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Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons™

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Singapore Management University

2007

Articles 1 - 7 of 7

Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics

The Association Between Audit Fees And Auditors' Opinions On Internal Control Weakness Under Section 404 Of The Sox, Jong-Hag Choi, Jeong-Bon Kim, Soo Young Kwon, Yoonseok Zang Dec 2007

The Association Between Audit Fees And Auditors' Opinions On Internal Control Weakness Under Section 404 Of The Sox, Jong-Hag Choi, Jeong-Bon Kim, Soo Young Kwon, Yoonseok Zang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

The Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requires top management toestablish, maintain, and regularly evaluate the effectiveness of the internal controlover financial reporting (ICOFR), and obtain an auditor’s attestation. In this paper, weidentify 232 firms that received “Ineffective” audit opinion on the effectiveness ofICOFR due to one or more material weakness in internal control (WIC). We examinethe association between audit fees and the WIC for pre- and post-SOX period. Wefind that highly levered clients with the WIC paid greater audit fees even in the preSOXperiod and continuously paid the high fees in post-SOX period, whereas theloss-making clients with WIC paid …

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Including Corporate Social Responsibility, Environmental Sustainaibility, And Ethics In Calibrating Mba Job Preferences, David B. Montgomery, Catherine A. Ramus Dec 2007

Including Corporate Social Responsibility, Environmental Sustainaibility, And Ethics In Calibrating Mba Job Preferences, David B. Montgomery, Catherine A. Ramus

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

It has long been understood by organizations and academics that the people make the place (Schneider, 1987). A quality workforce is an important source of competitive advantage, and organizational and financial success for firms (Capelli, 2000; Chapman, Uggerslev, Carroll, Piasentin, & Jones, 2005; Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994, 1998; Teece, 1998). Attracting talent is difficult for business organizations, and may become increasingly so in the years to come, as demographic and economic factors create a war for talent (Chapman, et al., 2005; Johnson, 2000; Michaels, Handfield-Jones, & Axelrod, 2001). Particularly salient in this war for talent is the ability to attract …

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Japanese Corporate Governance: Structural Change And Financial Performance, Asli M. Colpan, Toru Yoshikawa, Takashi Hikino, Hiroaki Miyoshi Dec 2007

Japanese Corporate Governance: Structural Change And Financial Performance, Asli M. Colpan, Toru Yoshikawa, Takashi Hikino, Hiroaki Miyoshi

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper analyzes institutional and legal changes related to corporate governance and their impact on financial performance in Japan since the second half of the 1990s. We attempt to address two issues systematically: (1) how much the governance reforms of Japanese firms transformed the conventional system of alliance capitalism and managerial control; and (2) what economic outcomes those governance changes have yielded. As the Commercial Code and other legal and institutional frameworks were revised, Japanese firms experienced shifts in terms of stock ownership, corporate control and managerial organizations. Our empirical results show that the influence of new ownership composition and …

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Corporate Governance Reform As Institutional Innovation: The Case Of Japan, Toru Yoshikawa, Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Jean Mcguire Nov 2007

Corporate Governance Reform As Institutional Innovation: The Case Of Japan, Toru Yoshikawa, Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Jean Mcguire

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

To address the convergence-divergence debate in corporate governance, we conduct a multiple-case, multiple-level study to analyze the diffusion of governance innovation in Japan. We argue that Japanese systems of corporate governance neither fully converge to, nor completely diverge from, the Anglo-American model. Rather, Sony-the pioneer of corporate governance reforms-and its followers selectively adopted features from this model, decoupled them from the original context, and tailored them to fit to their own situations to generate governance innovation. However, we find that the spread of innovation across firms and institutional levels is far from linear and straightforward, and that other well-regarded firms …

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The Promise Of A Managerial Values Approach To Corporate Philanthropy, Jaepil Choi, Heli Wang Nov 2007

The Promise Of A Managerial Values Approach To Corporate Philanthropy, Jaepil Choi, Heli Wang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This article presents an alternative rationale for corporate philanthropy based on managerial values of benevolence and integrity. On the one hand, top managers with benevolence and integrity values are more likely to spread their intrinsic concern for others into the wider society in the form of corporate philanthropy. On the other hand, top managers high in benevolence and integrity are likely to contribute to improved managerial credibility and trusting firm-stakeholder relationships, thereby improving corporate financial performance. Therefore, the article makes the argument that both corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance can better be interpreted as resulting from managers’ benevolence and …

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Auditor Locality, Audit Quality And Audit Pricing, Jong-Hag Choi, Jeong-Bon Kim, Aini Qiu, Yoonseok Zang Aug 2007

Auditor Locality, Audit Quality And Audit Pricing, Jong-Hag Choi, Jeong-Bon Kim, Aini Qiu, Yoonseok Zang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

No abstract provided.

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To Trust Or To Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis, Fali Huang Aug 2007

To Trust Or To Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

In a principal-agent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents’ intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain this phenomenon by endogenizing agent trustworthiness as a response to potential returns. When monitoring becomes relatively cheaper over time, agents acquire lower trustworthiness, which may actually drive up the overall governance cost in society. Across societies, those giving employees lower weights in choosing governance methods tend to have higher monitoring intensities and lower trust. These results are consistent with the …

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