Law Commons^™

Is A Ban On Non-Competes Supported By Empirical Evidence?, Sarah Oh Lam, Thomas Lenard, Scott Wallsten

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has proposed a rule to declare virtually all non-compete agreements unfair methods of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act and therefore, illegal. However, the empirical literature on non-compete agreements cited by the FTC in its Notice for Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) shows mixed results on earnings, job creation, firm formation, entrepreneurship, training, investment, and firm value. Evidence in other current studies also does not support an economy-wide ban. The FTC concludes that the proposed rule would yield net benefits even though by its own admission it lacks the information necessary to conduct a …

The Public’S Companies, Andrew K. Jennings

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Essay uses a series of survey studies to consider how public understandings of public and private companies map into urgent debates over the role of the corporation in American society. Does a social-media company, for example, owe it to its users to follow the free-speech principles embodied in the First Amendment? May corporate managers pursue environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) policies that could reduce short-term or long-term profits? How should companies respond to political pushback against their approaches to free expression or ESG?

The studies’ results are consistent with understandings that both public and private companies have greater public …

Divined Comity: Assessing The Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation And Updating The Second Circuit’S Prescriptive Comity Framework, William Weingarten

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, recently decided by the Second Circuit, sets a grave precedent for American plaintiffs seeking redress for antitrust injuries wrought by foreign defendants. The case involved a group of Chinese manufacturers and exporters of vitamin C, who conspired to fix prices and restrict output in the export market, injuring American consumers in import commerce. The foreign manufacturers conceded that they had colluded in fixing prices and restricting output, in flagrant violation of U.S. antitrust law. And yet, with the assistance of the Chinese government—intervening as amicus curiae—the defendants were successfully able to argue, on appeal …

The Battle With Big Tech: Analyzing Antitrust Enforcement And Proposed Reforms, Youngjae Lee, Morgan Hagenbuch

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Renewing Faith In Antitrust: Unveiling The Hidden Network Behind Pharmaceutical Product Hopping, Victoria Field

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Patents grant time-limited market exclusivity to drug manufacturers, meaning that other companies are prohibited from copying and selling the patented pharmaceutical. This allows manufacturers to lawfully charge monopoly prices. Generic competition starts at the expiration of the patent. To maintain coveted monopoly power, manufacturers often release an alternative formulation of the drug with a fresh patent that enjoys continued market exclusivity. Manufacturers who can convert their consumer base to the new formulation can continue charging peak prices. This process, called “product hopping,” has been the target of significant antitrust inquiry, with mixed results.

A product hop may be the result …

Returning To The Statutory Text: Why The Language Of Section 13(B) Requires Courts To Narrowly Construe The Ftc’S Ability To Obtain Injunctive Relief, Christopher Halm

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces over 70 laws in the areas of antitrust and consumer protection, and one valuable tool to support their enforcement is Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“Section 13(b)”). Section 13(b), among other features, grants the FTC authority to seek an injunction in district court against any defendant that is “about to violate” one or more of those laws. For the past three decades, courts have adopted a permissive judicial interpretation of that language, authorizing injunctions against defendants when the allegedly impending violations were only “likely to recur” based on past misconduct. This …

Output Effect Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Sinchit Lai

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

A growing body of literature evaluates the impact of antitrust laws on economic growth. Most of these empirical studies identify a positive impact; however, the existing literature only studies the effect of the existence of antitrust laws, but not their enforcement. To fill this gap in the literature, this Article uses private antitrust case filing numbers to examine the growth effect. Employing U.S. data and, after addressing endogeneity, using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis, I identify a negative and robust association between private enforcement and output on a national level in the short run over the period from …

The Disparate Treatment Of Rights In U.S. Trade, Desirée Leclercq

Fordham Law Review

Rights advocates are increasingly urging U.S. trade negotiators to include new binding and sanctionable provisions that would protect human rights, women’s rights, and gender equality. Their efforts are understandable. Trade agreements have significant advantages as a process for advancing international rights. Even though Congress and the executive incorporate international environmental standards and labor rights into U.S. trade agreements, they have refused to incorporate gender rights and broader human rights. The rationale behind the United States’s disparate treatment of rights in trade has received almost no scholarly attention. That is a mistake. Using labor rights as a case study, this Article …

Is Baseball Shrouded In Collusion Once More? Assessing The Likelihood That The Current State Of The Free Agent Market Will Lead To Antitrust Liability For Major League Baseball's Owners, Connor Mulry

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Note examines how Major League Baseball’s (MLB) current free agent system is restraining trade despite the existence of the league’s non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust. The league’s players have seen their percentage share of earnings decrease even as league revenues have reached an all-time high. This reality is due to the players’ inability to “cash-in” when their market value hits its apex. Once these players enter the open market, their value has greatly deteriorated and consequently, they are unable to generate earnings commensurate with their value to the league.

