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- Alan J. Meese (5)
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Articles 1 - 25 of 25
Full-Text Articles in Law
Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker
Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker
Faculty Scholarship
Mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors are a growing presence in U.S. equity markets, and these investors frequently hold large stakes in shares of competing companies. Because these common owners might prefer to maximize the values of their portfolios of companies, rather than the value of individual companies in isolation, this new reality has lead to a concern that companies in concentrated industries with high degrees of common ownership might compete less vigorously with each other than they otherwise would. But what mechanism would link common ownership with reduced competition? Some commentators argue that one of the most …
Ecosystem Competition And The Antitrust Laws, Daniel A. Crane
Ecosystem Competition And The Antitrust Laws, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Conventional antitrust norms analyze market power—as a stepping stone to anticompetitive effects and, hence, prohibited conduct—from the perspective of product substitutability. Two goods or services are said to compete with one another when they are reasonably interchangeable from the perspective of consumers, or to put it in more formal economic terms, when there is cross-elasticity of demand between them. Conversely, when two goods or services are not reasonably interchangeable, they are not horizontally related and are said not to compete with one another. Since a concern over horizontal agreements and horizontal effects dominate antitrust—courts even analyze vertical agreement or merger …
Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese
Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese
Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
Intrabrand restraints limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single brand. While most scholars believe that such contracts can help assure optimal promotion of a manufacturer's products, there is disagreement about the exact manner in which such restraints accomplish this objective. Many scholars believe that such restraints themselves induce dealers to engage in promotional activities desired by the manufacturer. Others believe that such restraints merely serve as "performance bonds," which dealers will forfeit if they fail to follow the manufacturer's precise promotional instructions. Some scholars reject both approaches, …
Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese
Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Gulf Airline Subsidization: Should The European Union And The United States Collaborate To Combat This Alleged Threat?, Savannah H. Moon
Gulf Airline Subsidization: Should The European Union And The United States Collaborate To Combat This Alleged Threat?, Savannah H. Moon
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
How Much Of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, Spencer Weber Waller
How Much Of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, Spencer Weber Waller
Spencer Weber Waller
No abstract provided.
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …
Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane
Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
State and local regulations that anticompetitively favor certain producers to the detriment of consumers are a pervasive problem in our economy. Their existence is explicable by a variety of structural features—including asymmetry between consumer and producer interests, cost externalization, and institutional and political factors entrenching incumbent technologies. Formulating legal tools to combat such economic parochialism is challenging in the post-Lochner world, where any move toward heightened judicial review of economic regulation poses the perceived threat of a return to economic substantive due process. This Article considers and compares two potential tools for reviewing such regulations—a constitutional principle against anticompetitive parochialism …
Defining Unreasonable Radius Clauses For American Music Festivals, Trevor Lane
Defining Unreasonable Radius Clauses For American Music Festivals, Trevor Lane
Seattle University Law Review
Since 1969, the music festival remains a staple of American musical culture, and in order to meet consumer demands, today’s music festival promoters rely on radius clauses ancillary to the performance agreements that they use with artists. These radius clauses limit artists’ ability to perform at other music festivals and concerts within a specified temporal and geographic radius of the contracted music festival. Beginning in 2010, legal challenges have alleged that broadly defined radius clauses used by music festival promoters violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. This Note contends that radius clauses which limit artists from performing beyond …
Analyzing Vertical Mergers To Avoid False Negatives: Three Recent Case Studies, Steven C. Salop
Analyzing Vertical Mergers To Avoid False Negatives: Three Recent Case Studies, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article analyzes three recent vertical mergers: a private antitrust case attacking the consummated merger of Jeld-Wen and Craftmaster Manufacturing Inc. (“CMI”) that was cleared by the DOJ in 2012 but subsequently litigated and won by the plaintiff, Steves & Sons in 2018; and two recent vertical merger matters investigated and cleared (with limited remedies) by 3-2 votes by the Federal Trade Commission in early 2019 -- Staples/Essendant and Fresenius/NxStage. There are some factual parallels among these three matters that make it interesting to analyze them together. First, the DOJ’s decision to clear Jeld-Wen/CMI merger appears to be a clear …
Coty, Amazon, And The Future Of Vertical Restraints: Evolving Distribution Norms On Both Atlantic Shores, Chris Sagers
Coty, Amazon, And The Future Of Vertical Restraints: Evolving Distribution Norms On Both Atlantic Shores, Chris Sagers
Law Faculty Articles and Essays
No abstract provided.
