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- Activist; Company; Target Controlled Company; Activism; Controlled Companies; Shareholder-Empowering; Shareholder-Empoyerment; Shareholder; Election; Minority Directors; Directors; Principal-Principal; Agency; De jure; De facto; Corporate Governance; Appointment; Board Representation; Institutional Investor; Board Representation; Controller; Non-activist; Shareholder Engagement (1)
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- Compliance and information technology; Dashboard compliance; Values compliance; Reasonable supervision; Broker-dealers; Investment advisers; Compliance officers; Compliance culture; Financial regulations; Data mining; Productivity of compliance officers; Technology oversight; Automated/ algorithmic trading; Letters of Credit; Big Data; Insider trading; Corporate governance (1)
- Compliance and technology; Self-regulatory organizations (SROs); Compliance; Financial regulations; Automated information gathering; Automated surveillance; Public disclosure; Information dissemination; Recordkeeping and reporting requirements; Dodd-Frank; Financial technology; Data analytics; Marketplace risks; Real-time regulation; Prophylactic regulation; “Regulation by enforcement” model; Empirical rulemaking; Culture of compliance; Homogenization of compliance practices; Cybersecurity; Human agency in compliance; Investment advisers; Broker-dealers; Regulatory performance standards; Revolving door; Corporate governance (1)
- Corporate Law; Accountability; Corporate Governance; Governance Procedure; Bankruptcy; Insolvency; Incumbent Management; Management; Good Governance; Deference; Shareholders; CEO; Market Control; Agency Cost; (1)
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- Corporate Law; Corporate Control; Insolvency; Zone of Insolvency;Takeover; Bankruptcy; Bankruptcy Law; Liquidation; Recapitalization; Governance Power; (1)
- Corporate Law; Corporate Control; Insolvency; Zone of Insolvency;Takeover; Bankruptcy; Bankruptcy Law; Liquidation; Recapitalization; Governance Power; Asset Sale; Section 363(b); RSA; RSAs; Chapter 11; Debtor (1)
- Federal Securities Law; Securities; Securities Law; Information; Informational Asymmetries; Financial Distress; Credit Default Swaps; CDS; Decoupling; Compliance; Final Period; Class Action Certification; Rule 10b-5; Management's Discussion and Analysis; Disclosure Requirements; Extra-company; Decoupling Activities; Information Asymmetry; Third-party Activities; Public Information; Empty Creditors; Bankrupt; Bankruptcy Law; Default; Net Short; Norske Skog; Hovnanian; Windstream Services; GSO Capital Partners (1)
- Fiduciary Duty; Bankruptcy; Bankruptch Trustee's Administration; Trustee; Bankruptcy Code; Bankruptcy Claims Trading; Bankruptcy M&A; Fiduciary Duties; Commodore; Debtor-in-possession; Trustee Duties (1)
- Financial regulation; Compliance technology; Cybersecurity; Agency problems; Risk analysis; Financial accidents; Systemic risks; “Too linked to fail”; “Too fast to save”; Hackers; Cybercriminals; Corporate governance; Risk management; Human agency; Artificial intelligence (1)
- Liquidity systemic risk risk bankruptcy financial contract financial contract jurisdiction international domino microprudential macroprudential valuation netting collaterial disposal systemic uncertainty procyclicality froth privilege mitigation over-the-counter OTC Risk Global Financial crisis Best practice Bankruptcy Code EU Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive FCD Financial contract privilege Assets Funding Collective distress resolution Distressed estate Immunity Priority Legislative Guide Insolvency United Nations Commission on International Trade Law UNCITRAL Creditor Debtor World Bank Secured Credit UNIDROIT Close-out Unification Secured credit Financial system International Swaps and Deivatives Association ISDA Regulation Mitigation Systematic crisis Capital Financial institution Financial liberalization Market discipline Credit boom Asset price bubble Price bubble Leverage Lender Excessive leverage Debt Vulnerability Channel Amplifier Mortgage default Asset value contagion Bonds Knightian uncertainty Tranches Investment Default Countercyclical Liquid market ICR Standard International Monetary Fund IMF Immunity Welfare Fairness Preservation mechanism Distribution mechanism Pari passu Commercial Tax Bankruptcy moratorium Acceleration rights Set-off rights Pre-bankruptcy Transaction Enforcement International Adjustment Repos Collateral Rehypothecate Derivative Cleared derivative CPP Clearinghouse Over-the-counter OTC Credit default swap CFS Margining European Union EU Title transfer Security Financial collateral arrangement Risk mitigation Secured claims Borrow Security interest Counterparty risk Exponentiate Close-out Procyclical Rehypothecation Domino risk Financial crisis Bankruptcy Code Long-Term Capital Management LTCM Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Act BAPCA Variation margining (1)
