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Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard
Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard
All Faculty Scholarship
When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 (“PSLRA”), the Act’s “lead plaintiff” provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel’s compensation.
Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors—pension funds, mutual …
The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
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The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.
The Securities Analyst As Agent: Rethinking The Regulation Of Analysts, Jill E. Fisch, Hillary A. Sale
The Securities Analyst As Agent: Rethinking The Regulation Of Analysts, Jill E. Fisch, Hillary A. Sale
All Faculty Scholarship
Recent press has highlighted shocking examples of bias, self-dealing, and inaccuracy in the behavior of the securities analyst. Critics have attributed the bubble and subsequent crash in the technology sector to analyst hype and posited that undue analyst optimism contributed to scandals such as Enron. After many years of minimal regulator oversight analysts are now the subject of extensive regulatory reform proposals, including a mandate in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requiring that the Securities and Exchange Commission adopt a variety of restrictions on analyst behavior.
Despite the media attention, there have been few attempts to conceptualize carefully the analyst's …