Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons^™

Criminal Subsidiaries, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

Corporate groups comprise parent companies and one or more subsidiaries, which parents use to manage liabilities, transactions, operations, and regulation. Those subsidiaries can also be used to manage criminal accountability when multiple entities within a corporate group share responsibility for a common offense. A parent, for instance, might reach a settlement with prosecutors that requires its subsidiary to plead guilty to a crime, without conviction of the parent itself—a subsidiary-only conviction (SOC). The parent will thus avoid bearing collateral consequences—such as contracting or industry bars—that would follow its own conviction. For the prosecutor, such settlements can respond to criminal law’s …

Disclosure Procedure, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

Securities disclosure is a human process. Each year, public companies collectively spend over fifteen million hours producing disclosures that undergird an equities market with tens of trillions in market capitalization. The procedures they follow in doing so affect whether their disclosures contain misstatements or omissions—errors that can cause trading losses for investors, and litigation for issuers. Yet despite the importance of the disclosures that firms produce, the literature says little about how they do it, including whether they are spending too much, too little, or just enough on their disclosure procedures. To fill that gap, this Article uses original surveys …

Is "Public Company" Still A Viable Regulatory Category?, George S. Georgiev

Faculty Articles

This Article suggests that the ubiquitous “public company” regulatory category, as currently constructed, has outlived its effectiveness in fulfilling core goals of the modern administrative state. An ever-expanding array of federal economic regulation hinges on public company status, but “public company” differs from most other regulatory categories in that it requires an affirmative opt-in by the subject entity. In practice, firms today become subject to public company regulation only if they need access to the public capital markets, which is much less of a business imperative than it once was due to the proliferation of private financing options. Paradoxically, then, …

The Public’S Companies, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

This Essay uses a series of survey studies to consider how public understandings of public and private companies map into urgent debates over the role of the corporation in American society. Does a social-media company, for example, owe it to its users to follow the free-speech principles embodied in the First Amendment? May corporate managers pursue environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) policies that could reduce short-term or long-term profits? How should companies respond to political pushback against their approaches to free expression or ESG?

The studies’ results are consistent with understandings that both public and private companies have greater public …

State Securities Enforcement, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

Each year, state securities regulators bring over twice the enforcement actions brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission, yet their work is largely missing from the literature. This Article provides an institutional account of state securities enforcement and identifies two key advantages—detection granularity and institutional decentralization—that states enjoy over their federal counterparts in policing localized frauds involving individual, often small-dollar, victims. Although states share enforcement jurisdiction with the SEC and DOJ, their enforcement activity reflects their institutional advantages and constraints and thus largely does not overlap with that of federal authorities. Instead, states serve as the nation’s residual securities enforcers, …

Follow-Up Enforcement, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

Firms sometimes break the law. When they do, a host of government agencies have power to bring enforcement actions against them, which serve to punish past wrongs, compensate victims, disgorge unlawful gains, deter others, and prevent recidivism. Each of these purposes but one—preventing recidivism—is either met or not once the case reaches settlement. Whether recidivism will occur, however, remains uncertain at the time a case is settled. In light of that uncertainty, this Article takes a critical look at how enforcers currently address recidivism prevention—what it dubs the “clawback” approach—under which defendant firms receive penalty credit today in exchange for …

Securities Disclosure As Soundbite: The Case Of Ceo Pay Ratios, Steven A. Bank, George S. Georgiev

Faculty Articles

This Article analyzes the history, design, and effectiveness of the highly controversial CEO pay ratio disclosure rule, which went into effect in 2018. Based on a regulatory mandate contained in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the rule requires public companies to disclose the ratio between CEO pay and median worker pay as part of their annual filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The seven-year rulemaking process was politically contentious and generated a level of public engagement that was virtually unprecedented in the long history of the SEC disclosure regime. The SEC sought to minimize compliance costs by providing …

Shareholders United?, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

Securities regulation has a way of crossing into other lanes. What public companies do is substantive regulation. How they govern themselves while doing it-or more importantly, how they disclose it-is securities regulation. So it is no surprise that the perennial concern over regulating money in politics should also become a question of federal securities regulation. The Shareholders United Act (the "Act")-passed by the House of Representatives as part of House Bill 1, an early, major piece of legislation in the 116th Congress-does just that. The Act would require that before engaging in political spending, public companies poll shareholders on how …

Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach To Antitrust, Thomas Arthur

Faculty Articles

This Article will demonstrate the superiority of the statutory approach for producing more stable and consistent antitrust law. Part I details the development of the constitutional approach to antitrust, demonstrating how the rise of the pragmatic and instrumentalist view of law led to the displacement of the original statutory approach to antitrust. Part II illustrates that the constitutional approach fundamentally cannot produce workable antitrust law. It summarizes both the doctrinal disarray that continues to plague each major area of antitrust law and the irreconcilable policy prescriptions of the contending antitrust "schools." Part III presents an alternative, statutory approach to antitrust …