust laws. Currently unions and corporations are treated very differently. Large corporate mergers are blocked if their effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly". They are permitted if they are likely to be benign, procompetitive, or proconsumer.

Collective bargaining, by contrast, enjoys a broad exemption from the antitrust laws. If they follow appropriate procedures, unions - even unions that, when taken together, cover all workers within …


Commentary: Implications Of Professor Scherer's Research For The Future Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande Jan 1990

Commentary: Implications Of Professor Scherer's Research For The Future Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

One way to test the accuracy of Professor Scherer's research is to compare it to the best previous work in the area. Prior to his current article the best analysis of the state of economic thinking and knowledge during antitrust's formative period was presented twelve years ago by—Professor Scherer. This was a skeletal precurser to the well-documented version that he now presents, but his overall conclusions are identical. During the twelve years since his conclusions were presented in the Yale Law Journal no one has demonstrated that his research is in any way faulty or misleading, even though many have …


Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, Robert H. Lande Jan 1989

Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

My role today will be comparable to the small child's in the classic story of the Emperor's new clothes; I too have a simple truth to tell. The sole goal of antitrust is not to enhance economic efficiency. Increased economic efficiency is not even the primary goal of the antitrust laws. The main purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent firms from acquiring and using market power to force consumers to pay more for their goods and services. Congress was primarily concerned that corporations would use market power "unfairly" to extract wealth from consumers. These wealth transfers were of …


The Rise And (Coming) Fall Of Efficiency As The Ruler Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande Oct 1988

The Rise And (Coming) Fall Of Efficiency As The Ruler Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The debate over the legitimate goals of antitrust is ceaseless and its practical resolution influenced by politics. The answer often given in the past, and particularly during the Warren Court era when a heavy emphasis was placed on social and political factors, contrasts sharply with the consensus view during the Reagan Administration that only economic efficiency counts. Since antitrust moves in cycles, a natural question arises—will antitrust continue to stand upon a foundation of efficiency, return to the old social and political perspective, or embrace some third view of its proper direction?


Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande Oct 1987

Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Vertical restraints come in a glittering menu of exceptional variety, including resale price maintenance (RPM), tying, exclusive dealing, requirements contracts, "best efforts" clauses, full-line forcing, airtight and nonairtight exclusive territories, customer restrictions, areas of primary responsibility, profit-passover provisions, restrictions on locations of outlets, and dual distribution. Firms sometimes combine vertical restraints into packages. The great variety of individual and combined vertical restraints complicates the discovery of market effects. Indeed, identifying what restraint(s) a given firm is using at any particular time can be difficult.


Wealth Transfers As The Original And Primary Concern Of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, Robert H. Lande Sep 1982

Wealth Transfers As The Original And Primary Concern Of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Chicago School antitrust policy rests upon the premise that the sole purpose of antitrust is to promote economic efficiency. This article shows that this foundation is flawed. The fundamental purpose of antitrust is to protect consumers. To protect purchasers from paying supracompetitive prices when they buy goods or services. This is the "wealth transfer," "theft", "consumer welfare" or "purchaser protection" explanation for antitrust.

The article shows that the efficiency view originated in a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Sherman Act undertaken by Robert Bork. Bork purported to show that Congress only cared about enhancing economic efficiency.

To …