- New York City ; Free Lance Isn't Free; FIFA; Free Lance Contracts (1)
- SEC; Commission; Enforcement; Enforcement Actions; Rule 102; 102; mandatory referral; attorney discipline; attorney conduct; attorney (1)
- Securities regulation; Investment advisers; Third party examiners; Third party examination models; Self-regulatory Organizations (SROs); Arbitrary and Capricious Standard; Administrative Procedure Act (APA); Administrative Rulemaking; Section 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; “Reasonably designed to prevent fraud” test; Unauthorized tax; Congress’s Power of the Purse; Securities regulation; Compliance policies and procedures; Adviser examinations; Nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs); Proxy advisory firms; Certified Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute/CFA; Public company auditors; Chief Compliance Officers (CCOs); Compliance audits and reviews; Internal controls; Cost-benefit analysis; Financial regulation (1)
- Shareholder Rights; Board of Directors; Bankruptcy; Fiduciary Duty; Heightened Fiduciary Duty; Sale of Control; Chapter 11; Control Rights; Restructuring; Penny Warrant; Private Placement; Redistribution of Benefits; Bankruptcy Procedure; Peabody Energy; Seadrill; CGG SA; Reorganization Plan; Control Transaction; Corporate Law (1)
- Social Capital; Social Network; Board of Directors; Corporate Governance; Director and Board Performance; Independent Directors; Hong Kong; Board Structures; Monitory Function and Liability; OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; Diversity of Views; Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Hong Kong's 2012 Code of Corporate Governance Practices; Definition of "Independent"; Social Capital Theories; "Investment in social Relations with Expected Returns in the Marketplace"; Solidarity Benefits of Closure; Structural Hole theory; Control Advantage; Law and Sociology; Cohesive Model; Minimum Performance Model; "Closeness Centrality"; "Betweenness Centrality"; Normative Implications of Social Capital; Regulatory Technology (RegTech); Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK); Cheung Kong Holdings (CKH); China Mobile Limited (China Mobile); NodeXL; Family Controlled Firms; State Owned Entities (SOE); Maximum Performance Model; Disintgrated Model (1)
Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Law
Why Does The Sec Hate Lawyers And Will The Bitterness Ever Go Away: A Review Of The Reasons For The Current State Of This Relationship And A Proposed Path Forward, Ernest Edward Badway, Joshua Horn, Christie Mcguinness
Why Does The Sec Hate Lawyers And Will The Bitterness Ever Go Away: A Review Of The Reasons For The Current State Of This Relationship And A Proposed Path Forward, Ernest Edward Badway, Joshua Horn, Christie Mcguinness
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) and its staff (“Staff”) have brought numerous actions against lawyers in a variety of contexts over the last several years. These enforcement actions have arguably prevented zealous advocacy as well as potentially leaving lawyers reluctant to make certain arguments on behalf of their clients so as to avoid potential disciplinary actions against them. While it is important for the Commission and its Staff to ensure that lawyers do not engage in violative conduct, this Article notes that the SEC and its Staff’s actions should be limited to only those occasions …
Activist Shareholders At De Facto Controlled Companies, Gaia Balp
Activist Shareholders At De Facto Controlled Companies, Gaia Balp
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Activist campaigns are likely to increasingly target controlled companies. Studies concerning activism at controlled companies focus on shareholder-empowering tools, such as the right to nominate and elect minority directors on the board, as a pathway for limiting the principal-principal agency problem. However, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between de jure and de facto controlled companies. Building on a recent case concerning a leading Italian corporation, this Article analyzes the possible unexpected corporate governance consequences of successful activist intervention at de facto controlled companies, showing that, where minority shareholders are granted the right to appoint directors on …
The Market For Corporate Control In The Zone Of Insolvency: Symposium Introduction, Edward J. Janger
The Market For Corporate Control In The Zone Of Insolvency: Symposium Introduction, Edward J. Janger
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
No abstract provided.
