Law Commons^™

Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, Jud Mathews

Jud Mathews

A persistent challenge for the American administrative state is reconciling the vast powers of unelected agencies with our commitment to government by the people. Many features of contemporary administrative law — from the right to participate in agency processes, to the reason-giving requirements on agencies, to the presidential review of rulemaking — have been justified, at least in part, as means to square the realities of agency power with our democratic commitments. At the root of any such effort there lies a theory of democracy, whether fully articulated or only implicit: some conception of what democracy is about, and what …

Proportionality Review In Administrative Law, Jud Mathews

Jud Mathews

At the most basic level, the principle of proportionality captures the common-sensical proposition that, when the government acts, the means it chooses should be well-adapted to achieve the ends it is pursuing. The proportionality principle is an admonition, as German administrative law scholar Fritz Fleiner famously wrote many decades ago, that “the police should not shoot at sparrows with cannons”. The use of proportionality review in constitutional and international law has received ample attention from scholars in recent years, but less has been said about proportionality’s role within administrative law. This piece suggest that we can understand the differences in …

Presidential Administration In The Obama Era, Jud Mathews

Jud Mathews

Transatlantic Perspective On Judicial Deference In Administrative Law, Maciej Bernatt

Maciej Bernatt

The U.S. concept of judicial deference in administrative law limits the scope of judicial review of administrative agencies’ actions in the light of agencies’ superior expertise and separation of powers arguments. It may serve as an interesting point of reference for the European discussion about adequate institutional balance between administration and courts. The paper analyzes whether there are grounds for the validity of the concept of judicial deference in Continental Europe and in what areas (law, facts or both). As a starting point it is observed that it remains generally accepted in Europe that it is a role of courts …

Deference Lotteries, Jud Mathews

Jud Mathews

When should courts defer to agency interpretations of statutes, and what measure of deference should agencies receive? Administrative law recognizes two main deference doctrines — the generous Chevron standard and the stingier Skidmore standard — but Supreme Court case law has not offered a bright-line rule for when each standard applies.Many observers have concluded that courts’ deference practice is an unpredictable muddle. This Article argues that it is really a lottery, in the sense the term is used in expected utility theory. Agencies cannot predict which deference standard a court will apply or with what effect, but they have a …

Law And Public Administration In Ireland, Fiona Donson, Darren O'Donovan

Darren O'Donovan

Extract: It is often said that administrative law is notoriously difficult to study and to teach because its doctrines are abstract and nuanced, moving across a wide array of statutes and aspects of legal practice. This book is an attempt to defend administrative law as an exciting and dynamic subject which is central to meeting the future challenges facing Irish public governance. Law and Public Administration in Ireland inevitably focuses heavily upon judicial review, as the central aspect of the legal regulation of governance, providing a firm backstop against government abuse of power. In our account of the grounds of …

Reconciling With The Past: John Willis And The Question Of Judicial Review In Interwar And Postwar England, Peter L. Lindseth

Peter L. Lindseth

This contribution was prepared for a conference at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law in honor of John Willis, the late Anglo-Canadian administrative law theorist who died in 1997. It will appear in a forthcoming issue of the University of Toronto Law Journal. Throughout his career, John Willis puzzled over the way in which both popular and elite opinion in England (not to mention throughout the Commonwealth and in the United States) persistently, and in his view uncritically, equated the "Rule of Law" in important respects with judicial review in the administrative state. Willis believed this attachment to judicial …

Searching For Proportionality In U.S. Administrative Law, Jud Mathews

Jud Mathews

Constituencies And Contemporaneousness In Reason-Giving: Thoughts And Direction After T-Mobile, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Chevron Inside The Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

For three decades, scholars (as well as courts and litigants) have written thousands of articles (and opinions and briefs) concerning the impact of the Chevron deference regime on judicial review of agency statutory interpretation. Little attention, however, has been paid to how Chevron and its progeny have actually shaped statutory interpretation inside the regulatory state. As part of the Fordham Law Review symposium Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, this Essay presents the findings of the first comprehensive empirical investigation into the effect of Chevron and related doctrines on how federal agencies interpret statutes they administer.

