Law Commons^™

Cooperative Implementation Of Federal Regulations, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Professor Michael examines regulatory programs in which the federal government leaves many compliance decisions up to the regulated entities themselves. Drawing on prior research and theory in the area, he concludes that such "cooperative implementation" is feasible if three principles are observed: (1) regulatory standards are written to leave discretion in methods of compliance and that discretion is within the competence of the regulated entities; (2) there are economic incentives to offset the additional costs to these entities; and (3) the entities self-report their own compliance, the agency closely monitors the program, and the agency maintains a residual program of …

The Problem Of Federal-Private Split Mineral Estates: Who Has Control?, David B. Shaver, Andrew C. Mergen, Scott W. Hardt, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

The Problem of Federal-Private Split Mineral Estates: Who Has Control? (April 23)

19 pages.

Includes footnotes.

Collection of 3 papers presented at the Hot Topics in Natural Resources Law program held on April 23, 1996.

Contents: National Park Service regulation of private mineral estates / David B. Shaver -- Recent litigation regarding federal split estates : who has control? what are the limits? / Andrew C. Mergen -- The problem of federal-private split mineral estates / Scott W. Hardt

Many federally owned lands overlie privately owned oil and gas and mineral rights. Increasingly, the competition between agency multiple use directives and private interests in resource development has resulted in legal battles between …

Executive-Branch Rulemaking And Dispute Settlement In The World Trade Organization: A Proposal To Increase Public Participation, Aubry D. Smith

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that, because the Executive Branch increasingly will be promulgating domestic regulatory rules intended to comply with the rules of the world-trading system, it is necessary to increase formal oversight of the Executive Branch's role in that context. Part I argues that the United States' participation in the WTO implies a substantial increase in the impact of foreign policy on domestic policy. Part II points out a loophole in Congress's attempt to compensate for this increase by installing various devices to ensure political oversight of the Executive: the Executive Branch is subject, under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act …