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Administrative Law

2004

Politics

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar Sep 2004

Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

This article empirically examines democratic participation in three different regulatory proceedings, involving financial privacy, nuclear regulation, and campaign finance. It then uses that analysis to critique -- and suggest alternatives to -- existing mechanisms to achieve public participation in the regulatory state. The current mechanism for structuring public participation in regulatory decisions (or “regulatory democracy”) relies on demand-driven procedures like the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment process. Organized interests and others who decide they have sufficient resources and interest to do so comment on regulations. While some observers consider this process close to ideal, others instead seem to accept …


Securing Truth For Power: Informational Strategy And Regulatory Policy Making, Cary Coglianese Apr 2004

Securing Truth For Power: Informational Strategy And Regulatory Policy Making, Cary Coglianese

ExpressO

No abstract provided.


The Continuing Showdown Over Who Should Regulate Amusement Attraction Safety: A Critical Analysis Of Why Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Should Remain State-Governed. , Chad Emerson Mar 2004

The Continuing Showdown Over Who Should Regulate Amusement Attraction Safety: A Critical Analysis Of Why Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Should Remain State-Governed. , Chad Emerson

ExpressO

No abstract provided.


Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson Feb 2004

Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson

ExpressO

This paper investigates rational choice explanations for patterns of Supreme Court decision-making with respect to the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative agency decisions. In particular, I assess empirically the thesis that the Supreme Court expands deference when the Supreme Court is ideologically closer to the executive than to the circuit courts, and contracts deference when the opposite is true. I find little to no evidence supporting this "rational choice" theory of judicial deference. Given this surprising null finding, I offer alternative explanations for the data and suggest directions for future research.


Rethinking Public Engagement In The Administrative State, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar Jan 2004

Rethinking Public Engagement In The Administrative State, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

This Article presents an empirical, doctrinal, and theoretical critique of public engagement in the modern administrative state. The legitimacy of the administrative state depends on the claim that it provides opportunities for public engagement as well as a mechanism for expert scientific decisionmaking. A typical rulemaking proceeding lets experts make technical judgments about terrorism, transportation, or telecommunications subject to court review guarding against arbitrariness. The whole process is then enmeshed in a system that is supposed to provide engagement – and therefore democratic accountability -- through presidential appointments and control, congressional oversight, and the public notice-and-comment process. This existing approach …