Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons^™

Free Trade And Corporate Social Responsibility: Ethical Dilemmas In Global Economic Development, Sarah Papion

Capstone Projects and Master's Theses

Through the lens of the free-trade-optimist, it is black and white: corporations bring jobs, and jobs equal a happy and healthy economy. A major oversight in this neoliberal Utopian ideology is that corporations are not in the business of building communities, nor do they have an interest in keeping their operations stationary enough to allow economic growth to occur over a span of years. Corporations abandon communities as quickly as they arrive to find their next cheap labor hub. Quite contradictory to the original purpose of free trade, economic growth in Free Trade Zones is not long term or secure. …

The United Nations Global Compact In México: Evaluation Of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting, Magaly Preciado

International Development, Community and Environment (IDCE)

The United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) is the world’s largest corporate responsibility platform. It is based on Ten Principles related to Human Rights, Labor Standards, Environment, and Anticorruption commitments that companies can voluntarily adhere to. The UNGC has been celebrated for bridging the Sustainable Development Goals to the private sector and for promoting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) among businesses. It has also been criticized for its lack of supervision and enforcement mechanisms. The signatories of the Compact are required to submit an annual report to the UN (Communication on Progress) but this is not evaluated in any form.

In México, …

The Early Eight And The Future Of Consumer Legal Activism To Fight Modern-Day Slavery In Corporate Supply Chains, Andrew G. Barna

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Is Corporate Social Responsibility An Agency Problem?, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This chapter examines whether CSR investments occur mostly in firms with severe agency problems, which suggests that CSR is an agency issue. We demonstrate that this is not the case: CSR investments and performance are higher when dividends are high, leverage is high, cash flows and cash holdings are low, and when there is a high managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. All these variables combined represent managerial discipline in terms of corporate investing. We also document that better legal protection of shareholder rights is positively related to CSR performance. This implies that when shareholders are more powerful relative to the management, the …