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Full-Text Articles in Law
Undoing Undue Favors: Providing Competitors With Standing To Challenge Favorable Irs Actions, Sunil Shenoi
Undoing Undue Favors: Providing Competitors With Standing To Challenge Favorable Irs Actions, Sunil Shenoi
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The Internal Revenue Service occasionally creates rules, notices, or regulations that allow taxpayers to pay less than they would under a strict reading of the law. Sometimes, however, these IRS actions are directly contrary to federal law and have significant economic impact. Challenging favorable IRS actions through litigation will likely be unsuccessful because no plaintiff can satisfy the requirements for standing. To address this situation, this Note proposes a statutory reform to provide competitors with standing to challenge favorable IRS actions in court.
Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley
Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
Prof. Bagley notes that reshaping captured agencies using the structural reforms suggested by Prof. Barkow may be politically infeasible and offers an alternative solution for eliminating interest-group capture. First, he suggests establishing a body within the Executive Branch that proactively investigates and documents capture dynamics. Second, he suggests creating legislative mechanisms that will encourage Congressional action on the body’s recommendations, and perhaps, more provocatively, requiring the Executive Branch to enact any such recommendations in the absence of Congress’s formal objection.
Disclosing 'Political' Oversight Of Agency Decision Making, Nina A. Mendelson
Disclosing 'Political' Oversight Of Agency Decision Making, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Scholars and courts have divided views on whether presidential supervision enhances the legitimacy of the administrative state. For some, that the President can supervise administrative agencies is key to seeing agency action as legitimate, because of the President's accountability to the electorate. Others, however, have argued that such supervision may simply taint, rather than legitimate, an agency action. The reality is that presidential supervision of agency rulemaking, at least, appears to be both significant and opaque. This Article presents evidence from multiple presidential administrations suggesting that regulatory review conducted by the White House's Office of Management and Budget is associated …