Law Commons^™

A Comment On Metzger And Zaring: The Quicksilver Problem, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

It is a pleasure to comment on the fine institutional studies in this issue by Gillian Metzger and David Zaring. Professor Metzger explores the many ways in which financial regulation, as reflected in the regulatory functions of the Federal Reserve (the Fed), differs from mainstream administrative law, as represented by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). She describes the historical roots of the divergence, explains how it has persisted over time, and offers some intriguing thoughts about the possibilities for convergence in the future. Professor Zaring paints a fascinating portrait of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the entity within the …

Through The Looking Glass To A Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law And Financial Regulation, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Administrative law and financial regulation have an uneasy relationship today. It was not always so. Indeed, the two were closely intertwined at the nation's birth. The Treasury Department was a major hub of early federal administration, with Alexander Hamilton crafting the first iterations of federal administrative law in his oversight of revenue generation and customs collection. One hundred and fifty years later, administrative law and financial regulation were conjoined in the New Deal's creation of the modern administrative state. This time it was James Landis, Chair of the newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and author of the leading …

The Organizational Premises Of Administrative Law, William H. Simon

Faculty Scholarship

The core doctrines of administrative law have not taken account of developments in the theory and practice of organization. The contours of these doctrines were set in the mid-twentieth century when the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was passed. Although these doctrines have evolved since then, administration itself has changed more. Many of the widely perceived deficiencies of the doctrines, including some associated with overregulation and others with underregulation, seem influenced by an anachronistic understanding of organization.

Much administrative law continues to understand public administration as bureaucracy. In particular, doctrine is strongly influenced by three premises. First, the backward-looking conception of …

The President And Choices Not To Enforce, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The executive branch is often called upon to assess how a particular statute it is charged to administer fits within the larger framework of the law. Professor Dawn Johnsen's thoughtful analysis addresses an important subset of these challenges: situations in which the President believes a particular statute is inconsistent with one or another provision of the Constitution and, therefore, should not be enforced. My purpose here is to explore the context of executive non-enforcement more broadly, in a way that may help in understanding the particular problem she addresses.

Issues of constitutional structure and function are among the most daunting …

The Internal Relations Of Government: Cautionary Tales From Inside The Black Box, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Both the structure of the Constitution and elementary civics texts imagine an Executive Branch under the close, unitary control of an elected chief executive, the President. Doubtless from the start, and unmistakably in the administrative state, the reality has been quite different. Those to whom Congress has delegated authority to act, particularly in that domain that we have in mind when invoking a "government of laws," conduct their business within a web more aptly described as coordination than control. In regulatory matters, the coordinating impulses run through the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and, increasingly, the Office of Information and Regulatory …