Law Commons^™

Alternative Trading Platforms In The United States: Incentives For Innovation In The Us Stock Market, Gabriel V. Rauterberg

Book Chapters

Is something wrong with the structure of our stock market? Recent scholarship faults the equity market for its lack of innovation. In particular, commentators stringently criticize the continuous nature of modern trading for baking in a wasteful arms race for speed among high-frequency traders. Under their current structure, stock exchanges process incoming instructions to trade in the order they arrive and as quickly as possible, which means in millionths of a second or less. The result is a race for technological speed because market participants can earn profits from being the first to trade on new information, even when that …

Christianity And Antitrust, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Daniel Crane

Book Chapters

The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether the Christian faith has a nexus with the institution of antitrust. It turns out it doesn’t – and it does. For example, Christianity cannot explain why the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is superior to the four-firm concentration ratio as a measure of industry concentration. Economics can. On the other hand, economics cannot explain why the per se rule against price-fixing is morally appropriate. The Bible can.

Toward A Realistic Comparative Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

Over the course of her extraordinary career, Eleanor Fox has contributed in many vital ways to our understanding of the importance of institutional analysis in antitrust and competition law. Most importantly, Eleanor has become the leading repository of knowledge about what is happening around the globe in the field of competition law and its enforcement institutions. At a time when much of the field of antitrust was moving in the direction of theoretical generalization, formal modeling, game theory, and the like, Eleanor tirelessly worked the globe to discover the actual practice of competition law in the world. She left no …

Misappropriation Of Trade Secrets, Leonard M. Niehoff

Book Chapters

This is an action for injunctive and monetary relief brought by Plaintiff pursuant to the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1998, MCL 445 .1901 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant {corporation I individual}, in violation of state law, has {acquired Plaintiff's trade secrets knowing, or having reason to know, that the trade secrets were acquired by improper means I disclosed or used Plaintiff's trade secrets without Plaintiff's consent}.

Section 5 And The Innovation Curve, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

the ftc’s authority to use Section 5 of the FTC Act to reach anticompetitive conduct that would not be illegal under the Sherman or Clayton Acts has been much discussed in recent years, particularly in conjunction with the FTC’s enforcement action against Intel. As of this writing, a Section 5 action against Google seems imminent.

Antitrust Principles Affecting Franchise Law, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

Antitrust law in the United States intersects with franchise law in a number of complex ways. Falling afoul of antitrust law can be costly-antitrust violations give rise to treble damages and, in the extreme, even criminal penalties. Further, the antitrust principles governing franchise relationships are in a state of transition. The upshot is that careful attention to emerging antitrust norms is critical for students of franchise law.

Patent Pools, Rand Commitments, And The Problematics Of Price Discrimination, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

The social welfare problematics of patent pooling by competitors are well known. Competitor patent pooling has the potential to create powerful efficiencies by eliminating holdout problems and blocking positions and reducing transactions costs from licensing negotiations. At the same time, competitors can use patent pools to cartelize in a variety of ways, for example by fixing prices, entrenching patents of dubious validity, and discouraging rivalry for innovation. Determining legal norms capable of capturing the efficiencies without enabling cartels has not proven easy.

Perhaps because of the practical difficulty of separating pro-competitive from anticompetitive pools, antitrust scrutiny has swung from extreme …

Private Enforcement Against International Cartels In Latin America: A Us Perspective, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

A recent empirical study estimates that from 1990 to the end of 2005, 283 private international cartels were discovered and that the overcharges from these cartels totaled $500 billion. Estimates of the percentage of all detected cartels range from one in six or seven to one in 10. If the one in 10 number is correct, that would mean that overcharges from international cartels in the last 15 years were $5 trillion, or about $330 billion per year. Even assuming that the detection rate is higher today due to the success of the US Justice Department's leniency program and stepped …

Why Was The U.S. Corporate Tax Enacted In 1909?, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Book Chapters

This chapter argues that the principal reason the US adopted the corporate tax in 1909 was to regulate corporate managerial power, and that in this regard the 1909 tax differed both from the 1894 corporate tax and from current conceptions of the tax as an indirect tax on corporation’s shareholders.

The United States has had a corporate income tax since 1909. Currently, this tax is under significant criticism, with several academics and practitioners calling for its abolition. It therefore seems appropriate in this context to try to determine what led to the enactment of this tax, and whether the original …

A View From Labor, Theodore J. St. Antoine, N. Goldfinger

Book Chapters

It will come as no surprise that our attitude, as union spokesmen, toward further extension of the antitrust laws over the activities of American labor organizations is much like the attitude of Calvin Coolidge's minister toward sin: we're against it. We feel our attitude is justified. But in contributing to a volume graced by so distinguished a company of scholars, it may be best that we do not confine ourselves merely to developing our own case in support of a conclusion which some might accuse us of having harbored all along.

We therefore shall take two different approaches. First, we …