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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Law
Writing Better Jury Instructions: Antitrust As An Example, Joshua P. Davis, Shannon Wheatman, Cristen Stephansky
Writing Better Jury Instructions: Antitrust As An Example, Joshua P. Davis, Shannon Wheatman, Cristen Stephansky
Joshua P. Davis
Deactivating Actavis: The Clash Between The Supreme Court And (Some) Lower Courts, Joshua Davis, Ryan Mcewan
Deactivating Actavis: The Clash Between The Supreme Court And (Some) Lower Courts, Joshua Davis, Ryan Mcewan
Joshua P. Davis
Numerous trial courts have misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s recent decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. An interesting question is why they have done so. Perhaps lower courts disagree with the Supreme Court about so-called “reverse payment” cases, the subject of the Actavis opinion. Or perhaps they simply have made random mistakes, as is perhaps inevitable, particularly in a challenging area of the law like antitrust. This Article suggests an alternative account: that lower courts are seeking clear guidance from Actavis, clear guidance that the Supreme Court has not tended to provide in antitrust cases in general and that it did …
Towards An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua Davis, Robert Lande
Towards An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua Davis, Robert Lande
Joshua P. Davis
The dominant view in the antitrust field is that private enforcement cases, and especially class actions, accomplish little or nothing positive but, on the contrary, are counterproductive. Despite strongly worded convictions, that view has been premised on anecdotal, self-serving and insufficiently substantiated claims. Indeed, the authors' 2008 study of 40 private cases appears to constitute the only systematic effort to gather information about a significant number of private antitrust actions. That study generated a great deal of controversy, including questioning of our conclusions by high officials at the Department of Justice and by Professor Daniel Crane at the University of …
The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Hammond, And Barnett, Joshua Davis, Robert Lande
The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Hammond, And Barnett, Joshua Davis, Robert Lande
Joshua P. Davis
Our article, "Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws," 2011 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 315, documented an extraordinary but usually overlooked fact: private antitrust enforcement deters a significant amount of anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, the article showed that private enforcement "probably" deters even more anticompetitive conduct than the almost universally admired anti-cartel enforcement program of the United States Department of Justice. In a recent issue of Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett challenged our analysis. They asserted that our comparison “is more misleading than informative.” It is unsurprising that they …
Summaries Of Twenty Cases Of Successful Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua Davis, Robert Lande
Summaries Of Twenty Cases Of Successful Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua Davis, Robert Lande
Joshua P. Davis
This document summarizes twenty cases of successful private antitrust enforcement. These twenty summaries build on earlier summaries of forty additional cases of successful private enforcement available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105523. An analysis of the data from the original forty cases is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090661 (published as Robert L. Lande and Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879 (2008)) and an argument based on the forty cases that private antitrust enforcement has greater deterrence effects than criminal enforcement by the Department of Justice is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1565693 (published as Robert L. Lande …
Of Vulnerable Monopolists?: Questionable Innovation In The Standard For Class Certification In Antitrust Cases, Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer
Of Vulnerable Monopolists?: Questionable Innovation In The Standard For Class Certification In Antitrust Cases, Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer
Joshua P. Davis
Some courts appear to have begun to revise the standard for granting class certification, including in antitrust cases. The new standard, if there is one, may empower courts to find facts relevant to the merits in a way that historically they have not been permitted to do. If courts are ratcheting up the standard at class certification by forcing plaintiffs to make a showing on the merits, then it seems an unfortunate development for various reasons. First, the rationale for the change is unsubstantiated and implausible. Neither theory nor evidence supports the claim that corporations settle meritless class actions with …
Antitrust, Class Certification, And The Politics Of Procedure, Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer
Antitrust, Class Certification, And The Politics Of Procedure, Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer
Joshua P. Davis
This Article develops two arguments against a possible trend in federal appellate courts toward imposing a new, heightened standard for class certification in antitrust cases. Recent case law can be read to imply that trial judges may make findings of fact on the merits in deciding class certification, including about whether plaintiffs will be able to show with class-wide evidence that every class member was harmed by allegedly anticompetitive conduct. The first argument is that the potential new standard would require a showing at class certification on an issue—whether all class members were injured—that plaintiffs need not, and typically do …
Applying Litigation Economics To Patent Settlements: Why Reverse Payments Should Be Per Se Illegal, Joshua P. Davis
Applying Litigation Economics To Patent Settlements: Why Reverse Payments Should Be Per Se Illegal, Joshua P. Davis
Joshua P. Davis
One of the most pressing issues in antitrust law is how to assess settlements of patent disputes that involve payments from brand name to generic drug manufacturers. At stake are billions of dollars, both in inflated prices to consumers attempting to meet their medical needs and in exposure to liability for drug manufacturers. This Article applies the economics of dispute resolution to clarify the costs and benefits of various approaches to assessing patent settlements in the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act. It concludes that reverse payments should be banned under a per se rule, unless and until courts are presented …