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Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons™
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- Amendments to bylaws (1)
- Bankruptcy (1)
- Board power (1)
- Charters (1)
- Contractual approach to corporate law (1)
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- Corporate governance (1)
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- Limits of the contract analogy (1)
- Limits to shareholder power (1)
- Preference law (1)
- Scrutiny of board-adopted bylaws (1)
- Secret liens (1)
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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
The Empty Idea Of “Equality Of Creditors”, David A. Skeel Jr.
The Empty Idea Of “Equality Of Creditors”, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
For two hundred years, the equality of creditors norm—the idea that similarly situated creditors should be treated similarly—has been widely viewed as the most important principle in American bankruptcy law, rivaled only by our commitment to a fresh start for honest but unfortunate debtors. I argue in this Article that the accolades are misplaced. Although the equality norm once was a rough proxy for legitimate concerns, such as curbing self-dealing, it no longer plays this role. Nor does it serve any other beneficial purpose.
Part I of this Article traces the historical emergence and evolution of the equality norm, first …
Governance By Contract: The Implications For Corporate Bylaws, Jill E. Fisch
Governance By Contract: The Implications For Corporate Bylaws, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
Boards and shareholders are increasing using charter and bylaw provisions to customize their corporate governance. Recent examples include forum selection bylaws, majority voting bylaws and advance notice bylaws. Relying on the contractual conception of the corporation, Delaware courts have accorded substantial deference to board-adopted bylaw provisions, even those that limit shareholder rights.
This Article challenges the rationale for deference under the contractual approach. With respect to corporate bylaws, the Article demonstrates that shareholder power to adopt and amend the bylaws is, under Delaware law, more limited than the board’s power to do so. As a result, shareholders cannot effectively constrain …