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Full-Text Articles in Law
Codifying Chevmore, Kent H. Barnett
Codifying Chevmore, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
This Article considers the significance and promise of Congress’s unprecedented codification of the well-known Chevron and Skidmore judicial-deference doctrines (to which I refer collectively as “Chevmore”). Congress did so in the Dodd-Frank Act by instructing courts to apply the Skidmore deference factors when reviewing certain agency-preemption decisions and by referring to Chevron throughout.
This codification is meaningful because it informs the delegation theory that undergirds Chevmore (i.e., that Congress intends to delegate interpretive primacy over statutory interpretation to agencies under Chevron or courts under Skidmore). Scholars and at least three Supreme Court Justices have decried the judicial inquiry into congressional …
From Integrity Agency To Accountability Network: The Political Economy Of Public Sector Oversight In Canada, Jamie Baxter
From Integrity Agency To Accountability Network: The Political Economy Of Public Sector Oversight In Canada, Jamie Baxter
Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press
The federal integrity agencies that are delegated collective responsibility for public sector oversight in Canada face a common challenge to stabilize their ongoing independence from political control. While Parliament has delegated to these agencies key oversight functions that demand some degree of structural independence, they remain vulnerable to shifting political preferences and to an increasingly partisan national politics. This Article uses a political economy framework to theorize the objectives that shape political preferences for agency independence in Canada, and to suggest that structural innovations in the form of 'accountability networks' may provide one strategy to help stabilize those preferences over …
Rulemaking As Legislating, Kathryn A. Watts
Rulemaking As Legislating, Kathryn A. Watts
Articles
The central premise of the nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating its Article I legislative powers. Yet Congress routinely delegates to agencies the power to promulgate legislative rules—rules that carry the force and effect of law just as statutes do. Given this tension between the nondelegation doctrine and the modern regulatory state, some scholars have attacked the nondelegation doctrine as fictional.
Little scholarly attention, however, has been given to considering how the central premise of the nondelegation doctrine coheres with—or fails to cohere with—administrative law as a whole. This Article takes up that task, exploring what might happen to administrative …
Delegation, Accommodation, And The Permeability Of Constitutional And Ordinary Law, Gillian E. Metzger
Delegation, Accommodation, And The Permeability Of Constitutional And Ordinary Law, Gillian E. Metzger
Faculty Scholarship
To some, the very idea of the constitutional law of the administrative state is an oxymoron. On this view, core features of the national administrative state — broad delegations and the combination of legislative, executive, and judicial power within administrative agencies, particularly agencies that are headed by unelected executive officials only removable on narrow grounds — are fundamentally at odds with both constitutional separation of powers principles and due process. To others, no such conflict between contemporary administrative governance and the Constitution exists, and assertions of the administrative state’s unconstitutionality rest on basic misunderstandings of what separation of powers and …