Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 24 of 24

Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics

The Unique Benefits Of Treating Personal Goodwill As Property In Corporate Acquisitions, Darian M. Ibrahim Sep 2019

The Unique Benefits Of Treating Personal Goodwill As Property In Corporate Acquisitions, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

Corporate acquisition talks may not get far if buyer and seller disagree over transaction structure, which can have significant after-tax effects. But the parties may have overlooked an item that, due to its potential tax treatment, could be the key to facilitating the acquisition. That item is the selling shareholder's "personal goodwill."

Personal goodwill exists when the shareholder's reputation, expertise, or contacts gives the corporation its intrinsic value. It is most likely to be found in closely held businesses, especially those that are technical, specialized, orprofessional in nature or have few customers and suppliers. If personal goodwill is treated as …


The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, Behzad Gohari, Karen E. Woody Jul 2019

The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, Behzad Gohari, Karen E. Woody

Karen Woody

This Article posits that the success of macroprudential regulation will depend on four factors. First, the economic philosophy of the central banker in charge of the domestic institution with jurisdiction over macroprudential regulation will prove crucial in the implementation of adopted regulation. If, like Chairman Greenspan, the banker is averse to the exercise of the Central Bank's regulatory oversight authority, then no amount or volume of policy or regulation will prevent or mitigate systemic risks and the accompanying shocks. Second, a sufficiently deep level of international cooperation is required to mitigate regulatory arbitrage, without being so broad that the ensuing …


The Stewardship Of Trust In The Global Value Chain, Kishanthi Parella Jul 2019

The Stewardship Of Trust In The Global Value Chain, Kishanthi Parella

Kish Parella

Global governance has not yet caught up with the globalization of business. As a result, our headlines provide daily accounts of the extent and consequences of these "governance gaps." The ability of corporations to evade state control also contributes to an unusual, even frightening, phenomenon: corporations are governing like states. Some governance functions traditionally delivered by state actors are now increasingly undertaken by transnational corporations. One area that is experiencing this substitution is dispute resolution of human rights. Corporations and other business enterprises, individually or collectively, are creating a variety of grievance mechanisms to address human rights and other conflicts …


Reforming The Global Value Chain Through Transnational Private Regulation, Kishanthi Parella Jul 2019

Reforming The Global Value Chain Through Transnational Private Regulation, Kishanthi Parella

Kish Parella

In many industries, corporations have changed the organization of their production from a vertically integrated model to a model that is often characterized by outsourcing-shifting business activities to external parties -and offshoring, where production occurs at sites overseas. The global value chain (GVC) for an American corporation often involves several tiers of suppliers. One end of the GVC is often occupied by a multinational buyer (MNB), such as a large brand name corporation. At the opposite end of the value chain are the factories, farms, and other production sites that supply multinational corporations with their goods. This organization of production …


Is Say On Pay All About Pay? The Impact Of Firm Performance, Jill E. Fisch, Darius Palia, Steven Davidoff Solomon Oct 2017

Is Say On Pay All About Pay? The Impact Of Firm Performance, Jill E. Fisch, Darius Palia, Steven Davidoff Solomon

Steven M. Davidoff Solomon

The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandated a number of regulatory reforms including a requirement that large U.S. public companies provide their shareholders with the opportunity to cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation. The “say on pay” vote was designed to rein in excessive levels of executive compensation and to encourage boards to adopt compensation structures that tie executive pay more closely to performance. Although the literature is mixed, many studies question whether the statute has had the desired effect. Shareholders at most companies overwhelmingly approve the compensation packages, and pay levels continue to be high. Although a lack of …


In Pursuit Of Good & Gold: Data Observations Of Employee Ownership & Impact Investment, Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto, Anne M. Tucker Mar 2017

In Pursuit Of Good & Gold: Data Observations Of Employee Ownership & Impact Investment, Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto, Anne M. Tucker

Anne Tucker

A startup's path to self-sustaining profitability is risky and hard, and most do not make it. Venture capital (VC) investors try to improve these odds with contractual terms that focus and sharpen employees' incentives to pursue gold. If the employees and investors expect the startup to balance the goal of profitability with another goal - the goal of good - the risks are likely to both grow and multiply. They grow to the extent that profits are threatened, and they multiply to the extent that balancing competing goals adds a dimension to the incentive problem. In this Article, we explore …


Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage Of Citizen Shareholders, Anne M. Tucker Nov 2015

Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage Of Citizen Shareholders, Anne M. Tucker