This Note first explores the progression of MLB’s exemption from …

Movements, Moments, And The Eroding Antitrust Consensus, Michael Wolfe

Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal

Timothy Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (Columbia Global Reports, 2018). $14.99.

Timothy Wu’s book, The Curse of Bigness, offers a brief history on and critical perspective of antitrust law’s development over the last century, calling for a return to a Brandeisian approach to the law. In this review-essay, I use Wu’s text as a starting point to explore antitrust law’s current political moment. Tracing the dynamics at play in this debate and Wu’s role in it, I note areas underexplored in Wu’s text regarding the interplay of antitrust law with other forms of …

Avoiding Market Definition Under Section 1 Of The Sherman Act, Johnny Shaw

Fordham Law Review

The 2018 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. American Express Co. was at odds with a trend among antitrust commentators and enforcement authorities away from dependence on formal market definition as part of plaintiffs’ burden of proof. Reliance on market definition as a dispositive issue has been ubiquitous in antitrust cases, but the costs from errors, inefficiency, and uncertainty inherent in that approach are glaring. The issue is ripe for clarification, and this Note suggests a new rule to that end. The proposed rule aims to delineate a set of cases in which formal market definition can confidently be …

Amazon And Platform Antitrust, Ben Bloodstein

Fordham Law Review

With its decision in Ohio v. American Express, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time embraced the recently developed, yet increasingly prolific, concept of the two-sided platform. Through advances in technology, platforms, which serve as intermediaries allowing two groups to transact, are increasingly ubiquitous, and many of the biggest tech companies operate in this fashion. Amazon Marketplace, for example, provides a platform for third-party vendors to sell directly to consumers through Amazon’s web and mobile interfaces. At the same time that platforms and their scholarship have evolved, a burgeoning antitrust movement has also developed which focuses on the …

Disagreeing Over Agreements: A Cross-Sectional Analysis Of No-Poaching Agreements In The Franchise Sector, Catherine E. Schaefer

Fordham Law Review

In October 2016, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division announced its intent to proceed criminally against parties to no-poaching agreements, or agreements between or among employers not to hire each other’s workers. Consequently, a wave of class action antitrust lawsuits has raised questions about the legality of no-poaching or no-hire provisions that certain franchised food businesses use. Fast-food restaurant chains, including McDonald’s, Carl’s Jr., and Pizza Hut, have recently found themselves embroiled in such litigation. This Note examines prior antitrust litigation involving no-poaching agreements between companies and discusses the differences and similarities between these cases and the cases involving franchised …

A History Of Competition: The Impact Of Antitrust On Hong Kong’S Telecommunications Markets, Sandra Marco Colino

Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal

Hong Kong has only had cross-sector competition law since 2015, but the city’s telecommunications markets have been subject to sector-specific antitrust provisions for over two decades. The importance of nurturing an efficient, innovative, and competitive telecoms industry for Hong Kong’s economic prosperity was acknowledged already at the time the sector was liberalized in the 1990s. Yet until the late 2000s, the government vehemently opposed the adoption of competition law in virtually all other sectors of the economy. This paper examines the effectiveness of the regulatory framework set up to guarantee the protection of competition in the telecommunications sector in Hong …

Constraining Monitors, Veronica Root

Fordham Law Review

Part I of this Article explains the failure of recent attempts by courts and legislators to constrain monitor behavior. Part II then argues that one reason for the lack of monitorship regulation lies in the reluctance of bar associations to oversee quasi-legal behavior. It then explains why reputation appears to be the primary factor reigning in monitor behavior today. Part III discusses implications of this Article’s findings. Specifically, it discusses concerns regarding the disclosure of information, the boundaries of the relationship between a monitor and other parties, and the ways a monitor’s identity might be utilized as a sanctioning mechanism. …

Constraining Monitors, Veronica Root

Fordham Law Review

Part I of this Article explains the failure of recent attempts by courts and legislators to constrain monitor behavior. Part II then argues that one reason for the lack of monitorship regulation lies in the reluctance of bar associations to oversee quasi-legal behavior. It then explains why reputation appears to be the primary factor reigning in monitor behavior today. Part III discusses implications of this Article’s findings. Specifically, it discusses concerns regarding the disclosure of information, the boundaries of the relationship between a monitor and other parties, and the ways a monitor’s identity might be utilized as a sanctioning mechanism. …

The Nba's Deal With The Devil: The Antitrust Implications Of The 1999 Nba-Nbpa Collective Bargaining Agreement Note, Dan Messeloff

Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Jurisprudence In The Second Circuit, Saul P. Morgenstern, Jennifer B. Patterson, Terri A. Mazur

