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Articles 1 - 30 of 185
Full-Text Articles in Law
Researching Antitrust Law, Keith Lacy
Researching Antitrust Law, Keith Lacy
Law Librarian Scholarship
Antitrust is a dynamic area of law subject to rapid change. It is highly sensitive to the attitudes of regulators and market conditions, always looking forward to how decisions made today will affect businesses and the lives of individual consumers. Current events — and passionate consumers, or fans — can incur “Swift” antitrust scrutiny, as Live Nation Entertainment discovered recently.
Yet it is inextricably linked to more abstract considerations. The term “antitrust” is itself archaic, reflecting animosity to a business practice innovated by Standard Oil in 1882. Understanding the history of antitrust actions often requires understanding something of history broadly …
Textualism As An Ally Of Antitrust Enforcement: Examples From Merger And Monopolization Law, Robert H. Lande
Textualism As An Ally Of Antitrust Enforcement: Examples From Merger And Monopolization Law, Robert H. Lande
Utah Law Review
This Article will first briefly present an overview of the textualist method of statutory interpretation. It will then briefly engage in a textualist analysis of important portions of two antitrust statutes: Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. At least in these areas, textualist analysis should, if anything, help re-invigorate antitrust enforcement.
Reviving Antitrust Enforcement In The Airline Industry, Jonathan Edelman
Reviving Antitrust Enforcement In The Airline Industry, Jonathan Edelman
Michigan Law Review
The Department of Transportation (DOT) has broad but oft overlooked power to address antitrust issues among airlines through section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act. However, the DOT’s unwillingness to enforce antitrust more aggressively may be translating into higher fares and fees for airline travelers.
More aggressive antitrust enforcement is urgently needed. Recent research has revealed a widespread practice of common ownership in the airline industry, whereby investment firms own large portions of rival airline companies. Although this practice leads to higher prices and reduced competition, antitrust regulators, from the DOT to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade …
Privity Vs. Proximity: The Supreme Court’S Erroneous Reading Of The Illinois Brick Doctrine In Apple Inc. V. Pepper, Suzin A. Win
Privity Vs. Proximity: The Supreme Court’S Erroneous Reading Of The Illinois Brick Doctrine In Apple Inc. V. Pepper, Suzin A. Win
Golden Gate University Law Review
The rapid development of the digital marketplace led the United States Supreme Court to revisit the forty-two year old antitrust precedent set in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court decided that under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, direct purchasers have standing to sue for treble damages due to unfair business practices, while indirect purchasers do not. Over four decades later, in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Court reevaluated this doctrine. This time, the Court had to determine which party received the “direct purchaser” status in a situation where plaintiffs bought apps from …
Farmer Cooperatives "Take Cover": The Capper-Volstead Exemption Is Under Siege, Donald M. Barnes, Jay L. Levine
Farmer Cooperatives "Take Cover": The Capper-Volstead Exemption Is Under Siege, Donald M. Barnes, Jay L. Levine
Arkansas Law Review
"When tillage begins, other arts follow. The farmers, therefore, are the founders of human civilization." There can be little dispute that food production is of vital interest to any nation’s security and economy. For this reason, the United States Congress, like many other legislatures around the world, has accorded special treatment to the agricultural industry, and particularly to farmers. One example of this special treatment is the Capper-Volstead Act, which provides farmers with immunity from antitrust liability for joint conduct undertaken by and through an “association” of producers.