The Essay …

International Legal Control Of Domestic Administrative Action, Joel P. Trachtman

Joel P Trachtman

International law increasingly is designed to constrain the regulatory activities of countries where these activities have external effects on other countries. While countries retain the right to regulate, it is a qualified right, with a number of restrictions under international trade, investment, finance, human rights, and other areas of international law. The restrictions are often nuanced: while maintaining maximum policy autonomy, countries agree to international legal rules that establish increasingly complex preconditions for national regulatory action. In some cases, preconditions are formulated so as to establish procedural, as distinguished from substantive, predicates for national action. These varying types of preconditions …

The Death Of Tax Court Exceptionalism, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

Tax exceptionalism—the view that tax law does not have to play by the administrative law rules that govern the rest of the regulatory state—has come under attack in recent years. In 2011, the Supreme Court rejected such exceptionalism by holding that judicial review of the Treasury Department’s interpretations of the tax code is subject to the same Chevron deference regime that applies throughout the administrative state. The D.C. Circuit followed suit by rejecting the IRS’s position that its notices are not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This Article calls for the demise of another instance …

Toward Adequacy, Sarah L. Brinton

Sarah L Brinton

Each year, hundreds of people, companies, organizations, and associations sue the federal government for injuries they have suffered at the hands of federal agencies. Such suits are often brought under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which Congress enacted expressly to allow broad access to courts in an age of increasing administrative agency action. By the terms of the APA itself, all final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court is reviewable under the APA.

But the very language meant to welcome such suits into court also acts as a …

How To Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, And Capital Formation In The Wake Of Business Roundtable, Ian D. Ghrist

Ian D. Ghrist

This article applies ideas from the Law and Economics movement to the D.C. Circuit's 2011 decision in Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission. The article lays out a framework for cost-benefit analysis that, if followed, should increase new rules' chances of surviving the heightened arbitrary and capricious review standard imposed by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.

The Dodd-Frank Act comprises the broadest financial reforms since the 1930s. The Act, however, makes surprisingly few important decisions and instead, almost exclusively defers to agency rulemaking or the creation of a new organization. The Act mandates the promulgation of …

How To Win The Deference Lottery, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

In response to Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 Texas Law Review 1349 (2013).

In Deference Lotteries, Jud Mathews proposes that the deference framework in administrative law be viewed through the game theory lens of a lottery. Such an approach helps us think critically about how varying standards of review may affect the behavior of agencies and courts engaged in the judicial review process. This Response suggests that the lottery lens can also help agencies think more strategically about how to develop and defend interpretations of statutes they administer. Assuming the validity of the lottery framework, the Response suggests a playbook …

Chevron Without The Courts? The Supreme Court's Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through An Immigration Lens, Shruti Rana

Shruti Rana

The limits of administrative law are undergoing a seismic shift in the immigration arena. Chevron divides interpretive and decision-making authority between the federal courts and agencies in each of two steps. The Supreme Court may now be transforming this division in largely unrecognized ways. These shifts, currently playing out in the immigration context, may threaten to reshape deference jurisprudence by handing more power to the immigration agency just when the agency may be least able to handle that power effectively. An unprecedented surge in immigration cases—now approximately 90% of the federal administrative docket—has arrived just as the Court is whittling …

Fitting The Formula For Judicial Review: The Law-Fact Distinction In Immigration Law, Rebecca Sharpless

Rebecca Sharpless

The ill-defined law-fact distinction often stands as the gatekeeper to judicial review of an agency deportation order, restricting non-citizens facing deportation to raising only questions of law when appearing before an appellate court. The restriction on review most affects cases whose dispositions typically turn on the resolution of factual issues, including claims under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and claims for discretionary relief from deportation like cancellation of removal. Convention Against Torture claims, for example, often involve extensive fact-finding on the part of the immigration judge regarding conditions in the applicant’s home country and the applicant’s personal circumstances. …

"Streamlining" The Rule Of Law: How The Department Of Justice Is Undermining Judicial Review Of Agency Action, Shruti Rana

Shruti Rana

Judicial review of administrative decision making is an essential institutional check on agency power. Recently, however, the Department of Justice dramatically revised its regulations in an attempt to insulate its decision making from public and federal court scrutiny. These “streamlining” rules, carried out in the name of national security and immigration reform, have led to a breakdown in the rule of law in our judicial system. While much attention has been focused on the Department of Justice’s recent attempts to shield executive power from the reach of Congress, its efforts to undermine judicial review have so far escaped such scrutiny. …

A Broader View Of The Immigration Adjudication Problem, Jill Family

Jill E. Family

Las Paradojas De La Democracia Deliberativa / The Paradoxes Of Deliberative Democracy, Andres Palacios Lleras

Andrés Palacios Lleras

Este artículo argumenta por qué la teoría de la democracia deliberativa es problemática y paradójica, y por lo tanto inadecuada para desarrollar las instituciones democráticas contemporáneas, o para reemplazarlas por otras. Es una teoría problemática porque parte de una postura epistemológica difícilmente sostenible. Es paradójica porque a pesar de ser presentada como incluyente a nivel social, la idea de deliberación que presenta y considera como deseable, es demasiado exigente como para ser realizada por toda clase de personas; y es de hecho, elitista en este aspecto. Pero también porque señala que las instancias que están mejor diseñadas para tomar decisiones …