Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 7 of 7

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Reverse Agency Problem In The Age Of Compliance, Asaf Eckstein, Gideon Parchomovsky Sep 2019

The Reverse Agency Problem In The Age Of Compliance, Asaf Eckstein, Gideon Parchomovsky

All Faculty Scholarship

The agency problem, the idea that corporate directors and officers are motivated to prioritize their self-interest over the interest of their corporation, has had long-lasting impact on corporate law theory and practice. In recent years, however, as federal agencies have stepped up enforcement efforts against corporations, a new problem that is the mirror image of the agency problem has surfaced—the reverse agency problem. The surge in criminal investigations against corporations, combined with the rising popularity of settlement mechanisms including Pretrial Diversion Agreements (PDAs), and corporate plea agreements, has led corporations to sacrifice directors and officers in order to reach settlements …


Fiduciary-Isms: A Study Of Academic Influence On The Expansion Of The Law, Daniel B. Yeager Jan 2016

Fiduciary-Isms: A Study Of Academic Influence On The Expansion Of The Law, Daniel B. Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

Fiduciary law aspires to nullify power imbalances by obligating strong parties to give themselves over to servient parties. For example, due to profound imbalances of legal know-how, lawyers must as fiduciaries pursue their clients’ interests, not their own, lest clients get lost in the competitive shuffle. As a peculiar hybrid of status and contract relations, politics and law, compassion and capitalism, fiduciary law is very much in vogue in academic circles. As vogue as it is, there remains room for my “Fiduciary-isms...”, a meditation on the expansion of fiduciary law from its origins in the law of trusts through partnerships, …


Venture Capital, Agency Costs, And The False Dichotomy Of The Corporation, Robert P. Bartlett Oct 2006

Venture Capital, Agency Costs, And The False Dichotomy Of The Corporation, Robert P. Bartlett

Scholarly Works

An implicit dichotomy of the corporation exists in legal scholarship. On one side of the dichotomy rests the publicly held corporation suffering from a significant conflict of interest between its managers and dispersed shareholders; on the other side, the closely held corporation plagued by intershareholder conflict. This Article argues that understanding the agency problems that can exist within a firm demands a rejection of this traditional dichotomy and the theories of the firm built upon it. Using venture capital (VC) finance, this Article demonstrates how this dichotomy obscures how all firms -- public and private -- often face the same …


What Default Rules Teach Us About Corporations; What Understanding Corporations Teaches Us About Default Rules, Tamar Frankel Apr 2006

What Default Rules Teach Us About Corporations; What Understanding Corporations Teaches Us About Default Rules, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article addresses corporate law's default rules, which allow corporations to waive their directors' liability for damages based on a breach of their fiduciary duty of care. Most large publicly held corporations have adopted such a waiver in their articles of association. This Article suggests that courts should limit the range of the waivers to the circumstances that existed when the voters voted and to the information they received before they voted. This Article distinguishes between public contracts (legislation) and private contracts (commercial transactions) and the default rules that apply to each. The Article shows that courts view corporations and …


Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities And The Agency Problem, Jayne W. Barnard Jan 1997

Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities And The Agency Problem, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Book Review. Cases On Business Organization By R. Magill And R. P. Hamilton, Robert C. Brown Jan 1935

Book Review. Cases On Business Organization By R. Magill And R. P. Hamilton, Robert C. Brown

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Some Unscheduled Liabilities Of Trust Companies, Henry M. Bates Sep 1912

Some Unscheduled Liabilities Of Trust Companies, Henry M. Bates

Articles

"The modern trust company, with its varied and highly developed functions, is a characteristic product of our present complex civilization... The trust company, as some one has said, has become the corporation's corporation, a sort of super-corporation.... The question then naturally arises, is there any law peculiar to trust companies?"