Mere Common Ownership And The Antitrust Laws, Thomas A. Lambert
Mere Common Ownership And The Antitrust Laws, Thomas A. Lambert
Faculty Publications
"Common ownership," also called "horizontal shareholding," refers to a stock investor's ownership of minority stakes in multiple competing firms. Recent empirical studies have purported to show that institutional investors' common ownership reduces competition among commonly owned competitors. "Mere common ownership" is horizontal shareholding that is not accompanied by any sort of illicit agreement, such as a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, or the holding of a control-conferring stake. This Article considers the legality of mere common ownership under the U.S. antitrust laws. Prominent antitrust scholars and the leading treatise have concluded that mere common ownership that has the incidental effect of lessening market …
Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle is accepted in some form by the entire Supreme Court and the majority of other writers. However, it means different things to different people. For example, some members of the Supreme Court can simultaneously acknowledge the antitrust consumer welfare principle even as they approve practices that result in immediate, obvious, and substantial consumer harm. At the same time, however, a properly defined consumer welfare principle is essential if antitrust is to achieve its statutory purpose, which is to pursue practices that injure competition. The wish to make antitrust a more general social justice statute is understandable: …
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Taking Antitrust Away From The Courts, Ganesh Sitaraman
Taking Antitrust Away From The Courts, Ganesh Sitaraman
Ganesh Sitaraman
A small number of firms hold significant market power in a wide variety of sectors of the economy, leading commentators across the political spectrum to call for a reinvigoration of antitrust enforcement. But the antitrust agencies have been surprisingly timid in response to this challenge, and when they have tried to assert themselves, they have often found that hostile courts block their ability to foster competitive markets. In other areas of law, Congress delegates power to agencies, agencies make regulations setting standards, and courts provide deferential review after the fact. Antitrust doesn’t work this way. Courts – made up of …
Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon
Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon
Randy D. Gordon
The act of judging is complex involving finding facts, interpreting law, and then deciding a particular dispute. But these are not discreet functions: they bleed into one another and are thus interdependent. This article aims to reveal-at least in part-how judges approach this process. To do so, I look at three sets of civil RICO cases that align and diverge from civil antitrust precedents. I then posit that the judges in these cases base their decisions on assumptions about RICO's purpose. These assumptions, though often tacit and therefore not subject to direct observation, are nonetheless sometimes revealed when a judge …
Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Mergers of competitors are conventionally challenged under the federal antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition in some product or service market in which the merging firms sell. Mergers can also injure competition in markets where the firms purchase. Although that principle is widely recognized, very few litigated cases have applied merger law to buyers. This article concerns an even more rarefied subset, and one that has barely been mentioned. Nevertheless, its implications are staggering. Some mergers may be unlawful because they injure competition in the labor market by enabling the post-merger firm anticompetitively to suppress wages or salaries. …
Taking Antitrust Away From The Courts, Ganesh Sitaraman
Taking Antitrust Away From The Courts, Ganesh Sitaraman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
A small number of firms hold significant market power in a wide variety of sectors of the economy, leading commentators across the political spectrum to call for a reinvigoration of antitrust enforcement. But the antitrust agencies have been surprisingly timid in response to this challenge, and when they have tried to assert themselves, they have often found that hostile courts block their ability to foster competitive markets. In other areas of law, Congress delegates power to agencies, agencies make regulations setting standards, and courts provide deferential review after the fact. Antitrust doesn’t work this way. Courts – made up of …
Healthcare Mergers And Acquisitions In An Era Of Consolidation: A Review And A Call For Agency Collaboration In Antitrust Enforcement, Anna Molinari
Healthcare Mergers And Acquisitions In An Era Of Consolidation: A Review And A Call For Agency Collaboration In Antitrust Enforcement, Anna Molinari
Pepperdine Law Review
Healthcare companies are consolidating at an alarming rate. From hospitals, to providers’ offices, to insurance companies, there are increasingly fewer consumer choices and more monopolies, which calls for heightened antitrust enforcement. Interestingly, antitrust enforcement authority in the healthcare industry is shared between the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which presides over hospital and provider mergers, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), which presides over health insurance mergers. Although the FTC has challenged many hospital and provider mergers, the DOJ has only challenged six health insurance mergers. Furthermore, last year, the DOJ ultimately approved all health insurance mergers. In 2017, in United …
The Merger Incipiency Doctrine And The Importance Of "Redundant" Competitors, Peter C. Carstensen, Robert H. Lande
The Merger Incipiency Doctrine And The Importance Of "Redundant" Competitors, Peter C. Carstensen, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
The enforcers and the courts have not implemented the merger incipiency doctrine in the vigorous manner Congress intended. We believe one important reason for this failure is that, until now, the logic underlying this doctrine has never been explained. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that markets’ need for “protective redundancy” explains the incipiency policy. We are writing this article in the hope that this will cause the enforcers and courts to implement significantly more stringent merger enforcement.
