Law Commons^™

Antitrust Rulemaking: The Ftc’S Delegation Deficit, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) recent assertion of authority to engage in legislative rulemaking in antitrust matters can be addressed in terms of three frameworks: the major questions doctrine, the Chevron doctrine, and as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation. The article argues that as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation the FTC has no such authority. This can be seen by considering the structure and history of the Act and is confirmed by the 1975 Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act. Given that the result follows from ordinary statutory interpretation, it is unnecessary for courts to consider the other two …

The Major Questions Doctrine: Right Diagnosis, Wrong Remedy, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s “major questions” doctrine has been attacked as an attempt to revive the nondelegation doctrine. The better view is that this statutory interpretation responds to perceived failings of the Chevron doctrine, which has governed court-agency relations since 1984. This article criticizes the major question doctrine and proposes modifications to the Chevron doctrine that would partially correct its failings while preserving the traditional interpretive role of courts.

Chevron'S Ghost Rides Again, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Gary Lawson has offered a remarkable account of the fate of the Chevron doctrine during a recent year in the Supreme Court, from August 2021 to June 2022. When one examines lower court decisions, petitions seeking review of those decisions, briefs filed by the parties, and transcripts of oral arguments, Chevron made frequent appearances during the year. But when one reads the published opinions of the Court, one finds virtually no reference to Chevron. Based on the published opinions of the Court, it was as if the Chevron decision did not exist.

The status of Chevron as a …

Administrative Harms, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Administrative power imposes serious wounds on the United States, its Constitution, and its citizens. Therefore, a persuasive defense of administrative power would need to respond to these harms, showing that it is constitutional and otherwise desirable, notwithstanding its many costs. If the administrative state is defensible, it will be necessary to wrestle with all of the damage it incurs.

Our Unruly Administrative State, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

One of the perennial academic rituals of administrative “law” is to explain its compatibility with the rule of law. As surely as seasons pass, academics muster their formidable intellectual resources to reassure us, and themselves, that in pursuing administrative power, they have not abandoned the rule of law.

A more immediate justificatory project might be to explain the constitutionality of the administrative state. But notwithstanding valiant efforts, its constitutionality remains in doubt. So a fallback measure of its legitimacy seems valuable.

From this perspective, even if the administrative state is not quite constitutional, it can enjoy legitimacy under traditional common …