Law Commons^™

Cohen: Hard Case Makes (Semi) Bad Law, Steve R. Johnson

Scholarly Publications

The first Justice Harlan famously cautioned that hard cases can lead to bad law. United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37, 49 (1878) (dissenting opinion). This aphorism captures the reality that, when confronted with litigating equities strongly favoring one party, judges tend to massage doctrine to support judgment for that party.

New Light On Auer/Seminole Rock Deference, Steve R. Johnson

Scholarly Publications

We have been engaged in an extended exploration of doctrines under which courts may defer to positions and interpretations by state and local tax agencies. The immediately prior installment of this column discusses such deference under state equivalents of what is known as the Auer or Seminole Rock principle, under which courts usually defer to agency interpretations of the agencies’ own ambiguous regulations.

About two weeks after the publication of that installment, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a major new decision on the Auer principle: Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. Talk America bids fair to be …

Deference To Tax Agencies' Interpretation Of Their Regulations, Steve R. Johnson

Scholarly Publications

This installment closes a loop begun in the last installment of this column. We have been exploring the degrees of deference accorded by the courts to interpretations and positions taken by state and local revenue agencies. The last installment examined conditional deference doctrines, that is, deference specific to particular situations or conditioned on the existence of particular conditions. That installment noted one line of conditional deference, applying to cases in which agencies are interpreting their own regulations. This is often called Auer deference, after one of the most prominent cases of the line. Because of the richness of the Auer …

Conditional Deference To Tax Authorities, Steve R. Johnson

Scholarly Publications

Recent installments of this column have explored an important point of intersection between administrative law and tax law: the degree of deference that courts accord to rules, regulations, and statutory interpretation positions of state and -local revenue agencies. This column continues that exploration. It examines what I call “conditional deference,” that is, according deference to the agency only when particular, defined conditions are present.

The first part below sets the context by describing Skidmore and Mead, two leading federal conditional deference cases. The second part contrasts state conditional deference doctrines, with particular emphasis on the operation of those doctrines in …

Do Treasury And The Irs Have To Explain Their Choices?, Steve R. Johnson

Scholarly Publications

The validity of tax regulations has been challenged by taxpayers almost as long as there have been tax regulations. Now, however, we are in a period of unusually high activity on this front. The Supreme Court recently upheld the validity of a regulation under section 3121 in Mayo Foundation for Medical Ed. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011); many cases are testing the validity of regulations extending the six-year statute of limitations under section 6501(e) to basis overstatements (or, as the Service would put it, clarifying the law in this regard); and many cases are …

Mayo And The Future Of Tax Regulations, Steve R. Johnson

Scholarly Publications

Of the heady early days of the French Revolution, Wordsworth wrote: “Bliss it was in that dawn to be alive. But to be young was very heaven.” Those of us interested in the intersection of tax law and administrative law may be excused if we feel similar exhilaration about the time in which we live.

In terms of the intersection, this is the most exciting moment in the tax history of the United States. Recent cases have tested – and cases still in progress continue to test –- the validity of several Treasury regulations:

1. On January 11 the Supreme …

Chevron Deference To State Tax Agencies, Steve R. Johnson

Scholarly Publications

The last installment of this column inaugurated a multi-installment project examining judicial doctrines of deference to interpretations and positions taken by state and local tax agencies. We noted that in the various states, these doctrines fall into about a half dozen categories.

This installment explores one of those categories. A major deference rule in federal administrative law (including tax law) emanates from the U.S. Supreme Court’s famous Chevron case. This installment considers the extent to which Chevron and similar approaches are applied in state and local tax cases.

The first part be low briefly describes C …

Following The Apa Will Not Eliminate Useful Guidance, Steve R. Johnson

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Trade Secrets, Disclosure, And Dissent In A Fracturing Energy Revolution, Hannah J. Wiseman

Scholarly Publications

In the United States, Congress has traditionally relied, in part, upon citizen participation to control industrial activity and its effects on public welfare. It has also required industry to disclose certain information to the public in order to enable this participation. Early on in the movement toward expanded federal regulation of industry, Congress granted broad standing to individuals in generous “private attorney general” provisions in environmental and business-related statutes. It also required agencies to follow strict notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, which directed agencies to publicize proposed rules and receive citizen comments. Through statutes such as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know …

Substituting Substantive For Procedural Review Of Guidance Documents, Mark Seidenfeld

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Chevron's Foundation, Mark Seidenfeld

Scholarly Publications

This Article addresses the question of how a court can justify deferring to an administrative agency interpretation of a statute under the Chevron doctrine given the accepted understanding that Article III of the Constitution makes the judiciary the ultimate decider of the meaning of law in any case or controversy that is properly before a court. It further considers the ramifications of the answer to that question on the potential forms that any doctrine of interpretive deference may assume.

This Article first rejects congressional intent to delegate interpretive primacy to agencies as the basis for Chevron. It argues that such …