Anne Tucker

In this Essay, I challenge the conventional corporate law wisdom that unhappy mutual fund investors paying high fees don’t need litigation or regulation to protect their interests because they should simply exit a fund and reinvest elsewhere. The exit solution, advanced by Professors John Morley and Quinn Curtis in Taking Exit Rights Seriously provided an elegantly simply solution to the problem of unhappy indirect investors (e.g., mutual fund investors) given that they are often low-dollar, low-incentive, rationally-apathetic investors facing enormous information asymmetries and collective action problems. According to their view, competition produced by exit, or the threat of exit, is …


Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, Christopher Geczy, Jessica Jeffers, David Musto, Anne Tucker Mar 2015

Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, Christopher Geczy, Jessica Jeffers, David Musto, Anne Tucker

Anne Tucker

Institutional investors, with trillions in assets under management, hold increasingly important stakes in public companies and fund individual retirement for many Americans, making institutional investors’ behaviors and preferences paramount determinants of capital allocations and the economy. In this paper, we examine high fiduciary duty institutions' (HFDIs') response to decreased profit maximization pressure as measured by the effect of constituency statutes on HFDI investment. We ask this question, in part, to anticipate HFDIs’ response to alternative purpose firms, like benefit corporations. Only with access to institutional investors’ capital can alternative purpose firms gain economic significance to rival the purely for-profit corporation. …


Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence On Why Investors In Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, Lynn A. Stout Feb 2015

Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence On Why Investors In Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, Lynn A. Stout

Lynn A. Stout

This Article evaluates two possible explanations for why shareholders of public corporations tolerate board control of corporate assets and outputs: the widely accepted monitoring hypothesis, which posits that shareholders rely on boards primarily to control the "agency costs" associated with turning day-to-day control over the firm over to self-interested corporate executives, and the mediating hypothesis, which posits that shareholders also seek to "tie their own hands" by ceding control to directors as a means of attracting the extracontractual, firm-specific investments of such stakeholder groups as executives, creditors, and rank-and- file employees. Part I reviews each hypothesis and concludes that each …


Corporate Social Responsibility In A Remedy-Seeking Society: A Public Choice Perspective, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2013

Corporate Social Responsibility In A Remedy-Seeking Society: A Public Choice Perspective, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Written for the Chapman Law Review Symposium on “What Can Law & Economics Teach Us About the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate?,” this Article applies the lessons of public choice theory to examine corporate social responsibility. The Article adopts a broad definition of corporate social responsibility activism to include both (1) those efforts that seek to convince corporations to voluntarily take into account corporate social responsibility in their own decision-making, and (2) the efforts to alter the legal landscape and expand legal obligations of corporations beyond traditional notions of harm and duty so as to force corporations to invest in interests …


Shareholder Primacy In The Classroom After The Financial Crisis, David Millon Nov 2013

Shareholder Primacy In The Classroom After The Financial Crisis, David Millon

David K. Millon

No abstract provided.


Foreword, Robert J. Rhee Oct 2013

Foreword, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

No abstract provided.


Teaching Business Law Through An Entrepreneurial Lens, Michelle M. Harner May 2013

Teaching Business Law Through An Entrepreneurial Lens, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

The legal market has changed. Although change creates uncertainty and fear, it also can create opportunity. This essay explores the opportunity for innovation in the business law curriculum, and the role of simulation to help create more practice-aware new lawyers.


The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee May 2013

The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law – the belief that principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty. A board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment rule precludes it. Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it. The conventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails. This dismissal of tort prinicples is wrong. Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a common analytical framework. The principles of board liability are rooted in tort doctrines governing duty, customs, …


Corporate Governance And The New Trend Of Directors In Company Law In Other Countries, Christopher Chao-Hung Chen, Shuaisheng Huang May 2012

Corporate Governance And The New Trend Of Directors In Company Law In Other Countries, Christopher Chao-Hung Chen, Shuaisheng Huang

Christopher Chao-hung Chen

No abstract provided.


Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones Nov 2011

Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

This book chapter on Corporate Governance and Accountability is a contribution to the book CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (Wiley, forthcoming 2010), edited by Ronald Anderson and H. Kent Baker. This chapter describes the sources of corporate governance standards for American corporations and analyzes the accountability mechanisms designed to ensure that corporate officials act faithfully in their management of corporate affairs. The chapter focuses on the financial reporting system under the U.S. securities laws which forms the foundation of the accountability system, and discusses structures and rules designed to ensure the integrity of financial reporting. The …


Understanding Csr: An Empirical Study Of Private Self-Regulation, Benedict Sheehy Sep 2011

Understanding Csr: An Empirical Study Of Private Self-Regulation, Benedict Sheehy

