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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Consequences Of Doj Control Of Litigation Authority On Agency Programs, Michael Herz, Neal Devins
The Consequences Of Doj Control Of Litigation Authority On Agency Programs, Michael Herz, Neal Devins
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Conundrum Of Executive Compensation, Mark J. Loewenstein
The Conundrum Of Executive Compensation, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
Much of the scholarship on executive compensation that appears in law reviews assumes that large U.S. corporations overpay their chief executive officers ("CEOs"). This assumption is understandable, as many of these compensation packages are indeed stunning. The question of whether CEOs are overpaid, however, is complicated. Some scholars in other disciplines, principally in economics and management science, have studied the issue but, as this Article demonstrates, this literature does not confirm the assumption. Indeed, some studies suggest that CEO pay is competitive. Moreover, efforts to reduce the level of executive compensation may have the unintended consequence of achieving the opposite …
The False Promise Of The "New" Nondelegation Doctrine, Jim Rossi, Mark Seidenfeld
The False Promise Of The "New" Nondelegation Doctrine, Jim Rossi, Mark Seidenfeld
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This essay responds to claims that the "new" nondelegation doctrine, applied by D.C. Circuit Judge Stephen Williams in American Trucking Association, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), advances the rule of law. The Supreme Court has generally favored ex post over ex ante mechanisms for control of administrative action. Currently, for instance, courts apply arbitrary and capricious review, as a way to control agency decision making ex post. But the rule of law benefits of the "new" nondelegation doctrine are no greater than those delivered by the current means of ex post controls. The rule of law …
Transparency And Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law's Relevance To Disclosure, Faith Stevelman
Transparency And Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law's Relevance To Disclosure, Faith Stevelman
Articles & Chapters
This article explores the duty of “disclosure/complete candor” (among directors, from boards to shareholders and from controllers to minority shareholders) within state corporate fiduciary law (especially Delaware’s, the most developed). It observes the odd minimization of the candor/disclosure duty within the core doctrines of fiduciary care, loyalty and good faith. It analyzes the evolution of the fiduciary disclosure duty and its “moment of truth” in the watershed litigation in Malone v. Brincat. The belated appearance of the fiduciary disclosure duty is partly the result of historical, customary and political understandings which have dwarfed logic and conceptual coherence in this area …