Toward A Realistic Comparative Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane
Toward A Realistic Comparative Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane
Book Chapters
Over the course of her extraordinary career, Eleanor Fox has contributed in many vital ways to our understanding of the importance of institutional analysis in antitrust and competition law. Most importantly, Eleanor has become the leading repository of knowledge about what is happening around the globe in the field of competition law and its enforcement institutions. At a time when much of the field of antitrust was moving in the direction of theoretical generalization, formal modeling, game theory, and the like, Eleanor tirelessly worked the globe to discover the actual practice of competition law in the world. She left no …
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Nancy Rose, Steven Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Nancy Rose, Steven Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …
Given Today's New Wave Of Protectionsim, Is Antitrust Law The Last Hope For Preserving A Free Global Economy Or Another Nail In Free Trade's Coffin?, Allison Murray
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Direct Purchaser Requirement In Clayton Act Private Litigation: The Case Of Apple Inc. V. Pepper , Konstantin G. Vertsman
The Direct Purchaser Requirement In Clayton Act Private Litigation: The Case Of Apple Inc. V. Pepper , Konstantin G. Vertsman
Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology
More than fifty years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. established the direct purchaser rule, the Supreme Court was provided with an opportunity in Apple Inc. v. Pepper to reevaluate and update the proximate cause standing requirement for litigation under § 4 of the Clayton Act. In the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision, the majority opinion established a rule that consumers who purchase directly from a monopolist satisfy the direct purchaser standing requirement notwithstanding the internal business structure of the monopolist. This interpretation of the direct purchaser rule, along with the recent reformulation …
Antitrust And Democracy, Spencer Weber Waller
Antitrust And Democracy, Spencer Weber Waller
Faculty Publications & Other Works
Our solution of the anti-monopoly problems must be in terms of our ideals-- the ideals of political and economic democracy. We want no economic or political dictatorship imposed upon us either by the government or by big business. We want no system of detailed regulation of prices by the government nor price fixing by private interests. We do not want bureaucracy or regimentation of any kind, but we will prefer governmental to private bureaucracy and regimentation, if we have to make such a choice. We cannot permit private corporations to be private governments. We must keep our economic system under …
Energy Competition: From Commodity To Boutique & Back, James W. Coleman
Energy Competition: From Commodity To Boutique & Back, James W. Coleman
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
Energy products such as power, gas, and oil have long been the world’s premier commodities. Consumers demand that power and fuel are available when they want it and they prefer to pay less for it. Few know or care where their fuel or power comes from. So for years energy companies believed that efforts to differentiate their products were mostly ineffective — they were re-signed to compete on price in fierce global commodity markets. But in recent years, a new focus on regulating how energy commodities are produced has begun to splinter previously integrated energy markets, creating markets for boutique …
The Tethered Economy, Aaron K. Perzanowski, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari
The Tethered Economy, Aaron K. Perzanowski, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari
Faculty Publications
Imagine a future in which every purchase decision is as complex as choosing a mobile phone. What will ongoing service cost? Is it compatible with other devices you use? Can you move data and applications across de- vices? Can you switch providers? These are just some of the questions one must consider when a product is “tethered” or persistently linked to the seller. The Internet of Things, but more broadly, consumer products with embedded software, are already tethered. While tethered products bring the benefits of connection, they also carry its pathologies. As sellers blend hardware and software—as well as product …
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Nancy Rose
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Nancy Rose
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …
Home-Field Disadvantage: How The Organization Of Soccer In The United States Affects Athletic And Economic Competitiveness, Carolina I. Velarde
Home-Field Disadvantage: How The Organization Of Soccer In The United States Affects Athletic And Economic Competitiveness, Carolina I. Velarde
Michigan Law Review
The United States men’s soccer team failed to qualify for the 2018 World Cup. In the aftermath, soccer followers questioned the organizational structure supervised by the United States Soccer Federation. An analysis of the relationships between professional soccer leagues reveals potentially anticompetitive practices that may contribute to the subpar performance of the U.S. Men’s National Team. This Note argues that the United States Soccer Federation is engaged in economically anticompetitive behavior that impedes the development of American soccer. Certain reforms, including an open-league system and player transfer fees at the youth development level, would enhance the economic and athletic competitiveness …
Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Mergers of competitors are conventionally challenged under the federal antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition in some product or service market in which the merging firms sell. Mergers can also injure competition in markets where the firms purchase. Although that principle is widely recognized, very few litigated cases have applied merger law to buyers. This article concerns an even more rarefied subset, and one that has barely been mentioned. Nevertheless, its implications are staggering. Some mergers may be unlawful because they injure competition in the labor market by enabling the post-merger firm anticompetitively to suppress wages or salaries. …
Ohio V. American Express: Misunderstanding Two-Sided Platforms, The Charge Card 'Market,' And The Need For Procompetitive Justifications, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Ohio V. American Express: Misunderstanding Two-Sided Platforms, The Charge Card 'Market,' And The Need For Procompetitive Justifications, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
In Ohio v. American Express Co., the United States Supreme Court had its first knowing encounter with what it incorrectly viewed as a two-sided platform in the context of American Express’ Non Disclosure Provisions (NDP). Under these provisions merchants accepting the American Express card for payment are not permitted to inform consumers that other cards charge merchants less for their use and that this could be reflected in the final price paid. The opinion includes poor reasoning, a lack of attention to precedent, and bad news for those who thought antitrust law was due for a revival. Yet, and perhaps …