Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons^™

Global Culture Concerns, Korcel M. Price

Korcel M Price

The following proposal seeks to change hiring, promoting, and firing practices among global and trans-national companies. The changes are intended to fortify the organization through better management, a better employee contract, and by moving closer to a learning organization.

At the heart of the proposal is the desire to move hiring, promoting, and firing practices to an external or internal third party, as means of creating a global culture that consistently applies the values of supra system’s organization.

Maybe It’S Right, Maybe It’S Wrong: Structural And Social Determinants Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Chris Horan, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

Context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. Focusing on negotiators use of deception, we used a simulated two-party negotiation to test how three contextual variables - regulatory focus, power, and trustworthiness - interacted to shift negotiators’ ethical thresholds. We demonstrated that these three variables interact to either inhibit or activate deception, providing support for an interactionist model of ethical decision-making. Three patterns emerged from our analyses. First, low power inhibited and high power activated deception. Second, promotion-focused negotiators favored sins of omission whereas prevention-focused negotiators favored sins of commission. Third, low cognition-based trust influenced deception when negotiators …

Agency Theory And Bounded Self Interest: The Moderating Role Of Fairness, Robert Phillips, Douglas Bosse

Robert Phillips

While agency theory’s contributions to our understanding of economic organization and strategic management are unparalleled, reviews of the empirical tests call for more explanatory muscle at the extremes. This paper provides arguments that answer that call. Relying on well-established findings from social psychology and other disciplines, we propose that agency theory’s assumption of pure self-interest be replaced with the more descriptively accurate assumption of self interest that is bounded by norms of fairness and reciprocity. The resulting arguments explain that perceptions of fairness/justice moderate the effectiveness of incentive alignment and monitoring mechanisms.

Maybe It’S Right, Maybe It’S Wrong: Structural And Social Determinants Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns

Mara Olekalns

Context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. Focusing on negotiators use of deception, we used a simulated two-party negotiation to test how three contextual variables - regulatory focus, power, and trustworthiness - interacted to shift negotiators’ ethical thresholds. We demonstrated that these three variables interact to either inhibit or activate deception, providing support for an interactionist model of ethical decision-making. Three patterns emerged from our analyses. First, low power inhibited and high power activated deception. Second, promotion-focused negotiators favored sins of omission whereas prevention-focused negotiators favored sins of commission. Third, low cognition-based trust influenced deception when negotiators …