Corporate Distress, Credit Default Swaps, And Defaults: Information And Traditional, Contingent, And Empty Creditors, Henry T. C. Hu
Corporate Distress, Credit Default Swaps, And Defaults: Information And Traditional, Contingent, And Empty Creditors, Henry T. C. Hu
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Federal securities law seeks to ensure the quality and quantity of information that corporations make publicly available. Informational asymmetries associated with companies in financial distress, but not in bankruptcy, have received little attention. This Article explores some important asymmetries in this context that are curious in their origin, nature, and impact. The asymmetries are especially curious because of the impact of a world with credit default swaps (CDS) and CDS-driven debt “decoupling.” The Article explores two categories of asymmetries. The first relates to information on the company itself. Here, the Article suggests there is fresh evidence for the belief that …
Bankruptcy Fiduciary Duties In The World Of Claims Trading, John A. E. Pottow
Bankruptcy Fiduciary Duties In The World Of Claims Trading, John A. E. Pottow
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
In earlier work, I explored the role of fiduciary duties in the bankruptcy trustee’s administration of a debtor’s estate, noting the absence of any explicit demarcation of those duties in the Bankruptcy Code. In this piece, I report the highlights of that analysis and see to what extent (if any) fiduciary duties can inform policy prescriptions for the issue of bankruptcy claims trading, colorfully referred to by some as the world of “bankruptcy M&A.” My initial take is pessimistic. Fiduciary duties, at least as traditionally conceived in bankruptcy, are unlikely to provide much help. But there is still a source …
Corporate Governance And Bankruptcy, Daniel J.H. Greenwood
Corporate Governance And Bankruptcy, Daniel J.H. Greenwood
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Ordinary corporate law invests enormous authority in corporate leaders, largely without accountability either to those they govern or to the judiciary, in defiance of much of what we know about effective governance procedure. Instead, we rely on the markets in which the corporation participates as the primary check on incumbent officials. Regardless of whether relying on markets is sufficient in the ordinary course, corporate insolvency is the markets’ verdict that incumbent management has failed. Accordingly, in bankruptcy and insolvency more generally, the law ought to abandon its ordinary deference to the corporate powers that be and instead impose standard good …
Private Benefits Without Control? Modern Chapter 11 And The Market For Corporate Control, Oscar Couwenberg, Stephen J. Lubben
Private Benefits Without Control? Modern Chapter 11 And The Market For Corporate Control, Oscar Couwenberg, Stephen J. Lubben
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Outside of bankruptcy, a board of directors’ decision to take control rights away from existing shareholders and grant them to another is subject to heightened fiduciary duties. As the sale of control represents a kind of end game, shareholders have one last chance to realize the full value for their investment. In such a context, their interests warrant special protection. A similar sale of control can happen in a chapter 11 procedure when a bankruptcy plan revamps the capital structure of the firm. In such a restructuring of the firm, control rights can be newly created, redefined and redistributed to …
Badges Of Opportunism: Principles For Policing Restructuring Support Agreements, Edward J. Janger, Adam J. Levitin
Badges Of Opportunism: Principles For Policing Restructuring Support Agreements, Edward J. Janger, Adam J. Levitin
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Bankruptcy is a market for corporate control. Current bankruptcy practice offers two alternative mechanisms for effectuating changes in control of a firm: (1) a pre-plan all-asset sale under section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code; or (2) an asset sale or recapitalization pursuant to a plan of reorganization under section 1129 of the Code. Pre-plan sales under section 363(b) are fast, but lack the procedural protections associated with a restructuring or sale pursuant to a plan. Plan confirmation can be costly and uncertain, however. Restructuring support agreements (“RSAs”)—contractual agreements to support a future restructuring that has certain agreed-upon characteristics—appear to offer …
Freelance Isn’T Free: The High Cost Of New York City’S Freelance Isn’T Free Act On Hiring Parties, Caitlin M. Baranowski
Freelance Isn’T Free: The High Cost Of New York City’S Freelance Isn’T Free Act On Hiring Parties, Caitlin M. Baranowski
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Recently, the New York City Council enacted the Freelance Isn’t Free Act (FIFA) to protect freelancers from non-payment. Among FIFA’s protections is the requirement that hiring parties provide a written contract to freelancers for any work exceeding $800 over a 120-day period. As the nation’s first legislation ensuring freelancers’ rights, FIFA marks a major turning point in the development of protections for the gig economy’s growing independent workforce. While its purpose is laudable and necessary, this Note argues that FIFA is currently too ambiguous. To resolve FIFA’s ambiguity, this Note recommends, at the very least, amending FIFA to include: 1) …
A Fork In The Road: Issues Surrounding The Legality Of Mandatory Class Action Waivers In Arbitration Agreements, Brielle Oshinsky
