Law Commons^™

The New Doj: Lessons Learned From The Ticketmaster Live Nation Decision, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Wickard Through An Antitrust Lens, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics: Farewell To The Chimera Of Forcing, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Standard Oil As Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Robert Bork's Forgotten Role In The Transaction Cost Revolution, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

The last few decades have witnessed a scientific revolution in the field of industrial organization in the form of transaction cost economics (TCE). This revolution has radically altered economists’ understanding and interpretation of both partial and complete economic integration. Not surprisingly, this sea change has substantially influenced antitrust law and policy, impelling the Supreme Court to reverse or greatly modify various precedents.

This essay supplements the received historiography of the TCE revolution. It contends that Robert Bork played a hitherto underappreciated role in that revolution. In particular, the essay contends that in 1966, before the official onset of the transaction …

Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

Most scholars would agree that a merger between General Motors and Ford should not be judged solely by Delaware corporate law, even if both firms are incorporated in Delaware. Leaving the standards governing such mergers to state law would assuredly produce a race to the bottom that would result in unduly permissive treatment of such transactions. Similarly, if the two firms agreed to divide markets, most would agree that some regulatory authority other than Michigan or Delaware should have the final word on the agreement. Thus, in order to forestall monopoly or its equivalent, the national government must itself exercise …

Reframing The (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare And Total Welfare, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

This Article critiques the role that the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm plays in the debate over the definition of “consumer welfare” that courts should employ when developing and applying antitrust doctrine. The Article contends that common reliance on the paradigm distorts the debate between those who would equate “consumer welfare” with “total welfare” and those who equate consumer welfare with “purchaser welfare.” In particular, the model excludes, by fiat, the fact that new efficiencies free up resources that flow to other markets, increasing output and thus the welfare of purchasers in those markets. Moreover, the model also assumes that both …

Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

Intrabrand restraints limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single brand. While most scholars believe that such contracts can help assure optimal promotion of a manufacturer's products, there is disagreement about the exact manner in which such restraints accomplish this objective. Many scholars believe that such restraints themselves induce dealers to engage in promotional activities desired by the manufacturer. Others believe that such restraints merely serve as "performance bonds," which dealers will forfeit if they fail to follow the manufacturer's precise promotional instructions. Some scholars reject both approaches, …

Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

Challenging traditional antitrust jurisprudence, Professor Alan J. Meese argues that the present structure of Rule of Reason analysis, applied pursuant to Standard Oil v. United States, has become outdated. The Rule of Reason as currently applied by the courts rests upon neoclassical price theory, an economic paradigm that assumes that legitimate competition consists of unbridled technological rivalry, unconstrained by nonstandard contracts. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to apply a competing paradigm- Transaction Cost Economics-when determining whether a contract is unreasonable "per se" or instead deserving of Rule of Reason scrutiny. Professor Meese argues that Transaction Cost Economics more …

Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Intrabrand Restraints And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

In Praise Of All Or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject The Quick Look, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Farewell To The Quick Look: Redefining The Scope And Content Of The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Economic Theory, Trader Freedom And Consumer Welfare: State Oil Co. V. Khan And The Continuing Incoherence Of Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Competition Policy And The Great Depression: Lessons Learned And A New Way Forward, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

The recent Great Recession has shaken the nation’s faith in free markets and inspired various forms of actual or proposed regulatory intervention displacing free competition. Proponents of such intervention often claim that such interference with free-market outcomes will help foster economic recovery and thus macroeconomic stability by, for instance, enhancing the “purchasing power” of workers or reducing consumer prices. Such arguments for increased economic centralization echo those made during the Great Depression, when proponents of regulatory intervention claimed that such interference with economic liberty and free competition, including suspension of the antitrust laws, was necessary to foster economic recovery. Indeed, …

Competition And Market Failure In The Antitrust Jurisprudence Of Justice Stevens, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Antitrust, Regulatory Harm, And Economic Liberty, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Labor Unions In The Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, Davison M. Douglas

Davison M. Douglas

No abstract provided.

Una Experiencia Comparada Del Derecho Antitrust: La Defensa Passing-On (A Comparative Experience Of The Antitrust Law: The Passing-On Defence), Jesús A. Soto

Jesús Alfonso Soto Pineda

RESUMEN: El artículo presenta la passing–on defence, como argumento de defensa de las empresas demandadas en el marco de procesos de reparación por daños y perjuicios surgidos de infracciones a las normas de libre competencia, haciendo referencia a las experiencias y actualidad de la figura en Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea, en busca de extraer el catálogo de beneficios e inconveniencias que apareja en la construcción de un sistema de defensa de la competencia que le acoja.

ABSTRACT: The article shows the passing–on defence, as an argument in favour of the cartel member in the liability process founded in …

Internet Regulation And Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, And Cable Bundling, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page

William H. Page

The goal of telecommunications policy has shifted from the control of natural monopoly to the promotion of competition. But the question remains how extensive and persistent the government's regulatory role should be in the operation of communications markets. One might think that regulators could find the answer to this question in antitrust law. But antitrust has itself been torn between interventionist and laissez-faire tendencies. Over the past two decades, the dominant Chicago School approach to antitrust has focused on economic efficiency, a standard that has led to the abandonment or contraction of some categories of liability. More recently, however, post-Chicago …

At The Brink Of Free Agency: Creating The Foundation For The Messersmith-Mcnally Decision - 1968-1975, Edmund P. Edmonds

Edmund P. Edmonds

"One of the most dramatic periods in baseball’s long history of labor relations occurred from 1968 through 1975. The Major League Baseball Players Association negotiated baseball’s first Basic Agreement in 1968 without the benefit of any leverage that could alter most of Organized Baseball’s long practices that controlled the players’ mobility and wages. In 1975, however, the union won an arbitration panel hearing that determined that pitchers Dave McNally and Andy Messersmith were free agents after playing one full season under the renewed option year of their contracts and filing a grievance under the newly adopted arbitration process. This stunning …

Legal Process And The Past Of Antitrust, William L. Reynolds, Spencer Weber Waller

William L. Reynolds

No abstract provided.

Third Party Access And Refusal To Deal In European Energy Networks: How Sector Regulation And Competition Law Meet Each Other, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

In this paper, we will analyse the issue of concurrence between competition and sector rules and the relation between parallel concepts within the two different legal frameworks. We will firstly examine Third Party Access in relation to essential facilities doctrine and refusal of access and we will identify the common points and objectives of these concepts and the extent to which they provide a context to each other’s implementation. Second, we will focus on how Commission uses sector regulation and objectives as a context within the process of implementation of competition law in the energy sector and third, we will …

Teoria Unificada Da Colusão: Uma Sugestão De Regulação Dos, Ivo T. Gico

Ivo Teixeira Gico Jr.

A legislação concorrencial brasileira caracteriza toda e qualquer forma de abuso do poder econômico como uma infração à ordem econômica. A principal conduta delitiva é a formação de cartel. A maior dificuldade na implementação de uma política pública contrária à cartelização dos mercados é a caracterização jurídica de um acordo entre concorrentes, principalmente, no contexto oligopolístico. Nossa hipótese é a seguinte: se a lei brasileira não exige a presença de um acordo para a caracterização do delito administrativo, deveria ser juridicamente possível condenar a coordenação indevida de ações entre concorrentes mesmo na ausência de acordo. Não obstante, como a colusão …