To vastly oversimplify, the current enforcement approach assumes that if N significant competitors are necessary for competition, N-1 competitors could …
Were The 1982 Merger Guidelines Old News?, Alan J. Meese, Sarah L. Stafford
Were The 1982 Merger Guidelines Old News?, Alan J. Meese, Sarah L. Stafford
Faculty Publications
This paper examines the impact of the 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines on the stock market prices of publicly traded firms in the United States. We argue that those Guidelines were perceived by the market as a real change in enforcement policy that would result in substantial deregulation of mergers throughout the economy. We conduct an event study of S&P 500 firms to test this hypothesis and find evidence of a significant positive effect on the stock prices of firms in moderately concentrated industries subject to antitrust regulation, the firms for which the 1982 Guidelines articulate a substantially less …
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really Want To Return To American Banana?, Joseph P. Bauer
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really Want To Return To American Banana?, Joseph P. Bauer
Maine Law Review
It keeps getting worse and worse. Over the past three and a half decades, the Supreme Court has made countless changes to substantive antitrust doctrine, making successful assertion of an antitrust claim more and more difficult. We have known for at least a century—at least since the Standard Oil decision—that the language in section 1 of the Sherman Act, providing that “every contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . , is declared to be illegal” is not to be read literally. “Every” does not mean “every.” It means only “some”—generally, only those …
Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon
Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
The act of judging is complex involving finding facts, interpreting law, and then deciding a particular dispute. But these are not discreet functions: they bleed into one another and are thus interdependent. This article aims to reveal-at least in part-how judges approach this process. To do so, I look at three sets of civil RICO cases that align and diverge from civil antitrust precedents. I then posit that the judges in these cases base their decisions on assumptions about RICO's purpose. These assumptions, though often tacit and therefore not subject to direct observation, are nonetheless sometimes revealed when a judge …
Astroturf Campaigns: Transparency In Telecom Merger Review, Victoria Peng
Astroturf Campaigns: Transparency In Telecom Merger Review, Victoria Peng
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Large telecommunications companies looking to merge spend millions of dollars in their lobbying efforts to clear regulatory hurdles and obtain approval for their proposed mergers. Corporations such as AT&T, Comcast, and Time Warner use public participation processes as vehicles to influence regulatory decision-making. In the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) merger review context, the notice- and-comment process and public hearings have become fertile breeding grounds for hidden corporate influence. Corporations spend millions on corporate social responsibility programs and call upon nonprofit organizations that receive their largesse to represent their corporate interests as grassroots interests when the FCC seeks public comment. This …
The New Road To Serfdom: The Curse Of Bigness And The Failure Of Antitrust, Carl T. Bogus
The New Road To Serfdom: The Curse Of Bigness And The Failure Of Antitrust, Carl T. Bogus
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Article argues for a paradigm shift in modern antitrust policy. Rather than being concerned exclusively with consumer welfare, antitrust law should also be concerned with consolidated corporate power. Regulators and courts should consider the social and political, as well as the economic, consequences of corporate mergers. The vision that antitrust must be a key tool for limiting consolidated corporate power has a venerable legacy, extending back to the origins of antitrust law in early seventeenth century England, running throughout American history, and influencing the enactment of U.S. antitrust laws. However, the Chicago School’s view that antitrust law should be …
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
The appropriate role of merger efficiencies remains unresolved in US antitrust law and policy. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has led to a significant shift in health care delivery. The ACA promises that increased integration and a shift from quantity of performance through increased competition will create a system in which quality will go up and prices will go down. Increasingly, due to the economic trends that respond to the ACA, including considerable consolidation both horizontally and vertically, it is imperative that the antitrust agencies provide an economically sound and administrable legal approach to efficiency enhancing mergers. …
Standing In The Way Of The Ftaia: Exceptional Applications Of Illinois Brick, Jennifer Fischell
Standing In The Way Of The Ftaia: Exceptional Applications Of Illinois Brick, Jennifer Fischell
Michigan Law Review