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: The article is a study of an important burgeoning form of regulation—private self-regulation—in the area of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Rather than taking a purely theoretical approach or a social scientific study relying publicly reported data, the article addresses the issue by way of interview based case studies. As a study in regulation it clarifies the difference between various types of self-regulation, trade associations’ codes as private self-regulation and government sponsored self-regulation. This distinction hampers efforts to understand the important aspects of motivation and compliance. This study provides empirical examination of compliance in private self-regulation. Given the impact and …


Combining Forces: The Joint Defense Agreement In Civil Litigation, Stephen Messer Dec 2010

Combining Forces: The Joint Defense Agreement In Civil Litigation, Stephen Messer

Stephen Messer

From day one of law school aspiring lawyers are taught that information shared in confidence between a lawyer and his client is confidential. Although all lawyers are well aware of this, surprisingly few know that conversations with a client and someone else's lawyer can also be privileged. This is what happens when a joint defense agreement is created; Joint defense agreements extend the attorney client privilege throughout the entire defense camp in cases where multiple defendants and their counsel have common interests in the litigation. This often overlooked, yet highly effective legal strategy may serve as a valuable tool for …


Falling Short: Has The Sec’S Quest To Control Market Manipulation And Abusive Short-Selling Come To An End Or Has It Really Just Begun?, Richard Ramirez Dec 2010

Falling Short: Has The Sec’S Quest To Control Market Manipulation And Abusive Short-Selling Come To An End Or Has It Really Just Begun?, Richard Ramirez

Richard E. Ramirez, J.D. | CFCS

No abstract provided.


Third Party Access And Refusal To Deal In European Energy Networks: How Sector Regulation And Competition Law Meet Each Other, Michael Diathesopoulos Dec 2010

Third Party Access And Refusal To Deal In European Energy Networks: How Sector Regulation And Competition Law Meet Each Other, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

In this paper, we will analyse the issue of concurrence between competition and sector rules and the relation between parallel concepts within the two different legal frameworks. We will firstly examine Third Party Access in relation to essential facilities doctrine and refusal of access and we will identify the common points and objectives of these concepts and the extent to which they provide a context to each other’s implementation. Second, we will focus on how Commission uses sector regulation and objectives as a context within the process of implementation of competition law in the energy sector and third, we will …


Racial Discrimination In Business Transactions, Robert E. Suggs Dec 2009

Racial Discrimination In Business Transactions, Robert E. Suggs

Robert E. Suggs

When the Supreme Court invalidated a municipal minority business set-aside in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., it failed to recognize the special circumstances confronting the minority entrepreneur. Contrary to the Court’s own erroneous assertion that “[s]tates and their local subdivisions have many legislative weapons at their disposal both to punish and prevent present [business] discrimination ….” – they do not. Nor can they create effective antidiscrimination remedies as a practical matter. As a result that decision leaves minority business owners vulnerable to discrimination from other business firms but without a remedy. Part I identifies the glaring failure of …


The Illegal-Settlements Myth, David Phillips Nov 2009

The Illegal-Settlements Myth, David Phillips

David M. Phillips

No abstract provided.


Invigorating The Role Of The In-House Legal Advisor Towards Ethical Culture And Governance In Client-Business Organizations: From 21st Century Failures To True Calling, Ben G. Pender Ii Dec 2008

Invigorating The Role Of The In-House Legal Advisor Towards Ethical Culture And Governance In Client-Business Organizations: From 21st Century Failures To True Calling, Ben G. Pender Ii

Ben G Pender II

Invigorating the Role of the In-House Legal Advisor Towards Ethical Culture and Governance in Client-Business Organizations From 21st Century Failures to True Calling Ben G. Pender II J.D., University of St. Thomas School of Law, 2009 M.A. Sociology, Organizational Effectiveness, Clark Atlanta University, 1996. B.S., Sociology, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1988. All Rights Reserved. © 2009. Summary This Article examines the need to invigorate the role of the in-house legal advisor from ‘mere legal technician’ to simultaneous legal advisory gatekeeper and ethical steward. This article asserts that the often-acquiescent in-house legal advisor as mere legal technician is partially …


Shareholders, Unicorns And Stilts: An Analysis Of Shareholder Property Rights, Benedict Sheehy Dec 2005

Shareholders, Unicorns And Stilts: An Analysis Of Shareholder Property Rights, Benedict Sheehy

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: Shareholders rights advocates argue that shareholders have the right to control the corporation. This article examines the basis for the claims. It begins with an analysis of rights, then moves to an analysis of legal rights, which is followed by an analysis of property rights as a species of legal rights. The article then examines the historical context, rationale and development of shareholder rights which leads to the analysis of current shareholders’ rights. The article concludes with some comments and suggestions concerning future development of corporate governance thinking.