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Full-Text Articles in Law
Antitrust And The 'Filed Rate' Doctrine: Deregulation And State Action, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And The 'Filed Rate' Doctrine: Deregulation And State Action, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In its Keogh decision the Supreme Court held that although the Interstate Commerce Act did not exempt railroads from antitrust liability, a private plaintiff may not recover treble damages based on an allegedly monopolistic tariff rate filed with a federal agency. Keogh very likely grew out of Justice Brandeis's own zeal for regulation and his concern for the protection of small business — in this case, mainly shippers whom he felt were protected from discrimination by filed rates. The Supreme Court's Square D decision later conceded that Keogh may have been “unwise as a matter of policy,” but reaffirmed it …
Capture Nuances In The Contest For Financial Regulation, Lawrence G. Baxter
Capture Nuances In The Contest For Financial Regulation, Lawrence G. Baxter
Faculty Scholarship
Applying capture analysis in the hotly contested arena of financial regulation is difficult. Numerous regulators with widely differing missions and widely diverse stakeholders are involved. Regulators operate under widely differing authorizing legislation. They even function at different levels of government. Agencies are often at odds with each other when it comes to determining optimal public policy. Unlike policy disputes in many other areas of regulation, which can be settled by reference to scientific data, public policy in financial regulation rests profoundly on essentially contested economic ideologies. This makes financial policy doubly difficult: one the one hand, it requires deep expertise—and …
Understanding Regulatory Capture: An Academic Perspective From The United States, Lawrence G. Baxter
Understanding Regulatory Capture: An Academic Perspective From The United States, Lawrence G. Baxter
Faculty Scholarship
Although it sometimes seems that financial regulatory agencies have been entirely captured by the larger players in the industry they regulate, a closer examination reveals that a variety of factors contribute to policy outcomes in this arena. Agencies have different agendas and stakeholders, and banks often perform quasi-governmental roles that blur the line between the captors and the captured. The real danger is that public policy can be distorted as a result of excessive influence by one set of interests at the expense of others. This danger is best thwarted or at least mitigated through the application of a range …