Fordham Law Review

A running thread through Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence is a willingness to examine market participants’ real-world conduct and the consequences of that conduct in seeking out the balance between incentivizing robust competition and protecting the market—and ultimately consumers—from distortions caused by anticompetitive conduct. This Article collects and describes rulings that reflect such themes in Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence. The court’s long history in this substantive space, its likely continued exposure to critical antitrust questions, and the importance of this area of the law to our national economy assure that others will be examining and shedding further light on the Second …

Helping Yourself While Serving Two Masters: Do Specialists Violate Rule 10b-5 When They Interposition?, Roman Asudulayev

Fordham Urban Law Journal

The decision of the Second Circuit in United States v. Finnerty (Finnerty III) was the culmination of a number of District Court decisions that found that specialists on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) could not be held liable for fraud under Rule 10b-5 for interpositioning, whereby they put themselves between buy and sell limit orders, in violation of NYSE rules, and profited on the spread. Finnerty III and its District Court sibling decisions were wrongly decided. Specialists presented a uniquely thorny issue of agency law to the Federal Courts in New York. This issue was under-analyzed by the Federal …

Quality Collusion: News, If It Ain’T Broke, Why Fix It?, Mark Mcmillan

Fordham Urban Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, And The Goals Of Competition Law, David A. Hyman, William E. Kovacic

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Economics And Politics: Perspectives On The Goals And Future Of Antitrust, Jonathan B. Baker

Fordham Law Review

This Article examines the roles of economics and politics in U.S. antitrust from several perspectives. It explains why the modern debate over the economic welfare standard that enforcers and courts should pursue is unsatisfying. It connects economics with politics by describing antitrust’s economic goals as the product of a mid-twentieth century political understanding about the nature of economic regulation that continues to be accepted. To protect that understanding, it explains, antitrust rules should now be implemented using a qualified consumer welfare standard. It identifies contemporary political tensions that threaten to create regulatory gridlock or even to undermine that political understanding …

Reframing The (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare And Total Welfare, Alan J. Meese

Fordham Law Review

This Article critiques the role that the partial equilibrium trade–off paradigm plays in the debate over the definition of “consumer welfare” that courts should employ when developing and applying antitrust doctrine. The Article contends that common reliance on the paradigm distorts the debate between those who would equate “consumer welfare” with “total welfare” and those who equate consumer welfare with “purchaser welfare.” In particular, the model excludes, by fiat, the fact that new efficiencies free up resources that flow to other markets, increasing output and thus the welfare of purchasers in those markets. Moreover, the model also assumes that both …

The Goals Of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, Joshua D. Wright, Douglas H. Ginsburg

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Implementing Antitrust’S Welfare Goals, Herbert Hovenkamp

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust’S Democracy Deficit, Harry First, Spencer Weber Waller

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Merger Settlement And Enforcement Policy For Optimal Deterrence And Maximum Welfare, Steven C. Salop

Fordham Law Review

Merger enforcement today relies on settlements more than litigation to resolve anticompetitive concerns. The impact of settlement policy on welfare and the proper goals of settlement policy are highly controversial. Some argue that gun–shy agencies settle for too little, while others argue that agencies use their power to delay to extract overreaching settlement terms, even when mergers are not welfare reducing. This Article uses decision theory to throw light on this controversy. The goal of this Article is to formulate and analyze agency merger enforcement and settlement commitment policies in the face of imperfect information, litigation costs, and delay risks …

Against Goals, Eleanor M. Fox

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, Barak Orbach

Fordham Law Review

During the first seven decades following the enactment of the Sherman Act, competition was the uncontroversial goal of antitrust. The introduction of the consumer welfare standard led to the dissipation of “competition” as the goal of U.S. competition laws. This Essay explores how antitrust lost the goal of competition and argues that this goal should be restored. The Essay reevaluates several influential antitrust propositions. First, while “consumer welfare” was offered as a remedy for reconciling contradictions and inconsistencies in antitrust, the adoption of the consumer welfare standard sparked an enduring controversy, causing confusion and doctrinal uncertainty. In effect, the consumer …

Trusts And The Origins Of Antitrust Legislation, Wayne D. Collins

Fordham Law Review

Between 1888 and 1890, thirteen states and the federal government enacted antitrust legislation criminalizing combinations among competitors intended to control prices in the marketplace. These laws were a reaction to the increasing formation of horizontal combinations, large and small, throughout the economy in the wake of dramatically changing economic conditions since the Civil War. Through most of this period, combinations struggled to find structures that would enable them to operate effectively. Simple combinations of independent firms, although neither criminal nor tortious, were often undermined because state common law refused to enforce the contractual arrangements that would prevent members from deviating …