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Antitrust and Trade Regulation

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Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor rate regulators. The specialized, technical competence and supervisory capacity that public utilities commissions enjoy are usually absent from judicial chambers. Nonetheless, when granting antitrust remedies-particularly remedies for monopolistic abuse of intellectual property-courts sometimes purport to act as rate regulators for the licensing or sale of the defendant's assets. At the outset, we should distinguish between two forms ofjudicial rate setting. In one form, a court (or the FTC in its adjudicative capacity) grants a compulsory license and sets a specific rate as part of a final judgment or an order. The …


The Scope Of Judicial Review Of Consent Decrees Under The Antitrust Procedures And Penalties Act Of 1974, Michigan Law Review Oct 1983

The Scope Of Judicial Review Of Consent Decrees Under The Antitrust Procedures And Penalties Act Of 1974, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

In the wake of this uncertainty, this Note analyzes the proper scope of judicial review of consent decrees. The Note argues that to further the policies embodied in the APP A, courts should undertake intense review of proposed settlements before entering them as final judgments. Both the congressional intent in enacting the APP A and the public's interest in effective enforcement of the antitrust laws support intense judicial review. The Note then demonstrates that the deferential standard that some courts have applied is derived mainly from a case that is inapplicable to the review of consent decrees. Finally, the Note …


Attempts And Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer To The Prophylactic Riddle Of Section Two, Edward H. Cooper Jan 1974

Attempts And Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer To The Prophylactic Riddle Of Section Two, Edward H. Cooper

Articles

The efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours of attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act1 have again forced the courts to wrestle with the classic antitrust dilemma: How far must single-firm competitive behavior be restrained to make competition free? The answer given by the majority of current decisions is that, absent some other established offense, single-firm behavior should be prohibited as an attempt to monopolize only when there is a specific intent to monopolize and the firm has come dangerously near to unlawful monopolization. A contemporary challenge to this orthodox answer is rapidly gaining force. …


Abstracts, Katharine Loomis Apr 1945

Abstracts, Katharine Loomis

Michigan Law Review

The abstracts consist merely of summaries of the facts and holdings of recent cases and are distinguished from the notes by the absence of discussion.


Can A Manufacturer Be Compelled To Sell?, Henry M. Bates Jan 1916

Can A Manufacturer Be Compelled To Sell?, Henry M. Bates

Articles

The fight for price maintenance is not yet completely settled, despite, the decisions in Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Parks & Sons Company, 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502, and Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616, 58 L. Ed. 1041, which held invalid contracts, whether nominally of agency, or of sale, between manufacturer and wholesaler or jobber whereby the latter in purchasing agreed himself to maintain and to sell only to others who would maintain a schedule of prices established by the manufacturer. But there are more …