Law Commons^™

Neoclassical Administrative Common Law, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay reviews John Dickinson’s neglected classic, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States. Writing on the cusp of the New Deal, Dickinson helped establish a mainstream, moderate stance about the shape and legitimacy of the administrative state. A closer reading of this work, which is rich in jurisprudential reflection and historical learning, offers a better idea about the structure, promise, and limits of the doctrinal world he helped create.

Uncertainty, Complexity, And Regulatory Design, Adam I. Muchmore

Journal Articles

This Article develops an analytic framework for understanding the role of uncertainty in regulatory design. It begins by differentiating between three types of uncertainty: legal uncertainty, factual uncertainty, and uncertainty about the application of law to fact. This framework highlights the pervasiveness of factual uncertainty and law-fact uncertainty in daily affairs. Viewed through this framework, legal uncertainty is less problematic than it is typically thought to be.

The Article then focuses on legal uncertainty, examining it from two perspectives: the relationship between rules and standards, and the relationship between simplicity and complexity. It suggests that there are fundamental limits on …

Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, Jud Mathews

Journal Articles

A persistent challenge for the American administrative state is reconciling the vast powers of unelected agencies with our commitment to government by the people. Many features of contemporary administrative law — from the right to participate in agency processes, to the reason-giving requirements on agencies, to the presidential review of rulemaking — have been justified, at least in part, as means to square the realities of agency power with our democratic commitments. At the root of any such effort there lies a theory of democracy, whether fully articulated or only implicit: some conception of what democracy is about, and what …

Who’S Exercising What Power: Toward A Judicially-Manageable Nondelegation Doctrine, Martin Edwards

Journal Articles

This Article argues that the traditional, "intelligible principle" nondelegation analysis is incomplete and that an examination of the delegate, rather than just the delegation, more effectively animates the doctrine. This is true not only as a practical matter; early Supreme Court cases, as well as later ones, have taken a keen interest in the recipient of the alleged delegation. In other words, a realistic and judicially enforceable nondelegation doctrine must include more than a mere tip of the juridical cap.

Without Deference, Jeffrey Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay explores what judicial review of agency interpretations of law would look like if the Supreme Court abandoned Chevron deference in favor de novo review. It concludes that such an alternative regime has appealing features, but may not bring as much immediate, practical change as many critiques or defenses of Chevron presume. The largest change would come from how we think about law and policy in the administrative state. The theoretical scaffolding that would uphold a regime of non-deferential review is far more classical in cast than the moderate legal realism underwriting Chevron. The more traditional character of this …

Faithful Execution And Enforcement Discretion, Patricia L. Bellia

Journal Articles

In November 2014, President Obama announced a significant turn in U.S. immigration policy: that immigration officials would decline to pursue deportation of unlawful immigrants who were parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents and who met certain other criteria. Although the proposed program, known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), never took effect, it provides a fascinating lens for exploring what limits, if any, the Constitution imposes on the executive branch’s decision not to enforce the law — on its exercise of administrative “enforcement discretion.”

Article II of Constitution obligates the President to …