In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Antitrust Trade Improvements Act (FTAIA) to resolve uncertainties about the international reach and effect of U.S. antitrust laws. Unfortunately, the FTAIA has provided more questions than answers. It has been ten years since the Supreme Court most recently interpreted the FTAIA, and crucial questions and circuit splits abound. One of these questions is how to understand the convergence of the direct purchaser rule (frequently referred to as the Illinois Brick doctrine) and the FTAIA. Under the direct purchaser rule, only those who purchase directly from antitrust violators are typically permitted to sue under section …
Balancing Effects Across Markets, Daniel A. Crane
Balancing Effects Across Markets, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
In Philadelphia National Bank (PNB), the Supreme Court held that it is improper to weigh a merger's procompetitive effects in one market against the merger's anticompetitive effects in another. The merger in question, which ostensibly reduced retail competition in the Philadelphia area, could not be justified on the grounds that it increased competition against New York banks and hence perhaps enhanced competition in business banking in the mid-Atlantic region. I will refer to the Supreme Court's prohibition on balancing effects across markets as a "market-specificity" rule. Under this rule, efficiencies that may counterbalance anticompetitive aspects must be specific to …
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
The appropriate role of merger efficiencies remains unresolved in US antitrust law and policy. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has led to a significant shift in health care delivery. The ACA promises that increased integration and a shift from quantity of performance through increased competition will create a system in which quality will go up and prices will go down. Increasingly, due to the economic trends that respond to the ACA, including considerable consolidation both horizontally and vertically, it is imperative that the antitrust agencies provide an economically sound and administrable legal approach to efficiency enhancing mergers. …
The Liability Of Foreign Governments Under United States Antitrust Laws, James F. Ponsoldt, Jesse Stone
The Liability Of Foreign Governments Under United States Antitrust Laws, James F. Ponsoldt, Jesse Stone
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa
International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Antitrust In Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, John M. Newman
Antitrust In Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, John M. Newman
Articles
"Zero-price markets," wherein firms set the price of their goods or services at so, have exploded in quantity and variety. Creative content, software, search functions, social media platforms, mobile applications, travel booking, navigation and mapping systems, and myriad other goods and services are now widely distributed at zero prices. But despite the exponential increase in the volume of zero-price products being consumed, antitrust institutions and analysts have failed to provide an adequate response to markets without prices.
Modern antitrust law is firmly grounded in neoclassical economics, which is in turn centered on price theory. Steeped in price theory, preeminent antitrust …
Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, And Economics, George A. Hay, Gregory J. Werden
Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, And Economics, George A. Hay, Gregory J. Werden
George A. Hay
The legality of a horizontal merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act turns on a reckoning of its social costs and benefits. This paper reviews what economics has to say about that reckoning and explores the relationship between economic learning and merger law and policy.
Lessons From At&T'S Flop: How To Grow In The Technology Industry While Avoiding Section 7 Antitrust Obstacles, John Soma
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
No abstract provided.
Merger Review By The Federal Communications Commission: Comcast-Nbc Universal, Christopher S. Yoo
Merger Review By The Federal Communications Commission: Comcast-Nbc Universal, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
The Communications Act of 1934 created a dual review process in which mergers in the communications industry are reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as well as the antitrust authorities. Commentators have criticized dual review not only as costly and redundant, but also as subject to substantive and procedural abuse. The process of clearing the 2011 Comcast-NBC Universal merger provides a useful case study to examine whether such concerns are justified. A review of the empirical context reveals that the FCC intervened even though the relevant markets were not structured in a way that would ordinarily raise anticompetitive concerns. …
Competition At The Teller's Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards For Banks And Other Financial Institutions, Joseph P. Bauer, Earl W. Kintner
Competition At The Teller's Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards For Banks And Other Financial Institutions, Joseph P. Bauer, Earl W. Kintner
Joseph P. Bauer
Congressional and judicial attitudes towards the banking industry have reflected two, sometimes conflicting, goals-the maintenance of the solvency of financial institutions to protect the interests of depositors, other creditors and the economy at large; and the promotion of competition among these institutions and in the economy. The advancement of these goals has been reflected in the application of the antitrust laws to the industry. For the most part, the Sherman and Clayton Acts apply with the same force and scope to financial institutions as to other industries. In some cases, however, the goal of institutional protection is favored, and the …