A Fork In The Road: Issues Surrounding The Legality Of Mandatory Class Action Waivers In Arbitration Agreements, Brielle Oshinsky
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Recently, federal circuit courts have presented contrasting outcomes regarding the legality of mandatory class action waivers in arbitration agreements. More specifically, these outcomes vary on whether such waivers violate the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and importantly, whether it is possible for these statutes to coexist with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have previously held that the act of an employer requiring employees to sign class action waivers in arbitration agreements posed no violation to either the FLSA or the NLRA. However, in May 2016, the Seventh …
Social Capital Of Directors And Corporate Governance: A Social Network Analysis, Zihan Niu, Christopher Chen
Social Capital Of Directors And Corporate Governance: A Social Network Analysis, Zihan Niu, Christopher Chen
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
This Article examines how a director’s social capital might affect his or her behavior, the board’s performance, and corporate governance, as well as the potential normative implications of the director’s social network. We argue that the quality of board performance could be improved where the social network closure within the board is high and there are many non-redundant contacts beyond the board. Network closure can improve trust and collaboration within a board, while external contacts may benefit a company with more diverse sources of information. Moreover, different network positioning leads to the inequality of social capital for directors. With more …
Preserving Human Agency In Automated Compliance, Onnig H. Dombalagian
Preserving Human Agency In Automated Compliance, Onnig H. Dombalagian
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
As technology transforms financial services, so too must it transform the regulation of financial markets and intermediaries. The imperative of real-time, prophylactic regulation increasingly compels reallocation of regulatory and compliance budgets to surveillance and enforcement technology. At the same time, in light of the well-known weaknesses of automated systems, securities firms (and their regulators) must temper investment in automation with efforts to augment the agency of compliance professionals. This symposium contribution considers how investment in the professional development of compliance personnel can better integrate automated tools within established compliance and supervisory structures and thereby advance regulatory and operational objectives.
Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, Or Both?, James Fanto
Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, Or Both?, James Fanto
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
This Article poses the basic question that is reflected in its title and that was the subject of the conference where the Article was initially presented: whether technology poses any threats to the mission of compliance and the position of compliance officers, whether it is just another useful tool for them, or whether it is something of both. It begins by explaining the origin of compliance in broker-dealers and investment advisers and its important current position in those firms. It then discusses why compliance officers have always been drawn to technology, particularly to keep up with the business sides of …
Mandatory Third Party Compliance Examinations For Investment Advisers: An Sec Waterloo?, Mercer Bullard
Mandatory Third Party Compliance Examinations For Investment Advisers: An Sec Waterloo?, Mercer Bullard
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) appears to be on the verge of requiring investment advisers to undergo third party examinations. One justification for the rulemaking is that the Commission lacks sufficient resources to examine advisers frequently enough. Another is to create indirectly a self-regulatory organization (SRO) for investments advisers. Both may leave a rulemaking particularly vulnerable to challenge as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act. This Article considers three novel grounds on which a rulemaking may be successfully challenged. Congress has repeatedly rejected SEC requests to provide additional funding for examinations or to create an …
Compliance, Technology, And Modern Finance, Tom C.W. Lin
Compliance, Technology, And Modern Finance, Tom C.W. Lin
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
An important transformation is happening in the financial industry. The rise of new technology and compliance has dramatically altered many of the key functions and functionaries of modern finance. Artificial intelligence, algorithmic programs, and supercomputers, instead of human actors, now constitute the core of many financial operations. Compliance officers have become just as critical to financial institutions as traders, bankers, and analysts. Finance as we knew it has changed and continues to change. This symposium Article offers a studied commentary on these unfolding changes, the crosscutting developments in compliance, technology, and modern finance. It examines the concurrent and intersecting ascents …
Liquidity, Systemic Risk, And The Bankruptcy Treatment Of Financial Contracts, Rizwaan J. Mokal
Liquidity, Systemic Risk, And The Bankruptcy Treatment Of Financial Contracts, Rizwaan J. Mokal
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
No abstract provided.